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Abstract 
 
Over the past four years, natural resource exploration and development have rapidly 
expanded across northern Kenya and, as a result, the region is in the midst of a frontier-
making project that may have seemed unimaginable a few years ago. In this dissertation, I 
use the concept of frontier as an analytical framework to examine processes that are 
transforming society, the economy, and landscape in northern Kenya. This dissertation 
contributes to scholarship on resource frontiers by analysing the specific governmental 
technologies used by both powerful and less powerful actors to produce, negotiate and 
contest the rules that govern landscapes and people in frontiers. 
 
In Article #1, I examine the use of novel technologies of governance in frontier spaces. I 
show how transnational corporations use voluntary standards — designed to regulate their 
social and environmental conduct — to legitimize and consolidate control over land and 
resources. In constructing my argument, I engage with two examples from Kenya’s northern 
resource frontier. I trace the specific technologies used by two corporations to secure access 
to land for the purpose of resource development, focusing specifically on their use of 
voluntary standards. I frame my analysis using Hall et al.’s (2011) ‘powers of exclusion,’ 
arguing that voluntary standards serve as one legitimising discourse that corporations can 
deploy to justify excluding other land users. 
 
In Article #2, I shift my focus to how frontiers are governed ‘from below’. This article 
focuses on the spectrum of different, sometimes competing, reactions to mega-infrastructure 
development in northern Kenya among rural land users. The central aim of this article is to 
examine how rural groups draw upon different forms of expertise — ranging from ecological 
science to international legal frameworks — to frame and legitimize their reactions to 
frontier-making projects. The analysis in this article contributes to wider debates about rural 
agency in frontier spaces, by demonstrating how rural land users can strategically deploy 
different forms of expertise to negotiate the rules that govern access to land and resources.  
 
In Article #3, my co-author and I analyse changing social and political relationships in 
northern Kenya in light of oil exploration and development. This article demonstrates how 
some northern Kenyans are seeking protection of their rights from oil companies, in light of 
the Kenyan government’s hands-off approach to governing northwestern Kenya. We argue 
that new expectations around corporate social responsibility are drawing oil companies and 
rural communities into an uneasy citizen-state-like relationship, altering the experiences and 
practices of citizenship in the region. This article contributes to discussions about new 
political spaces and new forms of political subjectivity in frontier spaces. 
 
Combined, these articles use northern Kenya as a case study to illustrate how the rules that 
govern access to land in resource frontiers are shaped through experiments in governance and 
innovative acts of citizenship. I frame my conclusions using recent literature on post-
frontiers. 
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 Introduction 
Frontier-making projects and experiments in governance and citizenship 
 
The arid and semi-arid lands (ASAL) of northern Kenya cover over 80% of the country but 
are inhabited by just over 10% of Kenya’s population (GOK 2012) (see Map 1). Nomadic 
pastoralists — people who primarily depend on livestock and livestock products for their 
livelihoods and who move their livestock seasonally to graze on communally managed 
pastures (REGLAP 2012) — make up the majority of the population in this region. Nomadic 
pastoralism is a livelihood system that is well adapted to the arid conditions of northern 
Kenya. The complex set of practices and knowledges embedded within this livelihood 
system enable people to make use of land in arid regions, where the success of other land 
uses, such as conventional farming, is more limited. Moreover, nomadic pastoralism also has 
the potential to be a relatively productive livelihood. For example, in 2010, livestock raised 
by Kenya’s pastoralists was worth approximately US $800 million (FAO n.d.). 
 
However, pastoralist communities in northern Kenya have often been imagined as traditional 
and ‘backward’, and relations between people living in northern Kenya and other parts of the 
country have been shaped by difference. As the Government of Kenya’s updated policy on 
northern Kenya explains: ‘To many people, Northern Kenya is remote and insecure. On their 
part, many in Northern Kenya regard the rest of the country as distant and different’ (2016: 
3). These perceptions relate to the fact that the Kenyan government has historically described 
nomadic pastoralism as economically unproductive and pastoralist communities as an 
obstacle to modernity and progress. At the same time, northern Kenyans have historically 
resisted being governed.  
 
Given the region’s low economic and political importance to the Kenyan state, along with its 
resistance to being governed, the central government has historically opted to play a minimal 
role in the north (Eriksen and Lind 2009). As a result, northern Kenya has long suffered from 
a lack of infrastructure and basic services. Complex patterns of communal violence have 
afflicted the region, particularly along the country’s northernmost borders, where the central 
government has never projected much authority (Menkhaus 2008: 24). Ultimately, due to  
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Map 1. The dark orange on this map represents the region that is commonly referred to as 
‘Northern Kenya’ — a region that shares specific ecological, social, economic and political 
characteristics that make it distinct from southern Kenya. 
 
northern Kenya’s longstanding economic, political and social marginalisation, pastoralist 
communities in the in the region experience high levels of poverty and low levels of socio-
economic development.  
 
The political marginalisation of northern Kenyans dates back to the colonial era, when the 
British colonial government began to allocate public resources disproportionately to more 
‘productive’ regions of the country, such as the agricultural highlands in central and western 
Kenya (Eriksen and Lind 2009). After independence, the Government of Kenya carried 
forward parts of this colonial agenda (Schrepfer and Caterina 2014). Kenya’s often-quoted 
first development blueprint, from 1965, articulates the rationale for minimal state 
involvement in the north. It recommends that, ‘development money should be invested where 
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it will yield the largest increase in net output,’ with the goal of ‘favour[ing] the development 
of areas with abundant natural resources, good land and rainfall, transport and power 
facilities, and people receptive to and active in development’ (RoK 1965). Throughout the 
latter part of the 20th century, the Kenyan government viewed nomadic pastoralism as an 
intermediate stage in socio-economic development that ‘was expected to die a “natural 
death”’ in response to modernisation’ (Idris 2011). Though government intervention in the 
north remained limited, some policies and programmes were implemented with the intention 
of transitioning pastoralist communities towards sedentary livelihoods and wage labour 
(Eriksen and Lind 2009, Lokuruka 2006).  
 
In order to adapt to the harsh living conditions of northern Kenya, as well as cope with the 
relative absence of a central government, pastoralist systems have evolved to be adaptive and 
innovative (Cately et al. 2013). As Cately et al argue, by necessity, Kenya’s nomadic 
pastoralists are resourceful and entrepreneurial (Cately et al. 2013). However, over the past 
couple of decades, more prolonged and frequent droughts have increased levels of 
vulnerability amongst pastoralists (Letai and Lind 2013). Many communities have turned to 
humanitarian organisations to meet their basic needs. For example, following a particularly 
severe drought in 2011, it was estimated that over 4 million people in northern Kenya were 
dependent on food relief from humanitarian organisations for survival (Constantaras 2014, 
Bersgalio et al. 2015). Over time, humanitarian organisations have become the primary 
providers of food, water, health, physical security and education in some parts of the region 
(Bersaglio et al. 2015), effectively substituting the government’s role in service provision 
(Thomas 1992). As a result of the region’s rising dependence on humanitarian assistance, 
northern Kenya has often been imagined as a space of crisis and humanitarian intervention in 
Kenya’s national imaginary, represented by images of drought, famine, and violence. 
  
Yet, in 2012, new imaginaries of northern Kenya emerged, when Anglo-Irish petroleum 
company, Tullow Oil, announced that it had discovered oil in a remote, northwestern corner 
of the country. After the initial discovery, oil exploration and appraisal activities were 
accelerated across the region. These activities have since indicated recoverable resources of 
up to 1 billion barrels of oil. Kenya’s oil discovery has received ample coverage in both 
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national and international media, with excited headlines reading: ‘A new oil discovery in 
Kenya is ‘very encouraging indeed’ for its export ambitions’ (Kuo 2016a); ‘Tullow eyes 
more oil still’ (Chai 2016); and ‘Kenya may have a lot more oil than it previously thought’ 
(Kuo 2016b). The oil discovery has repositioned northern Kenya from a colonial backwater 
to a resource frontier. This new image of northern Kenya was aptly summed up by an elder 
from a small village neighbouring an oil exploration site, when he told me: ‘[We were] 
forgotten in Kenya, but now that there is oil everywhere in our soil they are remembering us’ 
(interview with community representative in Loima, Turkana, November 2014). 
 
As Tsing writes, the speed of change in frontier spaces in the midst of boom and bust cycles 
‘takes one’s breath away’ (2005: 56). Northern Kenya is in the midst of being transformed 
from an imagined space of crisis and humanitarian intervention to a site of growing interest 
for transnational investors. Aided by transnational capital and international financial 
institutions, exploration and appraisal activities have rapidly expanded across the north over 
the past four years. In 2016, the Government of Kenya responded by opening more land for 
investment, licensing seventeen additional oil blocks for exploration. Other types of large-
scale land deals — previously uncommon in the region — are also taking place. For 
example, the Kenyan government is working in partnership with private investors to 
construct a highway, a railway, and pipeline from the coast of northern Kenya to South 
Sudan — a project that will transform large tracts of grazing land to infrastructure. Elites and 
political leaders are also rushing to acquire land in the north, hoping to capitalize on both 
rising land prices and new entrepreneurial opportunities created by the oil discovery. 
Consequently, reports of land grabs are running parallel to news headlines about the promise 
of oil for Kenya’s national economy. In one town near an oil discovery, media reports claim 
that 95 percent of public land has been ‘grabbed’ since 2012 (Citizen Reporter 2016). Such 
reports reflect the new scramble for land and natural resources in northern Kenya. 
 
Northern Kenya is in the midst of a frontier-making project that would have likely seemed 
unimaginable just a few short years ago, as new resource discoveries have ‘reconfigured the 
conditions of possibility’ (Lund 2016). Although the future of this frontier may appear 
uncertain and unstable — given insecurity in the region and the instability of commodity 
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prices — this frontier-in-the-making is already altering the social, political, economic and 
ecological terrain on which it is unfolding. The massive new infrastructure projects under 
construction across the region will permanently alter the political economy and ecology of 
northern Kenya. At the same time, new processes for enclosing natural resources have been 
undertaken, including both legal reforms and the physical fencing off of land and resources 
that were previously used by communities. These processes of enclosure may alter the ability 
of pastoralists to access and control land and resources for their livelihoods, both today and 
in the future. For example, new fences will interfere with the mobility of pastoralists, who 
must move their livestock to distant sources of pasture and water during periods of scarcity in 
order to survive. Because Kenya’s resource frontier presents new threats to pastoralist 
communities, natural resource development has become a source of contention between 
pastoralists, civil society organisations, local and national government authorities and 
resource companies. In short, Kenya’s frontier-making project is = contributing to a 
negotiation and reworking of power relations across the region. 
 
The unforeseen expansion of capitalist interests in Kenya’s north is, in and of itself, a key 
characteristic of frontier spaces. Northern Kenya joins other regions of the world, like the 
Indonesia-Malaysia borderlands, the Brazilian Amazon and Myanmar’s Upland Areas, where 
markedly similar and unexpected processes of capitalist expansion have rapidly reshaped 
economies, societies and landscapes. These processes are discussed in greater detail in the 
following sections, but it is worth noting at this point that I understand frontiers as regions 
that are remote and marginalised from political centres, which unexpectedly come to hold 
strategic significance or economic potential for exploitation (Geiger 2009: 28, also see 
Hvalkof 2008: 219). In this dissertation, I use the concept of frontier as an analytical 
framework to capture the processes that are transforming the economy, society and landscape 
in northern Kenya. These processes include the freeing of land for investment, followed by 
the (re-)possession of land for the purpose of natural resource development. I contribute to 
literature on frontier spaces by examining the specific practices, strategies, and discourses 
used by both powerful and less powerful actors to produce, negotiate and contest frontiers. 
Ultimately, I aim show how frontier spaces are shaped by experiments in governance and 
innovative acts of citizenship, using Kenya’s frontier-making project as a case study. 
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To conduct this research, I spent two years (from 2014 to 2016) studying Kenya’s emerging 
resource frontier. Like other recent work on frontiers, my fieldwork was multi-sited and 
multi-scalar and I relied on multiple methods (Campbell 2015, Geiger 2009, Larsen 2015, 
Tsing 2009). I spent a total of three months in different counties across northern Kenya, 
including Turkana, Isiolo, and Laikipia, in order to speak to diverse actors and to view 
different sites and processes implicated in Kenya’s frontier-making project. I also spent five 
months based in the capital of Kenya, Nairobi (intersected by trips to ‘the North), where I 
spoke to other actors involved in producing, negotiating and contesting Kenya’s frontier, 
including civil society actors, extractive company representatives and government officials. 
Interviewing was my primary method of data collection, but my methods also included 
analysing documents, facilitating focus group discussions and workshops, observing civil 
society events and participating in professional development courses. My approach to 
conducting this research is outlined in much further detail later in this introductory chapter. 
 
This dissertation is comprised of an introduction, three articles and a conclusion. In the 
remainder of the introduction, I elaborate on the key concepts that are used to frame my 
dissertation: frontiers, governance and citizenship. I begin by outlining key characteristics of 
frontiers. Next, I introduce my working definitions for governance and citizenship, and 
examine each of these concepts in relation to frontiers. I also elaborate on my own 
contributions to these bodies of scholarship. In the section that follows, I reflect on my 
methodology and my own position in relation to my research. The final section of this 
introduction briefly outlines the structure of the rest of the dissertation.  
The imaginative cartography of resource frontiers 
Although the frontier remains a somewhat contested concept, an established body of 
literature in anthropology, political ecology, political economy and human geography has 
engaged in important definitional and conceptual discussions about the characteristics that 
comprise frontier spaces (Tsing 2005; Li 1999; Massey 1999; Geiger 2008; Barney 2009). 
The concept originates from historical studies (Turner 1921), but has come to be used in 
social sciences more broadly over time to explain spaces at the edge of the state where 
  7 
processes of commodification are unfolding (Geiger 2008, Fold and Hirsch 2009, Kelly and 
Peluso 2015). Frontiers have been defined as ‘areas remote from political centres which hold 
strategic significance or economic potential for human exploitation, and are contested by 
social formations of unequal power’ (Geiger 2009: 28, also see Hvalkof 2008: 219). The 
potential of frontier spaces is often related to opportunities for industrial agriculture, mineral 
and hydrocarbon extraction, or forestry and conservation schemes; yet recent scholarship has 
also shown how frontiers can be ‘opened up’ for a variety of other purposes, such as 
infrastructure development, residential development or tourist use (for example, see 
Brockington et al. 2008, Corson 2011, Igoe and Brockington 2007).  
 
Frontiers have unique spatial and institutional dynamics. They tend to exist in regions that 
are distant from geographical centres of power (Hall 2013a) or in ‘out-of-the-way-places’ 
(Tsing 1993). As Geiger writes, frontiers are found at the ‘fuzzy edges’ or at the ‘seams’ of 
the state (2009: 195), such as in literal borderlands or coastal regions (Hall 2013a; Eilenberg 
2012), or in spaces perceived to be distant from the state as a result of ‘terrain like hills, 
mountains, swamps, deserts, forests and tundra where states find it difficult to maintain a 
presence, monitor behaviour and project power’ (Hall 2013a: 53; also see Scott 1998). As a 
result of their unique geography, frontiers are often ‘associated by people who live far from 
them (and by some who live within them) with a wide range of assumed characteristics: 
tradition, backwardness, underdevelopment, difference, inefficient and environmentally 
destructive resource use, indigeneity, rebelliousness, danger’ (Hall 2013a: 54). As Walker 
notes, such imaginaries ‘have more to do with the anxieties (and fantasies) of the “centre” 
than with the social and cultural realities of the “periphery”’ (1999: 9).  
 
Institutionally, frontiers tend to exist in regions where the state falls short of exercising 
effective authority and governance. This point relates to an ongoing and unsettled debate in 
frontier scholarship: Do governments “[fail] to subject frontiers to effective administrative 
control…because they lack the means thereto, or because they lack in political will?’ (Geiger 
2009: 35). Some suggest that the state ‘loosely’ administers frontiers by choice (Geiger 2008: 
78), while others claim that ineffective governance in frontiers is a result of weak ‘state 
machinery’ (Li 2005: 18). My work shows that there is no simply way to resolve this debate. 
  8 
Frontiers are spaces where “authorities, sovereignties, and hegemonies of the recent past 
have been or are currently being challenged by new enclosures, territorialisations and 
property regimes’ (Peluso and Lund 2011: 669). In such spaces, people compete for power 
and authority, which makes it difficult for the state to establish effective institutions, 
administering justice, collecting taxes and ensuring security in frontiers (Scott 1998). At the 
same time, the state may elect to remain relatively absent in these spaces, as non-state actors, 
such as humanitarian organisations, local elites and militia, often exercise more effective 
authority over these spaces to begin with. As Hall writes, the ability to govern frontiers is 
spread across both state and non-state actors, resulting in an internally fragmented approach 
to governance (2013: 52). In this sense, I agree with Hall (2013), who concludes the state can 
rarely convincingly claim to be the sole source of law and government in frontiers spaces, 
and must resign to sharing its authority with other actors.  
 
Another important point about frontiers is that they are usually unstable or insecure spaces, 
partly because frontier commodities and economies are unpredictable. Tsing (2003) argues 
that frontiers are projects that are perpetually in the making — notoriously unstable and 
continually changing in response to the pressure of global markets. Geiger reiterates that 
frontiers ‘…recede and advance in relation to changing demands for frontier commodities on 
regional and world markets’ (2008: 93). Investors are adept at coping with economic risk, 
and even associate significant risk with greater opportunity for significant profit; however, 
the unique characteristics of frontiers often make investing in these spaces especially risky. 
As West argues, local articulations with capital are often more creative, diverse, and erratic 
than anticipated (West 2006) and, for this reason, investors find it difficult to achieve what 
they set-out to achieve upon entering frontier spaces. Moreover, in recent years, the 
unprecedented price volatility of commodities globally has had decisive implications for 
investment in new and emerging frontiers. The inability for investors to plan and predict as a 
result of more volatile boom and bust cycles has impacted many frontier-making projects. 
For example, offshore deepwater oil and gas projects and onshore extractive projects that 
require new technologies or significant infrastructure tend to face longer delays when 
seeking financing. This price volatility has, without a doubt, stalled certain projects in 
Kenya’s resource frontier. 
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Finally, recent scholarship on frontiers has emphasized the importance of conceptualising 
frontiers as both real and imagined spaces. Frontiers share certain material characteristics, 
such as existing on the periphery of the state. However, these spaces are also created through 
certain narratives and by invoking certain imaginaries. For example, in order to attract 
investors, frontier spaces must be described as full of potential for profit yet unpopulated, 
unproductive and empty, because empty land is easier and quicker to make profitable than 
land that already has owners (Of course, in reality, frontiers are never as empty as they are 
imagined to be). Thus, I understand frontiers as material spaces that are reified by 
imaginaries of ‘opportunistic wilderness and infinite unexploited resources’ (Eilenberg 2014: 
5, also see Tsing 2005 and Büscher 2013). As stated previously, I define frontiers as spaces 
that are remote and marginalised from political centres, which unexpectedly come to hold 
strategic significance or economic potential for exploitation (Geiger 2009: 28, also see 
Hvalkof 2008: 219). The set of unique spatial and institutional dynamics outlined above 
further informs my conceptualization of frontiers.  
Governing resource frontiers 
Transforming the frontier from a remote, imagined wasteland to a site of capitalist expansion 
and accumulation requires specific governmental techniques — what Rose (1999) would 
refer to as ‘technologies of government’. In other words, the process of changing a frontier 
from what it is (or what it is perceived to be) to what it has the potential to be necessitates 
reorganising and reinventing how landscapes are ordered and people behave (Büscher 2013). 
In this dissertation, I consider how both state and non-state actors use diverse and innovative 
technologies of government to produce and govern Kenya’s resource frontier. Key questions 
running through this dissertation are: Who is involved in imagining, producing, and 
negotiating frontier spaces (Massey 1999; Barney 2009)? What (global) technologies of 
government are used to challenge previous mechanisms of land control and consolidate new 
forms of authority and control in such spaces (Peluso and Lund 2011)? And, what are the 
consequences of such transformations for the rights and livelihoods of people living in 
frontier spaces? I contribute to, and build upon, other recent work on frontiers, by focusing 
explicitly on how processes of globalisation and global technologies of governance are 
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enrolled in frontier-making projects. I argue that, as a result of globalisation, the way in 
which frontiers are governed is evolving. New actors are using global technologies that 
operate beyond the state to produce and govern frontier spaces, as well as to legitimise their 
control over land and resources.  
 
Before reviewing relevant literature on the governance in frontier spaces, as well as 
elaborating on my own contribution to this literature, it is necessary to clarify what I mean by 
governance. In writing about the governance of resource frontiers, I refer to both the 
authorities and technologies involved in frontier making-projects. I recognize the governing 
role of diverse agents, including those both within and beyond the state. Drawing on 
governmentality literature, I suggest that these actors undertake different activities, or 
employ various ‘technologies of government’ (Rose 1999, also see Isin 2000), in order to 
organize frontier landscapes and shape the conduct of people. These technologies of 
government include ‘forms of practical knowledge, with modes of perception, practices of 
calculation, vocabularies, types of authority, forms of judgment, inscription techniques and 
so forth’ — all of which are used to produce certain outcomes in relation to the conduct of 
the governed (Rose 1999: 52). For example, states may implement laws that forbid access to 
land and resources by previous land users or employ discourse that presents certain tracts of 
land as unoccupied and vacant in order to attract private investors (for example, see Li 2014, 
2005, Kelly and Peluso 2005, Tsing 1993). I am also interested in how various actors deploy 
new technologies that work beyond the nation-state to produce frontiers and govern conduct 
within frontiers. These new technologies are what Ilcan and Phillips (2003) refer to as ‘global 
technologies of government’. Li (2014), for example, identifies statistical picturing of 
‘underutilized’ farmland in the global South as a technique used by the World Bank to attract 
investors to frontiers. 
 
Early work on frontiers tended to describe these spaces as produced and managed through 
state-led processes.1 This scholarship argued that states employ rhetoric of development, 
progress, and modernisation in order to present frontier land and resources as 
                                                
1 It is worth noting that much of this literature has focused on contexts where the state has conventionally been 
perceived to be (relatively) strong and centralized, such as the resource frontiers of Southeast Asia. 
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‘underexploited’ and awaiting investment (Scott 1998, Tsing 2003, Tsing 2005). Scholars 
such as Scott (1998) and Li (2005) wrote about the strategies and techniques used by states to 
create ‘empty’ space for capitalist expansion. For example, states encouraged people to 
replace customary labour and production processes with new forms of labour and production 
that were less land-intensive and that could be better drawn into national economies (Scott 
1998). States also enacted legislation to replace existing forms of land tenure such as 
communally owned pastures and forests, with new forms of tenure through the establishment 
of freehold property (Scott 1998, Tsing 2003, Tsing 2005). People, lands, and resources were 
made ‘legible’ or ‘rentable’ for the state by simultaneously moving people into a more 
legible economy of wage labour or sedentary agriculture and transforming previous land 
controls through land reform (Scott 1998: 4). These technologies were used by states to 
conduct people in a manner that created space for frontier expansion. As Prudham and 
Coleman write: ‘The alienation or dissociation of people and things facilitates 
commodification’ (2011: 18). 
 
Recent ‘land rush’ literature, however, has indirectly challenged the state-centric focus of 
this earlier work on frontiers. During the late 1990s and early 2000s, there was an 
unprecedented scramble for land and resources globally (Borras et al. 2011, Deininger et al. 
2011, de Schutter 2011). Land was ‘grabbed’ for a wide range of purposes, such as resource 
extraction, commercial agriculture, bio-fuel production, ranching, and conservation 
(Zoomers 2010). Initial land rush literature attributed the emergence of new and deepening 
frontiers of land control to neoliberal reforms that were imposed on the global South by 
international development donors and financial institutions during the 1990s. Scholars such 
as Benjaminsen et al. (2008) and Magdoff and Tokar (2009) argued that these reforms 
created fragile, disorganized, and loosely governed states, paving the way for land grabbing 
by transnational corporations in the following decade. When commodity prices rose in the 
early 2000s, these corporations used global capital and new technologies, such as the 
commodification of land through international investment law, to bring land and resources in 
frontier spaces under their control (Peluso and Lund 2011, Cotula 2013, Ouma 2014). 
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More recently, though, literature on land rush has attempted to complicate these claims. 
Scholars such as Wolford et al. (2013) and Pederson and Burr (2016) challenge the notion 
that land is assembled for investment by either state-led process or global actors. They call 
for either/or claims to be replaced with more nuanced analyses of the ways in which power 
and authority operate through multiple actors (who are often interlinked) and across multiple 
scales (which are often difficult to discern between) in order to govern land and resources 
(Wolford et al. 2013). These scholars also suggest that future work should acknowledge the 
role that diverse actors and processes play in producing and governing frontier spaces, 
including customary, religious, state and nongovernmental actors, along with competing 
normative orders (Wolford et al. 2013). Moreover, they call for empirical analyses that 
demonstrate the importance of contextual factors, including specific historical processes, 
unique local-level institutions and various forms of local expertise, in producing diverse 
approaches to frontier governance (Pederson and Burr 2016). 
 
The three articles in this dissertation respond to the call for a better understanding of the 
‘specific tactics and instruments used by powerful and less powerful actors to’ create new 
frontiers (Peluso and Lund 2011), by offering empirical insights about the various actors and 
specific processes involved in producing and governing Kenya’s resource frontier. Through 
my research, I show how different actors are involved in determining the norms and rules 
that shape land use and access in Kenya’s frontier, including representatives of the state, 
local customary authorities, local and global civil society actors, and transnational 
corporations. For example, in Article #1, I examine how transnational corporations use 
transnational regulation as a global technology of government to consolidate control over 
land and resources in northern Kenya. In Article #2, I consider political reactions from rural 
land users in response to Kenya’s frontier-making project. I show how local civil society 
actors negotiate and contest the terms of large-scale land deals. Together, my articles serve to 
illustrate that Kenya’s resource frontier is not being produced and governed through either 
state-led or top-down processes. Rather, this frontier is a globalized space, produced through 
contestations and negotiations between diverse actors, institutions, and normative orders 
operating at and across multiple scales.  
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In this sense, my dissertation suggests that contestation and negotiation are fundamental 
features of frontier governance. As various actors compete to govern access to, and control 
over, land and resources, their interests often work in tension with one another and their 
authority overlaps, producing a ‘spatially ‘patchworked’ frontier landscape’ that is governed 
by different and competing normative orders and modes of regulation (Barney 2009: 152). 
Each article illustrates how different actors, backed by different forms of transnational capital 
and interests, attempt to enforce competing and contradictory claims to land and resources in 
northern Kenya. For example, Article #2 illustrates how local civil society organisations are 
financially backed by global actors as they advocate to protect their collective tenure of land, 
while at the same time, Article #1 shows how oil companies work directly with the state to 
influence land legislation in a way that undermines collective tenure rights. Sikor and Lund’s 
(2009) claim that struggles over land are as much about the constitution of authority as they 
are about the land itself. In line with this argument, my articles reveal the diverse actors that 
are involved in shaping frontier spaces — each competing to govern land and resources and 
to exercise authority over Kenya’s new resource frontier.  
 
In addition to examining who governs Kenya’s resource frontier, my three articles also 
illustrate how this frontier has been produced and governed. Like other recent literature on 
land rush in frontier spaces, I examine the specific governmental strategies used to assemble 
land as a resource for investment (for example, see Li 2015, Kelly and Peluso 2015, 
Einzenberger 2016, Goldstein 2016, Silva-Castañeda 2016, Wolford 2015). These scholars 
have shownhow actors tell narratives, draw maps, survey land, conduct censuses, and 
improve infrastructure in order to render land accessible and investible. These technologies 
are used to adjudicate and create metrics between more and less ‘efficient’ uses of land and 
resources, as well as to inscribe boundaries that delineate and legitimate how land and 
resources should be allocated and to whom (Li 2015, Prudham and Coleman 2011). I provide 
further evidence of how these technologies at work in northern Kenya. For example, in 
Article #2, I illustrate how Kenya’s national development plan, ‘Vision 2030’, provides a 
blueprint for the country’s future, which prioritises infrastructure development and large-
scale land investments while reducing the rangelands available for pastoral grazing. This 
development plan rationalises, legitimises, and may even legalise the appropriation of land 
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from existing land users in order to create space for private investment, which is deemed to 
be a more productive land use than current land uses. 
 
More importantly though, my articles identify and examine the technologies that work 
beyond the state to produce and govern resource frontiers. Two of my articles examine how 
‘global technologies of government’ (Ilcan and Philips 2003) are used to reorder frontier 
landscapes and govern conduct within these spaces. In Article #1, I show how transnational 
companies hire international consultants to categorize who is Indigenous and who is not — 
based on definitions outlined in international human rights law — in order to legitimise 
dispossessing certain land users from land that they and the state wish to develop. In this 
case, expert knowledge is used to classify which populations have a right to land versus those 
that can be rightfully displaced. In Article #2, I illustrate how conservation organisations use 
biodiversity science to contest natural resource extraction and infrastructure development, 
attempting to consolidate their own control over land and resources in northern Kenya. Both 
examples provide evidence of how ‘expert professionals’ and certain types of global 
expertise are enrolled in frontier-making projects (for more on expert professionals and 
expert knowledge in global development, see: Brink 1994, Li 1999a, Scott 1998, Ilcan and 
Phillips 2003, Goldman 2005). This contribution of my dissertation responds to recent calls 
for empirical investigations of the specific tactics and instruments used by both powerful and 
less powerful actors to produce and govern frontier spaces (Peluso and Lund 2011).  
Living in a resource frontier  
Transforming the frontier from an imagined backwater to an industrialized site of capital 
accumulation also has important implications for how citizenship is experienced and 
practiced. As frontiers are transformed from spaces that are distant and disconnected from the 
political centre to spaces that receive and facilitate global flows in trade and investment, the 
‘seams’ between sovereignty, territory and citizenship are reworked (Ong 2005). In frontiers, 
new actors challenge authorities of the recent past, using new techniques and strategies to 
possess, expropriate, and extinguish previous land controls (Peluso and Lund 2011). My 
dissertation demonstrates that such processes have the potential to create new political 
subjectivities, while simultaneously denying or eroding existing political identities. With this 
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in mind, a second set of questions running through this dissertation includes: How are 
different types of subjects created through frontier-making projects? What happens when 
previously existing and new political subjectivities come into contact with each other? More 
generally, is anything unconventional about the practice and experience of citizenship in 
frontier spaces? Similar questions have been asked of other types of novel political within the 
critical citizenship studies literature. For example, critical citizenship studies literature has 
pointed towards refugee camps (Rygiel 2012, Sigona 2015), special economic zones (Ong 
2006, Park 2005), mega-cities (Ong 2007) and deportation centres (Isin and Rygiel 2007) as 
examples of emergent political spaces where the practice and experience of citizenship 
becomes disarticulated from the terrains of the state. As I suggest in this section, as well as 
argue in the article that follow, frontiers can be conceputalised as a novel political space: 
Like refugee camps and special economic zones, for example, frontiers are spaces where 
mutations in citizenship and new forms of political mobilisation abound.  
 
Before reviewing relevant literature, I clarify what I mean by citizenship. I define citizenship 
by drawing on critical citizenship studies scholarship, taking it to mean ‘the ‘institution’ 
mediating rights between the subjects of politics and the polity to which these subjects 
belong’ (Isin and Nyers 2014: 1).2 In this context, ‘institution’ refers to laws, practices, 
customs, or norms. Importantly, my understanding of citizenship does not refer exclusively 
to national citizenship: The nation-state is just one of several polities to which a subject may 
belong. I am interested in the various institutions through which people claim their rights, 
including customary/local governance structures, global social movements, religious 
communities, and cities, to name but a few examples. Also, like Isin (2002), Isin and Nyers 
(2014) and Latta (2013), I see citizenship as a relatively fluid construct that may change over 
the course time. As Latta argues, citizenship is ‘…a site of ongoing political becoming, 
through the unfolding of new political subjects and identities in dialectical tension with 
shifting contours and definitions of the collective’ (2013: 568). I recognize that a person may 
occupy multiple political spaces and draw on multiple identities simultaneously. As Isin and 
Nyers explain ‘…the citizen of a polity almost never belongs only to that polity but to several 
                                                
2 I also find Bellamy’s definition useful. He defines citizenship as ‘a particular set of political practices 
involving specific public rights and duties with respect to a given political community’ (Bellamy 2008: 3). 
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nested, if not overlapping and conflicting, series of polities ranging from the city, region, the 
state, and the international’ (2014: 2). These are important qualifications to make in relation 
to frontiers, where a person may act as a subject of a traditional authority in one context, but 
as a subject of the nation state in another (Mamdani 1996, Robins et al. 2008).  
 
Scholars such as Lund (2011), Jacob and Le Meur (2010, 2012), and Cleaver et al. (2013) 
have written about the relationship between land and citizenship in other parts of sub-
Saharan Africa. Jacob and Le Meur (2010, 2012) observe that claims to local identity and 
belonging, which they describe as ‘local citizenship’, afford people access to land and 
resources in West Africa. They also reflect on how people exercise layered forms of 
belonging in order to negotiate access to land and resources (Jacob and Le Meur 2010, 2012, 
Cleaver et al. 2013). For example, Cleaver et al. (2013) have shown how pastoralists in East 
Africa appeal to hybrid authorities, namely, authorities that govern using formal and informal 
laws, practices, customs, or norms, to mediate their access to land, resources, and other 
benefits. This observation reinforces Lund’s claim that ‘while people have a national 
citizenship, which endows them with certain rights, it is not the only significant form of 
belonging in a political community and the only source of rights’ in many contexts across 
sub-Saharan Africa (2011: 10).  
 
My dissertation contributes to scholarship on land and citizenship in sub-Saharan Africa, as 
well as to critical citizenship studies scholarship more broadly, by examining the (re-)making 
of political subjectivities in Kenya’s resource frontier. Political subjectivities in remote 
frontiers tend to be layered and complex. As frontiers occupy the ‘edges’ of the state, people 
who live within them often exist partially outside the state and are not fully incorporated as 
state subjects (Scott 1998). Moreover, frontiers are also often produced in spaces where 
populations are difficult to govern or resist governance altogether — such as spaces inhabited 
by nomadic pastoralists, swidden farmers or subsistence fishers (see also Scott 1998 and Hall 
2013). In such spaces, more flexible and dynamic citizenship formations emerge. For 
example, Kenya’s Constitution guarantees movement across borders to many of the 
pastoralist groups that reside in the north — with no legal documents required — in order to 
facilitate and protect their mobility as trans-border communities. This is one example of how 
  17 
unique citizenship formations in frontiers enables people to occupy multiple political spaces 
and draw on multiple identities simultaneously. In short, the types of spaces where frontiers 
tend to emerge are often characterized by complex landscapes of political subjectivities. 
 
Thus, when the state moves into frontier spaces to extend its territorial control over land and 
resources, the political landscape becomes even more complex. The state may desire to 
produce state subjects out of peoples that it has historically governed more loosely or 
flexibly. However, creating more governable subjects is difficult work. Scott (1998), Tsing 
(2005), Li (2014), and Eizenberger (2016) examine the various interventions and techniques 
used by the state — such as drawing maps, conducting censuses and issuing identity cards — 
to make its territory ‘legible’ and to form subjects that are governable. Governments may 
extend public services or promise infrastructure provision in order to draw subjects into the 
state. This type of intervention aims to strengthen the social contract between the state and 
citizens while at the same time working to produce ‘ideal citizens’ who know how to enact 
their rights and responsibilities in relation to state laws, norms and economic orders. For 
example, transport infrastructure enables people to contribute to the national economy, 
schools serve to teach people cultural norms and national languages, and health facilities can 
be used to teach about family planning.  
 
I contribute to critical citizenship studies literature through my dissertation. In Article #2, I 
examine the construction of a mega-infrastructure project across northern Kenya. I show how 
the Kenyan government is using this project to attract investors to northern Kenya, by 
providing them with access to infrastructure to export their goods. At the same time, I argue 
that this project is meant to draw pastoralist communities into the folds of the state, and to 
teach them the ‘attitudes, dispositions and values’ of the state (Isin and Nyers 2014: 5). 
Through mega-infrastructure development, the government aims to create new livelihood 
opportunities for pastoralists, along with improved access to markets and economic 
integration. Simultaneously, new restrictions will be placed on livestock mobility because of 
this infrastructure development. This scheme is ultimately being used to encourage nomadic 
pastoralists to settle in fixed places and to become part of the modern economy. This 
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illustrates how producing and governing frontier spaces is intimately linked to constituting 
particular kinds of state subjects. 
 
In addition to producing new state subjects, my analysis also reveals how frontiers produce 
new kinds of political subjects and subjectivities altogether. In Article #3, I show how 
pastoralists in northern Kenya have turned to oil companies to mediate their rights claims, 
because the state has remained relatively absent around sites of oil development, allowing oil 
companies to have some level of administrative control over the region. In recognition of the 
authority of oil companies, communities are demanding that companies provide certain 
social services and corporations are complying with these demands in return for a ‘social 
license to operate’. I argue that this is drawing communities and oil companies in Kenya’s 
resource frontier into an uneasy citizen-state-like relationship. This reflects what Latta (2013) 
describes as competing scales and practices of citizenship — where rural people make use of 
unexpected and alternative political spaces both within and beyond the state in order to lay 
claim to their rights. 
 
As a further example of how frontiers produce new forms of subjectivity, in Article #2 I 
examine how pastoralist communities are attempting to counter state and corporate claims to 
their grazing lands by having their rights as Indigenous peoples recognized at the global 
level. These groups are reaching above and beyond the state to have their rights mediated by 
intergovernmental actors, such as the United Nations and International Work Group for 
Indigenous Affairs. In directing their rights claims towards this type of global actor, 
pastoralist communities are exercising a concrete ‘act of citizenship’ (see Isin and Nielsen 
2008) and attempting to constitute themselves as citizens of a global Indigenous polity. Both 
of these examples illustrate how non-state actors and jurisdictions can constitute important 
sources of rights and status for people (Maas 2013: 2), as well as the diverse ways though 
which new subjectivities are created through frontier-making projects. This, I argue, is an 
important contribution of my dissertation given that frontiers are unique political spaces that 
have received little attention from citizenship studies scholars to-date.  
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Summary of contribution to existing literature 
Tsing suggests that frontiers are ‘zones of not yet — not yet mapped, not yet regulated’ 
(Tsing 2005: 28), while Little (2001) argues that frontiers are messy because they lack 
clearly-defined rules of interaction. I suggest that for this very reason, frontiers are also zones 
of experimentation and innovation with governance and citizenship. My articles show how 
actors with varying degrees of power use both old and new technologies of government to 
produce, negotiate and contest the rules that govern frontier landscapes and populations. My 
articles also reveal how this approach to governing creates a complex political landscape 
with implications for how citizenship is experienced and practiced. Ultimately, my 
dissertation depicts contemporary frontiers as spaces where the ‘seams’ between sovereignty, 
territory and citizenship are removed or remade (Ong 2005), and then reflects on the new 
forms of governance and citizenship that emerge as a result.   
 
My dissertation also contributes a new case study to existing scholarship on resource 
frontiers. By purposefully investigating a frontier in East Africa, I expand the geographic 
scope of recent scholarly work on frontiers, which has tended to focus on frontier spaces in 
Southeast Asia (for example, see: Einzenberger 2016, Tsing 2008, Barney 2009 and Geiger 
2008) and Amazonia (for example, see: Larsen 2015, Campbell 2015 and Geiger 2008). 
Although my analysis is rooted in a specific locale, it has broader theoretical significance in 
sub-Saharan Africa, if not beyond, given that similar actors and processes tend to assemble in 
contemporary frontiers globally. 
A note on methodology and positionality 
Before proceeding to outline the structure of my dissertation, I offer a bit more detail about 
my research design and my own position in relation to my research. Interwoven in this 
section are details about the challenges and limitations that I faced while conducting the 
research, because these influenced my methodological choices and the focus of my overall 
project. Supporting information about my research design, methods, and activities can be 
found in the Appendices, which are included at the end of the dissertation. I also provide 
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further detail about the specific methods, used to collect data at the beginning of each 
individual article, as well as in the cover page that precedes each article. 
 
Case study selection 
As stated previously, I use northern Kenya as a case study to provide an in-depth 
examination of governance and citizenship in an emerging resource frontier. In the interest of 
being authentic and transparent, it is important to acknowledge that I choose this case study 
as a result of a ‘false’ or ‘failed’ start that ultimately reshaped my entire project (Burawoy 
1991; England 1994). I began this project in 2012, with the intention of comparing the social 
and environmental practices and policies of Canadian extractive companies in Tanzania and 
Canada. For a number of reasons, this project proved to be unfeasible. For example, finding 
points of comparison between Canada’s and Tanzania’s resource sectors proved to be 
difficult, given the significant historical, social, economic, political and legal differences the 
two countries. One of the most significant challenges, though, was that the Tanzanian 
research authority did not approve my research permit.3 Though there is no way to be certain, 
the topic and nature of the research I was proposing may have been one reason that my 
permit was never processed. The role of Canadian companies in Tanzania’s resource sector 
has been highly politicized (and associated with violent social conflict) in recent years. With 
this situation in mind, I also see certain ethical and logistical issues around the research that I 
originally planned for Tanzania, which I may not have been easily resolved.  
 
In light of these challenges, I decided to rework my project. As I already had strong research 
connections in Kenya, I shifted my case study site north, with the intention of studying the 
social and environmental practices and policies of extractive companies in Kenya’s nascent 
resource sector. 4  This project evolved during my fieldwork, ultimately focusing on the 
multiplicity of actors and processes involved governing the social and environmental 
implications of resource development in Kenya. Hanson writes that social science 
researchers need to ‘…devise methods and methodologies that maximise the chance that we 
                                                
3 Although, I have since been told that I could have hired legal counsel to assist with this process. 
4 Canadian extractive companies (along with other Canadian actors) still feature prominently in my research; 
however, the focus on Canadian extractive companies alone was no longer feasible, given that the sector is so 
small and there are only a few major Canadian companies with activities in the country 
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will see things we were not expecting to see, that leave us open to surprise, that do not 
foreclose the unexpected’ (1997: 125). Although I did not design my ‘false’ start, I do 
believe that my unexpected shift to Kenya allowed me to conduct better research. The case of 
northern Kenya’s resource frontier has much to offer, both theoretically and empirically, as 
the following articles discuss. On a more personal level, this shift provided me the 
opportunity to journey through the research process in a country where I have a long personal 
history, as well as a deep-seated interest in the experiences of my research participants. 
Finally, looking to the future, this shift has also helped me solidify important research 
partnerships, to establish my longer-term research programme, and to begin to produce 
research that reflects the important struggles over land, resources, and belonging that are 
taking place in northern Kenya’s resource frontier. 
 
As a final clarification about my case, I should note that although I refer to ‘northern Kenya’ 
throughout this dissertation, I recognize the issues with describing such a vast and diverse 
region with the use of a single term. There are important differences across the north that 
significantly influence how people experience ongoing transformations in the region — 
including ecology, geography, existing access to infrastructure, livelihood opportunities and 
current development indicators. For example, the most northern parts of Kenya, such as 
Turkana County, are dominated by nomadic pastoralism, while people in the more southern 
parts of Kenya’s ASAL, such as Isiolo County, practice more mixed livelihoods, including 
rain-fed and irrigated agriculture, agro-pastoralism, bio-enterprise, and conservation or 
tourism-related activities. As a result, people in these different regions have different abilities 
to take advantage of the new opportunities that Kenya’s frontier-making project may present.  
 
However, there are certain characteristics that are distinctive across northern Kenya’s 
ASALs. These include the region’s aridity, extensive production of and reliance on livestock, 
and remoteness. As a result, academic literature commonly makes use of the concept of 
‘northern Kenya,’ and policies developed by the Government of Kenya also refer to the 
region as a whole. Following this line of reasoning, I also use the term ‘northern Kenya’ 
throughout my dissertation, recognising the specific and shared ecological, social, economic 
and political realities of the ASAL that distinguishes them from the rest of Kenya. At the 
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same time, I acknowledge that the lack of differentiation between counties in my analysis is a 
limitation of this research. My research design is multi-sited in order to capture similarities 
and differences in how this frontier-making project is being rolled out and experienced across 
the region.  
 
Methodology 
This dissertation is based primarily on empirical fieldwork conducted in Kenya, where I 
employed a mixed-methods approach. My methods involved conducting interviews and 
focus group discussions, visiting key field sites across northern Kenya, observing industry 
and civil society events, and analysing relevant documentation. In addition to these ‘formal’ 
methods, my understanding of Kenya’s resource frontier was informed by: prior fieldwork 
carried out in northern Kenya in January 2012; a related consultancy conducted for the 
Overseas Development Institute between 2014 and 2015 in northern Kenya; and my 
professional and non-professional relationships with people living, working or conducting 
research in the region.  
 
The data informing these papers were collected through 58 semi-structured, qualitative 
interviews with civil society/non-governmental organisation (NGO) representatives, 
community members, local and national government representatives, and industry actors. 
Most of these interviews were conducted across counties most implicated in Kenya’s 
frontier-making project to-date, Turkana, Isiolo and Laikipia, as well as in the capital of 
Kenya, Nairobi (refer to Map 1 on pg. 10). Additional interviews were conducted over phone 
or by Skype (see Appendix A for complete list of interviewees). Article #3 also draws on 
data collected through two focus group discussions and one ‘workshop’ with community 
members impacted by oil exploration in the Loima sub-county of Turkana. These interviews 
and focus group discussions were conducted during two periods of fieldwork in Kenya, the 
first lasted from October 2014 to April 2015 and the second in May 2016.  
 
In my analysis and writing, I prioritized data that I collected through interviews and focus 
group discussions in acknowledgement of my ‘reliance on the research subject to provide 
insight into the subtle nuances of meaning that structure and shape everyday lives’ (England 
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1994: 241). This methodological choice reflects a ‘research-as-supplicant’ approach, which 
is ‘…predicated upon an unequivocal acceptance that the knowledge of the person being 
researched (at least regarding the particular questions being asked) is greater than that of the 
researcher’ (England 1994: 241, also see McDowell 2010). At the same time, I recognize that 
data collected through my interviews and focus group discussions was conditioned by what 
interviewees were willing (or able) to disclose. As McDowell writes, ‘Rather than being a 
transparent, straightforward exchange of information, the interview is a complex and 
contested social encounter riven with power relations’ (2010: 161). Paying attention to the 
power differentials in my encounters with research participants, I pursued an open-ended, 
conversational style and largely let my interviewees direct the conversation. As a result, 
certain lines of questioning were answered in greater detail during some interviews than 
others.  
 
To address gaps in my data collection, I also collected data by visiting and observing 
important sites of resource development across northern Kenya. I visited various sites along 
the proposed infrastructure corridor/pipeline development, as well as oil exploration sites 
with former and current oil company employees. These employees were, or had previously 
been, contracted by an oil company to provide security logistics during oil exploration 
activities. At these oil explorations sites, people explained their day-to-day tasks — what 
they did, where they slept, what they ate — and they also described what happened while the 
companies were exploring the area. Watson and Till (2010) describe participant observation 
as ‘a practice of discovery’ that a researcher undertakes in order to become familiarized with 
an unfamiliar world. From my perspective, participant observation and site visits achieved 
exactly this — allowing me to visualize and more deeply understand the everyday tasks 
involved in producing resource frontiers. 
 
 
  24 
 
 
Image 1. The author visiting oil exploration sites with contracted security providers for an oil 
company exploring in the region (Photo Credit: Brock Bersaglio) 
 
I also gathered relevant insights by observing industry and civil society events. By and large, 
I observed these events virtually. For example, while I was in Kenya, Chatham House 
International Affairs Think Tank in the United Kingdom hosted a conference titled ‘Kenya's 
Emerging Oil and Gas Sector: Fostering Policy Frameworks for Effective Governance’. This 
conference brought together key industry and civil society actors from Kenya’s oil and gas 
sector to discuss governance and policy frameworks. I was able to view parts of this event 
virtually, and then interview some of those that participated in this conference at a later date. 
Similarly, I viewed a conference on East Africa’s Oil and Gas Boom hosted by the Africa 
Growth Initiative at Brookings and Oxfam America in Washington virtually, and then 
interviewed some participants of this conference once they returned to Kenya. 
 
In this vein, I also audited online professional development courses offered by Edumine, a 
certificate program offered in partnership by University of British Columbia (UBC) and the 
Canadian Institute of Mining (CIM), throughout the course of my doctoral studies. These 
courses related to environmental and social regulation in the extractive sector and were titled: 
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‘Establishing a Social Licence to Operate in Mining’, ‘Social Responsibility in Exploration’, 
‘The Evolving Image of Mining’, and ‘Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights’ 
(see Appendix C for Course Descriptions). Observing events and auditing courses helped to 
develop my broader understanding of the sector and familiarized me with the technical 
language used by industry actors. Rather than directly informing my analysis, these courses 
prepared me for interviews — teaching me to ‘talk the talk’ of industry so that I could ask the 
right questions and understand answers — and helped me to interpret relevant documents. 
 
Finally, to complement and supplement my other methods, I analyzed relevant documents, 
including meeting minutes, conference reports, news stories, policy papers, industry 
publications and websites, conference materials, academic research, and consultancy reports. 
In the case of Article #2, relevant news stories were also collected using Google Alerts and 
Factiva and coded manually. Through content and discourse analysis, I immersed myself in 
what had been said and written about Kenya’s resource frontier, ‘…exploring patterns in and 
across the statements and identifying the social consequences of different discursive 
representations of reality’ (Jorgensen and Phillips 2002: 21). Document analysis helped me 
answer questions that were left unanswered by my other methods of data collection, as well 
as to map the contours of debates about resource development in northern Kenya and situate 
my case in its broader regional and global context.  
 
My collection and analysis of documents also helped me identify information gaps in my 
study. For example, by reviewing news stories, I came across a number of examples of 
resistance ‘from below’ to developments and investments in northern Kenya that I did not 
hear about during my first stint of fieldwork. This led me to return to Kenya for a second 
period of fieldwork in May 2016. During this month, I spent time in north-central Kenya 
conducting additional interviews in order to expand my data collection. These interviews 
were primarily with actors who are at the centre of debates about land and 
infrastructure/pipeline development, including representatives of rights-based and 
environmental non-governmental organisation (NGO), local and customary leaders, 
community members and industry actors. During this visit, I also visited certain sites of 
development and investment that were not yet under construction during my previous 
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fieldwork trips. Finally, I revisited some of my earlier interviewees during this month, in 
order to validate the data obtained through previous interviews and my analysis. Ultimately, 
returning to Kenya for this second period of fieldwork provided me with the opportunity to 
gather new insights to address silences in my data, to triangulate my analysis, and to address 
any contradictions that emerged during different trips (Elwood 2010). 
 
Positionality  
In conceptualising, designing, and carrying out this research, I grappled with my 
positionality, as well as my blurred status as an ‘insider-outsider’ in certain situations. I came 
to this project having previously lived and worked in East Africa. I also have personal 
connections to East Africa’s ‘expat’ community, as my family has lived in the region since 
the 1970s. My prior experiences and relationships undoubtedly influenced my understanding 
of the research topic, as well as who I spoke to, my approach to collecting data, and my 
analysis of findings.  
 
Given my positionality, I remain uneasy about the subtle ways that colonialisation may 
manifest in my methods and analysis (Denzin and Lincoln 2008). My discomfort relates to 
England’s (1994) question about how best to incorporate the voices of ‘others’ without 
colonising them in a manner that reinforces existing patterns of inequality and domination 
(England 1994: 241). Such concerns are especially pertinent in post-colonial settings, such as 
those in which this research was carried out. This is a recurring point of discomfort for me, as 
I reread and rewrote parts of my dissertation. Although I hope that my work reflects diverse 
voices and perspectives on Kenya’s land and resources, I wonder if my conversations in the 
field, analysis of data, and writing of this dissertation ultimately privilege the voices that 
align closest with my own politics. Most pointedly, I recognize that I have the privilege of 
being somewhat critical of rapid resource development and private investment in northern 
Kenya whereas many northern Kenyans do not, at least not outwardly, given the state of their 
political marginalization and their need/desire for new economic opportunities.  
 
I also recognize that my position as a young, educated, white female afforded me access to 
research sites that I may have not been granted otherwise. Corporate actors are often 
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unwilling to grant interviews; but having connections that were able to call in requests on my 
behalf certainly opened doors for me on more than one occasion. Interestingly, in other 
instances, I was granted access to corporate actors for other reasons. I am fairly confident 
that my position, including my age, my gender, my skin color, and my perceived 
inexperience in the ‘real world’, all resulted in some interviewees giving me information that 
they would not have been so willing to share with a differently positioned academic.  This 
experience reflects McDowell’s (1998) claim that because interviewees often perceive young 
women as ‘unthreatening’ or ‘not official,’ confidential statements or documents may be 
offered freely, or difficult issues may be broached without prompting. I believe that some 
information was shared with me ‘off the record’ that would not have been shared if I had 
positioned myself more openly as a scholar-activist prior to beginning each interview. This 
creates a second point of consternation for me. What do you do with meaningful and 
important information that is shared ‘off the record’ because your interviewees assume that 
your politics align with theirs? At what stage in a conversation is it your responsibility, as a 
researcher, to explicate your politics to an interviewee?  
 
I express these points of discomfort not to invalidate my findings, but to acknowledge the 
personal and contextual factors that place limitations on my work. I aim to make my position 
in my research ‘explicit’ and ‘locatable’, as well as to suggest that the knowledge that I 
produce through my research is situated (Samers 1995 as cited in Jensen and Glasmeier 
2010). I want to avoid falling into the trap that England cautions against, where ‘concerns 
associated with doing research are usually ignored and accounts are produced from which the 
personal is banished’ (1994: 244). Instead, I recognize that my research is entangled in a 
complex web of power and privilege that was sometimes advantageous to my work and other 
times not. What I produced, ultimately, is a situated form of knowledge rather than a 
universal truth (England 1994). By talking about my research as ‘partial’ and offering no 
single, straightforward conclusions or solutions (Cook. 2005: 22), I hope that anyone who 
reads my work will also take the ‘situatedness’ of my research into account (Jensen and 
Glasmeier 2010). 
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At the same time, I also see these discomforts as a valuable learning experience that will 
inform my research endeavours in the future. Dwyer and Buckle (2009) suggest that 
reflexivity is important, but so too is a researcher’s ability ‘to be open, authentic, honest, 
deeply interested in the experience of one’s research participants, and committed to 
accurately and adequately representing their experience’ (2009: 59). During fieldwork that I 
conducted more recently in May 2016, I was more upfront about my position and politics 
with interviewees than I was in the past. I feel that this created opportunities for deeper and 
more meaningful conversations. It also revealed points of contention where industry actors or 
industry proponents clearly saw things quite differently than me. I aspire to move towards a 
more open and authentic approach to research moving forward, even if it is not always 
comfortable. 
 
Outline of dissertation 
The remainder of my dissertation is comprised of three articles and a conclusion. Each article 
is preceded by an introductory cover page, which sets the context of the specific article and 
identifies its primary contributions. The cover page also explains how the particular article 
has been reviewed and received to-date, as well as what my plans are for the article moving 
forward.  
 
In Article #1, I show how transnational corporations are finding ways to use voluntary 
standards — which are meant to regulate their social and environmental conduct — to 
legitimize and consolidate their control over land and resources. To support this argument, I 
offer two examples from Kenya’s northern resource frontier. I trace the specific global 
technologies of government used by two corporations to secure access to land for the purpose 
of resource development in the face of community resistance. I frame my analysis using Hall 
et al.’s (2011) ‘powers of exclusion,’ arguing that voluntary standards serve as one example 
of a legitimising discourse that corporations can use to justify excluding other users from 
land and resources. This article contributes to scholarship on transnational regulation, and 
voluntary standards more specifically, by showing how powerful actors use expert 
knowledge of voluntary standards and corresponding managerial techniques — such as 
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research, assessment tools and third-party auditing — to influence the outcomes of struggles 
over land. In relation to broader themes of my dissertation, this article provides important 
insights on new approaches to governance in frontier spaces, focusing on the role of powerful 
actors in producing and managing frontier spaces. 
 
In Article #2, I shift to focus on how frontiers are governed ‘from below’. This article 
focuses on a mega-infrastructure development in northern Kenya. I examine the spectrum of 
different and competing reactions to this infrastructure project. The central aim of this article 
is to examine how rural groups draw upon different forms of expertise — ranging from 
biodiversity science to international legal frameworks — as a basis for framing and 
legitimising their diverse reactions to Kenya’s frontier-making project. The analysis 
contributes to wider debates about rural agency, by demonstrating how rural groups 
strategically deploy different forms of expertise to negotiate the rules that govern frontier 
landscapes and populations. This article contributes to the broader themes that frame my 
dissertation in two ways. First, it illustrates how less powerful actors participate in 
negotiating and contesting frontier-making projects. Second, it reveals how frontiers are 
shaped by innovative acts of citizenship. 
 
Finally, in Article #3, my co-author and I analyse changing political relationships in northern 
Kenya in light of oil exploration and development. This article demonstrates how some 
northern Kenyans are seeking protection of their rights from oil companies, in light of the 
Kenyan state’s hands-off approach to governing northwestern Kenya. We argue that this is 
drawing oil companies and rural communities into an uneasy citizen-state-like relationship, 
altering the experiences and practices of citizenship in the region. Although this process 
creates new political space where some individuals can claim their rights, the ability to make 
use of this political space and direct rights claims towards oil companies is distributed 
unevenly across the region, resulting in differential citizenship. This article reflects on the 
new political spaces and new forms of political subjectivity that emerge as a result of 
frontier-making projects. 
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Following these three articles, there is a short conclusion. In the conclusion, I reinstate the 
broader contributions of my dissertation to existing literature. I then consider whether 
Kenya’s emerging resource frontier is an ‘old’ frontier or a post-frontier, drawing on an 
emerging body of scholarship on post-frontiers. Throughout my concluding discussion, I 
return to the themes of governance and citizenship, in order to reflect on how the governance 
of frontier spaces, as well as life within them, is changing as a result of processes of 
globalisation and new technologies of government.  
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Article #1 
The master’s tools: Voluntary social and environmental standards and the politics of 
legitimisation in East Africa’s extractive sector 
 
Context 
This first article analyses how corporations use voluntary social and environmental standards 
and corresponding managerial techniques – such as research and assessment tools – to 
legitimise their control over land and resources. This analysis contributes to broader 
discussions about governance in contemporary frontier spaces, one of the themes underlying 
my dissertation. Drawing on two examples from northern Kenya, I illustrate how resource 
companies use voluntary social and environmental standards to rationalize and justify their 
control over land and the exclusion of existing land users for the purpose of resource 
development. Although not an explicit focus of this article, by showing how companies can 
deploy voluntary standards to secure their claims over land, I also illustrate how voluntary 
standards can replace state governance and regulation. This aligns with work by Vandergeest 
and Unno (2012), who suggest that voluntary standards are a form of extraterritorial 
governance that companies can use to produce a regulatory regime that either pre-empts or 
displaces the need for state regulation. By illustrating how companies use voluntary 
standards to define rules around land access in a way that advances their interests, this article 
demonstrates how corporate actors claim rule-making authority in frontiers. This, I argue, 
contributes to producing novel political spaces that are governed through graduated and 
overlapping sovereignties (Ong 2006; Sassen 1996; Vandergeest and Unno 2012). 
 
This approach to governance has impacts on how citizens are governed in frontier spaces, 
relating to the second theme motivating my dissertation. Work by Vandergeest and Peluso 
(1995) and Vandergeest and Unno (2012) has shown that nonstate actors can use 
transnational regulation to influence how people use and manage natural resources in certain 
spaces — ultimately subjecting people to new types of authority. My analysis focuses 
specifically on corporations, to show how private firms can govern subjects and their use of 
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land by invoking certain transnational norms. As I show in this article, corporations employ a 
narrative that legitimises the exclusion of existing land users from land in order to exploit 
natural resources for ‘public good’. They then use voluntary standards to frame their 
enclosure of land as necessary, right, and appropriate. Coordinating land deals is a highly 
political process that requires ‘an extra burden of ideological legitimation’ to be accepted by 
those whose access to land is threatened (Levien 2013). I argue in this article that voluntary 
standards can be deployed as legitimising device, used ‘to justify the displacement of some 
social claims to land in favour of others’ (Prudham and Coleman 2011: 22).   
 
This article is based on an extensive analysis of government, corporate and civil society 
documents, as well as media sources. In analyzing documents, I searched for references to 
voluntary standards made in relation to the two resource development projects at the centre 
of my analysis: the development of wind energy on the shores of Lake Turkana and the 
development of oil across Turkana County, both in northern Kenya. The data gleaned from 
these documents is supplemented by semi-structured, qualitative interviews with key 
informants. I conducted 20 interviews in Turkana, Laikipia and Isiolo Counties with 
representatives of rights-based and environmental non-governmental organisation (NGO), 
local and customary leaders, local government authorities, and industry actors. These 
interviews were conducted during two periods of fieldwork in Kenya: the first was from 
October 2014 to April 2015 and the second was during May 2016. In terms of site visits, I 
visited sites of oil exploration and development across Turkana, but I did not visit the actual 
site of the Lake Turkana Wind Project.  
 
An earlier draft of this article was presented at the International Critical Agrarian Studies 
Colloquium (ICAS) in February 2016, and is published online as part of the conference 
proceedings. ICAS is organized by the International Institute of Social Studies (ISS) at 
Erasmus University in The Hague and brings together a community of like-minded scholars, 
development practitioners and activists from different parts of the world that work on 
agrarian issues. I am the sole contributor to this article. 
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The master’s tools: Voluntary social and environmental standards and the politics of 
legitimisation in East Africa’s extractive sector 
 
Charis Enns 
Abstract 
As states have become increasingly unwilling or unable to regulate the social and 
environmental externalities of transnational corporations, voluntary social and environmental 
standards have emerged as a prominent tool of global governance. These standards are 
designed to institutionalize responsible corporate conduct through the creation of global 
norms for ethical or appropriate business behaviour. In this article, however, I argue that 
transnational corporations are finding ways to use voluntary standards as a technology of 
government to secure their investments in land and natural resources. To support this 
argument, I offer two examples from Kenya’s northern resource frontier. I trace the specific 
techniques used by two resource projects to secure access to land for the purpose of resource 
development, even in the face of community resistance. I show how corporations use 
voluntary standards, along with other technologies of government, to resolve contentious 
land issues and to legitimate their own control over land and resources. I frame my analysis 
using Hall et al.’s (2011) ‘powers of exclusion,’ arguing that voluntary standards serve as 
one example of a legitimising discourse that corporations can use to justify excluding other 
users from land and resources. This article contributes to research on voluntary standards, by 
analysing how powerful actors use expert knowledge of voluntary standards and 
corresponding managerial techniques — such as research, assessment tools and third-party 
auditing — to influence the outcomes of struggles over land.  
 
Keywords: Transnational regulation; voluntary standards; transnational corporations; land; 
powers of exclusion; Kenya 
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Introduction  
The renewed rush to invest in land and resources is risky for all parties involved, including 
transnational investors and corporations, home and host country governments, and those who 
live on the land and depend on its resources (Edelman et al. 2013; Li 2015). As Levien 
(2013) argues, coordinating land deals is a highly political process that requires ‘ideological 
legitimation’ if the exchange of land is to be accepted by those whose access to land is 
threatened. Similarly, Li suggests that ‘assembling land as a resource available for some 
purposes to the exclusion of others requires a great deal of complex cultural work’ (2014: 
592). This process involves state-led interventions and regulations in order to make land 
accessible to investors, along with the deployment of innovative technologies to make land 
and natural resources productive. It also involves the construction of narratives that represent 
some uses of land and resources as more desirable than others to legitimise the exclusion of 
certain social groups — in favour of those that bring large-scale financial investment, for 
example. 
 
Li (2014) argues that, in recent years, the proliferation of global environmental and social 
standards has exposed large-scale land and resource investments to new risks. According to 
Li (2014), if investors fail to uphold certain global norms around environmental and social 
performance, they may face resistance by impacted populations, along with coercion by 
officials, journalists and NGOs that threaten to expose deficiencies in their projects. This can 
be seen in the extractive sectors across sub-Saharan Africa, where companies regularly face 
criticism from activists and in the media for failing to respect land rights when acquiring land 
or developing natural resources. In some cases, communities have used global norms 
embedded in voluntary social and environmental standards to challenge the legitimacy of 
investor’s claims to land, despite the fact that the state has granted the land to private 
investors. For example, the Tanzanian government (temporarily) revoked land from a foreign 
company and returned it to Maasai communities in central Tanzania in 2015, following 
grassroots activism and international pressure claiming that the land deal violated 
international Indigenous rights standards. Thus, while assembling land and resources for 
investment has always been a contested process, new global voluntary environmental and 
social standards have created new points of vulnerability for transnational investors. 
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However, transnational investors are innovative and adaptive when it comes to mitigating 
risk. As new voluntary environmental and social standards have emerged with the intention 
of regulating corporate conduct, transnational investors have found ways to use these 
standards to mitigate risk and secure their investments in land and natural resources. In this 
article, I illustrate the various technologies of government that investors use to legitimate 
their control over land and resources, arguing that voluntary standards serve as one new tool 
that can be used to resolve contentious land issues. Drawing on two examples from northern 
Kenya, I trace the specific techniques used by two resource projects to frame their control 
over land and resources as legitimate. In each case, I show how investors have used 
voluntary standards to influence the outcome of struggles over land. I argue that when 
investors face resistance from existing land users over access to land and resources, they 
point to their compliance with voluntary standards as proof that their conduct is in line with 
global norms and that resistance against them should be seen as unfounded and counter-
productive. I ultimately aim to show that although global social and environmental standards 
have the potential to encourage more responsible corporate conduct, transnational investors 
can quite easily coopt voluntary global standards as a discursive frame that enhances the 
legitimacy of their claims to land. 
 
To begin this article, I clarify my contribution to existing literature, as well as my analytical 
framework. I also provide a brief overview of what voluntary environmental and social 
standards are and why they have emerged, focusing on standards for the natural resource 
sector specifically. Next, I introduce my case study, describing Kenya’s natural resource 
boom and outlining the techniques that have been used by the Kenyan government to open 
land and resources for investment in northern Kenya. In the fourth section, I introduce my 
two cases. I show how two resource projects have worked to assemble land and resources for 
investment, using voluntary standards, along with other technologies of government, to 
legitimise their access to land. I conclude with a brief discussion about the ‘exclusionary 
potential’ of voluntary standards and I suggest that there is a need for further research that 
examines how voluntary standards influence the outcomes of struggles over land and 
resources, and to whose benefit. 
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My argument is informed by fieldwork conducted during two research trips to Kenya. The 
first trip was from October 2014 to April 2015 and the second was during May 2016. This 
fieldwork involved collecting and analysing government, corporate and civil society 
documents — including meeting minutes, conference reports, and news stories, and 
secondary literature — that show how two resource projects have worked to assemble land 
and resources for investment, using voluntary standards, along with other technologies of 
government, to legitimise their access to land. These two projects, which serve as the case 
studies analyzed in this paper, are the development of wind energy on the shores of Lake 
Turkana and the exploration and development of oil across Turkana County. To support my 
document analysis, I conducted 20 interviews in Turkana, Laikipia and Isiolo Counties with 
representatives of rights-based and environmental non-governmental organisation (NGO), 
local and customary leaders, local government authorities, and industry actors. These 
interviews were conducted during two periods of fieldwork in Kenya: the first was from 
October 2014 to April 2015 and the second was during May 2016.  
 
Analytical Framework 
I frame my analysis using Hall et al.’s (2011) ‘powers of exclusion’. Hall et al. (2011) define 
exclusion as the processes by which different social groups, with varying degrees of power, 
gain or lose access to land. They identify four different powers that enable exclusion: the 
market, force, regulation and legitimation. 5 These powers are what Rose (1999) refers to as 
“technologies of government” — namely, techniques and knowledge designed to govern 
populations and landscapes. In my analysis, I describe how each of these powers has been 
used to ‘free land and resources’ for investment in Kenya (Tsing 2005). I then draw attention 
to the role of voluntary standards in exclusion. I show how voluntary standards are deployed 
in coordination with other techniques and practices to legitimise exclusion.6 My analysis 
reveals the exclusionary potential of voluntary standards; demonstrating how voluntary 
                                                
5 This definition of legitimacy draws on work by Bernstein and Coleman (2009), who define legitimacy as the 
acceptance and justification of shared rule by a community. They also describe legitimisation as the process 
through which practices become institutionalized or accepted as ‘appropriate’. 
6 In my analysis, I describe the various technologies of government that are used to create space for investment 
in Kenya’s emerging resource frontier, rather than focusing on voluntary standards alone, recognizing that 
different powers of exclusion ‘do not so much follow as reinforce each other,’ working in tandem to alter the 
ways people can access or be excluded from land (Hall et al. 2011: 192). 
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standards can be deployed by organizations, institutions and corporations to make land and 
resources legible and controllable in a way that is amenable to private investment. 
 
In addition to revealing how voluntary standards can be used to legitimate and create space 
for private investment, my analysis also illustrates how voluntary standards can be deployed 
to absorb land and natural resources into “new paradigms of control and authority” (Millar 
2016: 2010). A broader of body of recent literature “argues that the norms and discourses of 
global neoliberal governance are being deployed by organizations, institutions, and 
corporations to redefine the social meaning of land; to dis-embed it from norms unique to 
specific sociocultural settings and re-embed it within universalized norms of control and 
authority applied by agents of the global neoliberal transition” (Millar 2016: 2010; also see: 
Edelman et al. 2013). As I show, universalized norms of land control and access have been 
embedded in voluntary standards. Thus, when deployed, voluntary standards operate as a 
technology of government that can disrupt and displace more conventional modes of land 
control and access with new paradigms of land control and access, enabling transnational 
investors to consolidate their managerial power over land and existing land users.  
 
Regulating corporations with voluntary social and environmental standards  
Before proceeding with my analysis, a brief overview of what voluntary environmental and 
social standards are, and why they have emerged, is necessary. Citizens’ claims for social 
and environmental protection from the activities of corporations have traditionally been 
directed at the state. As Scherer et al. write, the debate on the relationship between the state, 
society and business has been built ‘…on the assumption of a reasonably coherent regulatory 
environment, where nation state institutions address issues of public concern and regulate 
business behaviour’ (2014: 147). Over the past decades, however, states have become either 
less willing or less able to provide such protections to their citizens (Moog et al. 2015, 
Rosenau and Czempiel 1992, Hall and Biersteker 2002). As Moog et al. explain: ‘Many of 
the demands that citizens are making today – for environmental protection, for example, or 
for workers’ rights and fair compensation – are essentially demands for public goods that are 
not being adequately assured by governmental institutions at either the national or 
international level” (2015: 472). Bartley (2007) suggests that this is the result of a global 
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transition towards modes of neoliberal governance, which are characterized by the de-
centralisation of state control, a shift towards deregulation and the promotion of corporate 
self-regulation. 
 
In light of this shift, transnational advocacy movements have searched for new ways of 
holding corporations accountable for their social and environmental impacts and new 
approaches to governing and regulating corporations have emerged. In effect, nonstate actors 
have moved into the governance spaces created by deregulation and they now perform 
certain governance and regulatory functions that once were regarded as belonging to the 
government (Ruggie 2005, Ramasastry 2015, Matten and Crane 2005). Such nonstate 
rulemaking for corporations — also known as transnational business governance or 
transnational private regulation — has taken various forms. For example, corporations may 
self-regulate, by designing and implementing corporate codes of conduct. It is also 
increasingly common to find nonstate actors, such as global civil society, international 
development organisations, and international financial institutions (IFIs), transnational 
corporations and industry associations, joining forces to collaboratively govern corporate 
conduct.  
 
As nonstate actors lack power to make sovereign laws or rules, they instead govern by norm 
building (Moog et al. 2015). One way of establishing new norms is by creating voluntary 
standards to guide corporations on more responsible economic, political, social, or 
environmental practices. In essence, voluntary standards aim to institutionalize new norms, 
rules and standardized procedures for corporate actors at the global level (Brammer et al. 
2012). Prominent examples of voluntary standards that have been created for the natural 
resource sector specifically include: The International Council on Mining and Minerals 
Sustainable Development Framework; the Conflict-Free Gold Standard, the Extractive 
Industry Transparency Initiative; Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance 
of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests; and, the Voluntary Principles on Security and 
Human Rights, to name just a few. These standards have institutionalized new norms for the 
sector with respect to mitigating corporate social and environmental impacts, preventing 
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human rights abuses in supply and value chains, guiding transparency and payment 
disclosures, clarifying issues over land tenure, and regulating the use of private security. 
 
Some have described voluntary standards as non-state ‘experiments’ and ‘innovations’ that 
aim to draw up rules to induce more responsible behaviour by corporations (Moog et al. 
2015, Bartley 2003). Voluntary standards are created to operate transnationally — like 
transnational corporations do — offering common norms, rules and standardized procedures 
that transcend borders with the intention of shaping corporate conduct regardless of where in 
the world a corporation is operating, or what the standards are in that particular locale (Ponte 
2014, Ponte et al. 2014). As a result of the proliferation of voluntary standards over the past 
twenty years, some scholars suggest that governing corporations through voluntary standards 
– rather than through public law and regulation alone – has emerged as one of the most 
prominent trends in global governance today (Ponte et al. 2011, Djama 2011, Cheyns and 
Riissgaard 2014).7  
 
Proponents of this trend suggest that voluntary standards have the potential to fill the 
regulatory gaps created by neoliberal governance, and to protect against and remedy 
corporate-related social and environmental abuses (Ruggie 2013). When corporations choose 
to abide by voluntary standards, they are effectively agreeing to be held against more rigid 
rules than they are legally required to (Gilbert et al. 2011). Voluntary standards also provide 
corporations with new incentives to behave responsibly — such as the opportunity to 
improve their reputation — and expose corporations to new risks if they fail to adhere to the 
agreed upon norms — such as coercion by journalists and NGOs (Utting 2002, Li 2015). 
Some scholars have also championed voluntary standards as a more ‘democratic’ approach to 
governing and regulating corporations, as a wide range of stakeholders can participate in 
decisions about how to regulate corporations (Backstrand 2006).  
 
                                                
7 By global governance I mean the international regimes, conventions, norms and ideas that inform domestic 
and international laws and politics, as well as other forms of governance within the international arena that take 
place without the presence of formal state or interstate institutions — such as transnational social movements or 
the creation of voluntary standards by multistakeholder institutions. This understanding of global governance 
draws from Hall and Biersteker (2002). 
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Other scholars, however, have been more sceptical about the potential of voluntary standards 
to govern and regulate corporations. Research by Pattberg (2005) and Zammit (2003) uses 
various case studies to illustrate that voluntary standards have a ‘limited track-record in terms 
of effectiveness’ (Pattberg and Widerberg 2016: 44). Some critics — including both policy-
makers and academics — conclude that although voluntary standards may make it appear as 
though global social and environmental problems are being better managed and regulated, 
the practices of corporations often do not improve in reality. For example, Fransen and Kolk 
(2007) and Bruno and Karliner (2002) argue that corporations agree to voluntary standards in 
principle but never intend to adhere to them in practice — effectively using voluntary 
standards as a form of ‘greenwashing’ or ‘ethical window-dressing’.  
 
Others still have problematized the broader political implications of attempting to regulate 
corporations using voluntary codes of conduct and certification standards. Vandergeest and 
Unno (2012) find that voluntary standards may pre-empt or displace the need for state 
regulation, effectively encroaching on national sovereignty. This, they claim, may ‘reinforce 
longstanding global relations of domination’ where powerful actors from the global north can 
determine the rules that govern access to land and resources more effectively than states in 
the global South (Vandergeest and Unno 2012: 358). Similarly, Barney (2014) suggests that 
companies can use voluntary certification standards to gain access to concession land, and 
establish political backing and legitimacy for their land acquisitions. Work by scholars, such 
as Vandergeest and Unno (2012) and Barney (2014), has served to politicize scholarship on 
voluntary standards — revealing that although such standards were created to regulate 
corporations, they can be employed to achieve other ends. 
 
In this article, I contribute to scholarship that politicises voluntary standards. Like 
Vandergeest and Unno (2012) and Barney (2014), I use qualitative case-based evidence to 
show how, and to what ends, powerful actors use voluntary standards to influence struggles 
over land and resources. I examine how those investing in Kenya’s land and resources have 
taken steps to align their social and environmental conduct with certain voluntary standards. I 
suggest that although some argue that this is leading investors to act in more socially and 
environmentally responsible ways, it is also producing unexpected benefits for investors. 
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When these investors and their resource projects face resistance from existing land users, 
they point to their compliance with voluntary standards as proof that their conduct is in line 
with global norms and that resistance against them should be seen as unfounded. This 
illustrates how investors can use voluntary standards as a discursive frame that enhances the 
legitimacy of their claims to land, while displacing traditional modes of land control and 
access with new ‘universalized’ paradigms of land control and access (Edelman et al. 2014; 
Millar 2016). 
 
I problematize this use of voluntary social and environmental standards by arguing that it 
ultimately reinforces power inequalities between global actors and rural land users. As 
powerful actors use voluntary standards to legitimize new paradigms of control and authority 
over land while disrupting and displacing more conventional modes of control and authority, 
they also gain power over land and people. Moreover, my analysis also shows how managers 
of resource projects hire technical experts, such as international consulting firms, to produce 
documents that demonstrate their compliance with voluntary standards. These experts assess 
and audit corporate practices against voluntary standards to create evidence that companies 
are acting appropriately, and in accordance with global norms, in exerting their control over 
land. 8  In this way, my analysis also lends itself to discussions about how professional 
expertise is used to gain power over land and people (Millar 2016; also see Li 2014). Experts 
who assess corporate conduct against voluntary standards play an important role in 
interpreting ‘the right manner of disposing things’ (Foucault 1991: 95), aiding investors in 
assembling land as a resource for investment in a legitimate way and dealing with 
communities living on that land without abating global norms. Returning to my earlier 
discussion about powers of exclusion, this approach to analyzing voluntary standards 
demonstrates their exclusionary potential — showing how voluntary standards can be 
deployed to make land and resources amenable to private investment. 
 
                                                
8 Although rural land users can respond by similarly hiring experts and deploying voluntary standards to contest 
corporate claims, they often lack the resources necessary to do so. I address this point in more detail in Article 
#2. 
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Kenya’s resource boom  
Over the past five years, the phrase ‘Kenya rising’ has become increasingly common in 
African development discourse, as many suggest that Kenya has emerged as ‘one of Africa’s 
key growth centers’ (World Bank 2015). The country has consistently achieved a growth rate 
between 6.5 and 7 per cent. This growth has been aided (albeit somewhat paradoxically) by 
both falling commodity prices and discoveries of oil, gas, minerals and other natural 
resources.9 Eager to sustain this momentum, the Kenyan government, international financial 
institutions and development agencies have invested in infrastructure, training and jobs as 
tools for facilitating transnational investment in Kenya’s resources (Letai 2015). The Kenyan 
government hopes that these efforts will pay off in the coming decades, transforming Kenya 
into “middle-income country providing a high quality life to all its citizens” by the year 2030 
(RoK 2007). 
 
One key to the ‘Kenya rising’ narrative has been the recent discovery of largely untapped 
natural resource wealth. Although Kenya’s economy has historically been dependent on low-
value exports — such as tea, coffee and horticulture — recent discoveries of oil, gas, 
minerals and other clean energy sources have awakened the country’s largely dormant 
extractive sector (DFID n.d.). Major mineral projects, such as Base Titanium’s Kwale 
Mineral Sands project in the east and Acacia Mining’s (formally Africa Barrick) large-scale 
investment in western Kenya, have invigorated the mining sector. Moreover, after nearly a 
century of unsuccessful exploration, there have been significant discoveries of oil reserves in 
northern Kenya and off the Kenyan coast. Although falling crude prices have dampened 
expectations, the country is on track to begin commercial oil production in 2017. Moreover, 
the potential of other natural resources – including geothermal energy in central Kenya and 
wind power in northern Kenya – has attracted other large-scale investment, further 
contributing to excitement about Kenya’s natural resource boom.  
 
The Government of Kenya has framed developing Kenya’s natural resources as the way 
forward and as an essential step towards achieving Kenya’s long-term national development 
plan, Vision 2030 (Letai 2015). According to current estimates, resource extraction will grow 
                                                
9 As Kenya is a net commodity importer, it is a net beneficiary of falling commodity prices.  
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from contributing just 1% of Kenya’s GDP to 10% by 2020 (DFID n.d.). Beyond 
contributing to the country’s national GDP, the government also believes that oil revenues 
will transform and expand health and education services and halt poverty in northern Kenya 
— the country’s poorest region. In an optimistic story about the transformative potential of 
oil, the World Bank claims that Kenya’s ‘oil boom could propel [the country] through the 
middle-income threshold much earlier than its Vision 2030 anticipated’ (World Bank 2013). 
 
International financial institutions, development agencies, bilateral donors and private 
investors are keen to support Kenya’s vision for the future, and have contributed financing to 
support the early stages of Kenya’s natural resource boom. For example, the UK Department 
for International Development (DFID) has committed £15,000,000 through the ‘Kenya 
Extractives Industry Development Programme,’ which advances ‘…a legal and regulatory 
framework [for the extractive industry] that makes Kenya an attractive destination for foreign 
investment while also ensuring benefits to Kenyans’ (DFID n.d.). In line with Kenya’s 
narrative about the importance of resource development for achieving Vision 2030, DFID 
justifies its investment by stating that natural resource development is ‘…crucial to support 
Kenya’s exit from aid in the next decade’ (DFID n.d.). (It should not go unnoticed that the 
largest player in Kenya’s emerging petroleum sector is a UK firm, Tullow Oil). The 
Norwegian government is also aiding Kenya through the ‘Oil for Development’ programme. 
This multi-million dollar programme aims to improve the management of natural resources 
by building capacity and resource management skills in the public sector. 
 
Beyond financing governance reform to support resource development, transnational actors 
are also financing individual resource projects across Kenya. The World Bank and African 
Development Bank have contributed hundreds of millions of dollars to finance the expansion 
of a large geothermal project in central Kenya (the largest on the African continent) (World 
Bank 2015, AfDB 2016); Google, among other organisations, is backing ‘Africa’s largest 
wind power project’ in northern Kenya (Cuff 2015); the International Finance Corporation 
(IFC) is providing substantial equity investments to private firms undertaking further oil 
exploration activities in northern Kenya (IFC 2015). Most recently, a coalition of 
organisations agreed to help finance LAPSSET — a project that includes an oil pipeline and 
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an oil refinery. This coalition of donors includes: the Sustainable Development Investment 
Partnership; Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation; Citi; the Development Bank of Southern 
Africa; Deutsche Bank; East Capital; the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development; and, the European Investment Bank (Kabukuru 2016). 
  
Ultimately, Kenya is in the midst of a natural resource boom and this boom that is fuelling 
the ‘Kenya rising’ narrative. The most common characteristics of resource booms can be 
clearly identified in Kenya (for further discussion on resource booms, see: Hall et al. 2011, 
Hall 2011, Barbier 2010). First, large areas of land are being acquired and converted to 
commercial use, with a focus on accelerating investment and industrialisation in the 
country’s northern arid lands (RoK 2011). The recent discoveries of valuable natural 
resources in northern Kenya are driving this rush for land. Second, Kenya’s resource boom 
has initiated long-term transformation of land use. In addition to establishing policies that 
‘free’ land and resources for investment and industrial development, the government is also 
transforming land use through large-scale infrastructure projects that will improve mobility, 
but also cause lasting changes to the environment. Such lasting changes to land use make it 
difficult to convert land back to other forms of use and tenure (Hall et al. 2011). Finally, as 
demonstrated above, Kenya’s resource boom is drawing new sorts of actors into the country, 
which is impacting relations between existing and new land users. The presence of new 
powerful actors creates new terms of land control and has serious implications for local land 
users. 
 
Assembling land resources for investment in northern Kenya 
As the previous section demonstrates, a new story line has emerged in Kenya that positions 
transnational investment in the country’s resources as essential to the ‘Kenya rising’ 
narrative. In support of this narrative, the government has made large tracks of land available 
for natural resource development and transnational investment. The act of freeing land for 
investment, however, requires the artful exclusion of existing land users. As Li (2014) and 
Levien (2013) argue, assembling land for investment is achieved through difficult political 
and cultural work: People must be convinced to be excluded from land in order to free it up 
for other uses. Given that Kenya’s natural resource boom is so recent, the government is still 
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undertaking work to secure exclusion — attempting to formalize, legalize and legitimise 
access to land for the purpose of natural resource development. This work is complicated by 
the fact that the majority of the population in northern Kenya, which is the epicentre of the 
resource boom, practices mobile, pastoral livelihoods. 
 
When a government seeks to exclude people from land, it deploys multiple technologies, 
including: force; the market; regulation; and, legitimation (Hall et al. 2011). To some extent, 
the Kenyan government has used both force and the market to create space for stable land 
transactions. For example, in order to access land for pipeline and port construction, a 
number of coastal and pastoralist communities in northern Kenya were displaced from their 
customary lands between 2012 and 2013 (interview with domestic civil society organisation 
in Laikipia, May 2016). These communities mobilized in response to their exclusion, 
resisting eviction and even reoccupying disputed land in some cases (interview with 
domestic civil society organisation in Laikipia, May 2016). The government responded by 
deploying the power of the market, disbursing nearly $9 million USD to compensate the 154 
families whose lands were impacted by the construction (Kabukuru 2016). By offering a 
market price for land, some conceded to their exclusion. 
 
The government has also implemented new regulations — both formal and informal rules — 
to govern access to land in Kenya. These regulations demarcate new boundaries between 
pieces of land, prescribe the kinds of land use that are and are not acceptable in certain 
regions of the country, and establish which types of people or groups can use particular tracts 
of land (Hall et al. 2011). For example, Kenya’s new Community Land Bill (2015) devolves 
ownership and governance for certain tracts of land to local communities, effectively 
establishing a collective tenure regime across most of northern Kenya.10 To some extent, this 
Bill represents a progressive gain for Kenya, as the customary lands of subsistence farmers, 
pastoralists, hunters and gatherers are now protected by legislation. Yet, if natural resources 
are found on community lands, it appears that communities can be resettled and no monetary 
compensation for displaced peoples is required (interview with domestic civil society 
organisation in Laikipia, May 2016; IHRB 2016). This illustrates how the Kenyan 
                                                
10 This bill replaces the Trust Land Act, and promises to better protect communal ownership  
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government regulates who has access to land, for what purpose, and under what conditions. 
In this case, state regulation favours the most ‘productive’ land use (interview with domestic 
civil society organisation in Laikipia, May 2016). 
 
Finally, the government also uses legitimation as a power of exclusion. One of the most 
important forms of legitimation used by the government is a narrative that frames natural 
resource development as necessary for the nation’s development. For example, Vision 2030 
frames investment in Kenya’s land and natural resources as essential to nation-building and 
modernisation (Fourie 2014). Kenya’s new Constitution and recently revised Land Act 
(2012) also reflect this narrative. The 2010 Constitution states that ‘Land in Kenya shall be 
held, used and managed in a manner that is equitable, efficient, productive and sustainable’ 
(Article 40 (1)) while the Land Act (2012) stresses the imperative of making ‘underutilised’ 
land more ‘efficient’ and ‘effective’ for the common good of the country. Local media 
reinforce this narrative as well, promoting natural resource development as a win-win 
scenario for the country and its citizens. For example, a recent newspaper headline read: ‘Oil 
companies don’t drill; they develop!’ (Ross 2016). Such discourse frames natural resource 
development as the proper use of land in northern Kenya in order to legitimate exclusion.  
 
Ultimately, the Kenyan government has used a set of state-led interventions in order free the 
country’s newly discovered natural resources for private investment. These interventions are 
transforming land relations in northern Kenya, enabling the exclusion of existing land users 
from land in favour of natural resource development for the ‘common good’ of the country.  
 
Using voluntary standards to exclude 
Importantly, in a globalizing world, transformations in land relations are often not carried out 
by the state alone. Rather, a multitude of actors are involved in assembling land and 
resources for investment. In the final sections of this paper, I offer two cases to illustrate how 
private investors are also playing a key role in transforming land relations in northern Kenya. 
Hall et al. (2011) argue that new regimes of access to and control over land are generally 
rationalized using techno-scientific arguments (such as feasibility or efficiency claims) and 
moral arguments (what is right or appropriate). In the following two cases, I show how two 
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resource projects use various technologies of government to establish control over land and 
resources. I specifically pay attention to how these investors use voluntary standards as a 
discursive frame that enhances the legitimacy of their claims to land, and rely on expert 
knowledge about voluntary standards to present their control over land as ‘right’.  
 
The Lake Turkana Wind Power Project and the IFC Performance Standards  
The Lake Turkana Wind Power (LTWP) project is a large-scale project under construction in 
northern Kenya, 12 kilometers from the eastern shore of Lake Turkana in Marsabit County 
(see Map 2). Once completed, the project will be the largest wind farm in Africa, with the 
wind farm’s 365 turbines covering approximately 40,000 acres of land (although, LTWP 
holds a 150,000 acre concession of land in total). LTWP estimates that the wind project will 
generate over 15% of Kenya’s power once complete. In addition to a large substation, the 
project also includes the rehabilitation and expansion of a 200-kilometer road to access the 
project site. Construction on the project began in mid-2015 and the project is set to begin 
generating power in 2017. 
 
Beyond contributing to more affordable access to energy across the country, the project is 
also praised for attracting the largest private investment in Kenya’s history. A consortium of 
partners and shareholders manage the project, including KP&P BV Africa (NL), Aldwych 
International Limited (UK), Vestas (DK), Norwegian Investment Fund for Developing 
Countries (NO), Danish Investment Fund for Developing Countries (IFU), the Finnish Fund 
for Industrial Cooperation Ltd (FI), and Sandpiper (Danwatch 2016). Other major financial 
partners include the African Development Bank, the French Development Finance Institute, 
the Overseas Private Investment Corporations, the European Investment Bank, the 
Netherlands Development Finance Company and the East African Development Bank.  
 
Although highly praised by government officials, international financial institutions, private 
investors and Kenyan media, LTWP has been controversial at the local level for the past 
several years. LTWP’s land concessions overlays land that has traditionally been used by 
nomadic pastoralist communities — primarily as dry season grazing grounds. In 2009, 
LTWP negotiated a 99-year lease agreement of this land with the central government through 
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a process that allegedly lacked transparency and took advantage of ambiguities in the law 
that allowed private investors to lease community lands without first obtaining permission 
from communities (interview with civil society organisation in Lodwar, November 2014). 
Although nearby communities retain use rights of this land for the purpose of grazing their 
livestock, they will not be compensated for land and resources lost as a result of 
infrastructure development (turbines) (Danwatch 2016). Unresolved issues over land 
ownership and the lease arrangement have left the project exposed to complaints from 
affected pastoralists communities. In 2014, some communities filed a lawsuit against LWTP, 
the county government, the National Government and the National Land Commission for 
illegal land acquisition.  
 
Map 2. Site of Lake Turkana Wind Project 
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In addition to issues over land ownership, domestic civil society groups, some media outlets 
and pastoralist communities have also raised concerns about the effects of the wind project 
on their livelihoods. LTWP has engaged in consultation with communities in light of such 
concerns, but has not resolved some pressing issues. For example, LTWP states that 
compensation is not necessary, as there will be little loss of resources because pastoralist 
community members will be able to graze their livestock between turbines. As the 
consortium explains: ‘Nomadic pastoralist[s] have customary rights of use to land pastures, 
however have no recognisable legal right or claim to the land other than use and are therefore 
not eligible for land compensation. There are no land tenure issues for the nomadic 
communities as LTWP has accepted the cultural ‘right of use’ tenure for grazing livestock 
and traversing LTWP’s land’ (LTWP 2014: 7). In stark contrast, communities and civil 
society groups argue that the health of grazing pastures will be disturbed by the wind turbine 
operations (Danwatch 2016). Moreover, they argue that the road expansion will disrupt more 
grazing land — beyond what the installation of the turbines has already destroyed (Danwatch 
2016). These groups continue to press LTWP for compensation, claiming that the consortium 
is failing its international obligation to ‘avoid or minimise adverse social and economic 
impacts from land acquisition or restrictions on land use and to compensate for loss of assets’ 
(Danwatch 2016: 25).  
 
Distrust over the land acquisition processes, as well as uncertainties about the livelihood, 
social and environmental impacts of the project, have fueled community organisation against 
LTWP. However, LTWP has been relatively successful at securing its access to and control 
over land in spite of community concerns. On the one hand, this success can be attributed to 
the support of the government. State-led interventions, as outlined in the previous section, 
have served to consolidate LTWP’s control over its concession and secure LTWP’s 
investment. On the other hand, LTWP has also used its own strategies to maintain and 
legitimate its control over this concession.  
 
First, LTWP has framed the disputed land as unproductive and underutilized and in need of 
development. One project investor described the site as being ‘a huge distance from 
civilization’ (Stevis 2015) while the former Chair of LTWP stated: 
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If you were to see some of the images of our wind site…I would say it reminds me of 
the pictures I used to see of the moon. Every hill is a crater, it’s old lava flows and lava 
rock everywhere, and it is very windy. There is absolutely nothing there, there is no 
infrastructure, there are no electrical connections, there are no roads, there is no way to 
host anyone unless you put them in a tent, so we have to build everything (Van 
Wageningen 2013). 
 
Images and promotional materials also depict LTWP’s concession as sparsely populated and 
underdeveloped. Such images portray this tract of land as void of people and empty, except 
for LTWP’s buildings. 11 Devaluing current uses of land and diminishing the presence of 
existing land users, while aggrandising the potential for new and improved uses serves as a 
strategy to render land investible (Li 2014, Peluso and Lund 2011). LTWP’s discourse about 
their concession appeals to the Kenyan government, which is aspiring to make 
‘underutilised’ land in the country’s north more ‘efficient’ for the common good of the 
country (RoK 2012). Moreover, by using discourse and showing images that depict this land 
as empty; LTWP undermines the resistance of pastoralist communities by suggesting that 
they are not using this tract of land anyways. This reflects broader efforts by the government 
and investors alike to frame the region as empty and underutilized, despite the fact that 
nomadic pastoralist communities have depended on this land for their livelihoods for 
centuries, in order to create and secure space for natural resource development. 
 
The second way that LTWP has legitimised their control over land is demonstrating that the 
project complies with voluntary standards for responsible land acquisition. By doing so, 
LTWP effectively uses global norms to disrupt and displace customary modes of land control 
and access, and to justify its control over land. In particular, LTWP has demonstrated that the 
project complies with the International Financial Corporation (IFC) Performance 
Standards.12 As the LTWP consortium states:  
                                                
11 To be fair, the region’s burgeoning tourism industry employs similar discourse in attempting to attract tourists 
to the region: The tactic of making space empty in order to attract profit is not unique to the resource sector 
alone.   
12 These eight standards define IFC clients’ responsibilities for managing their environmental and social risks. 
Although LTWP is not an IFC client, it has elected to align its social and economic practices with these 
standards because some of its partners and investors have stipulated that the project must uphold these standards 
as a condition of receiving financing. 
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The Project has been developed in compliance with all relevant local and international 
legislation and standards, including the IFC Performance Standards and Equator 
Principles (LTWP as citied in Danwatch 2016: 23). 
LTWP also reports that the “project underwent a rigorous audit process and completed a 
National Environmental Impact Assessment, as well as an International Environmental and 
Social Impact Assessment (ESIA), in compliance with the IFC Performance Standards on 
Environmental and Social Sustainability” (LTWP, as cited by BHRC 2016). Compliance 
with the IFC Performance Standard is used to show investors that the necessary precautions 
have been taken to acquire land in an appropriate way and to manage social and environment 
risks. This helps to portray any investments in the wind power project as secure and 
responsible, and any resistance against the project as unfounded and unwarranted.  
 
Moreover, consultants and technical experts have been hired to produce documents that can 
be used to show investors how contentions political issues are being managed using 
voluntary standards. For example, LTWP has hired experts to produce an Environmental and 
Social Impact Study, an Environmental Impact Assessment Study Report, a Resettlement 
Action Plan and an Indigenous Peoples Policy Framework. Problematically, while these 
documents describe LTWP’s adherence to international voluntary standards, many 
international observers have contested the claims made in these documents, as well as 
critiqued LTWP’s minimalistic approach to complying with voluntary standards (Danwatch 
2016).  
 
For example, as stated above, LTWP claims to comply with the IFC Performance Standards, 
including Performance Standard #7, which requires investors to obtain free, prior and 
informed consent from affected Indigenous peoples prior to commencing a project. Once 
constructed, the wind farm will occupy land that is inhabited by five minority ethnic groups: 
the Turkana, Samburu, Rendille, Gabra and El Molo. Although Kenya has no specific 
legislation governing Indigenous peoples and has abstained from adopting relevant 
international legislation on Indigenous peoples, these groups identify with the Indigenous 
movement (IWGIA 2015). Importantly, self-identification is a key criterion for determining 
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indigeneity according to international law. Moreover, according to the African Commission 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights, each of these groups are recognised as Indigenous Peoples. 
 
Yet, rather than accept these groups self-identification, or IWGIA or the African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights categorisation of these groups as Indigenous, 
LTWP conducted its own research in order to evaluate whether any ‘bona fide indigenous 
peoples’ would be impacted by the project (emphasis added, LTWP Ltd. 2014: 17). Based on 
the research conducted by their own experts, LTWP initially concluded that ‘no indigenous 
people have been identified’ in the project’s footprint (EIB 2011), while later updating this 
statement to claim that only one of the five minority ethnic groups living within the 
consortium’s concession, the El molo, should be considered Indigenous (LTWP 2012: 5). 
Estimates suggest that somewhere between 50 and 2000 people identify as El molo but none 
live within the project’s direct footprint. Overlooking the internationally-agreed upon 
definition of indigeneity led LTWP to a convenient conclusion: It can claim that the project 
upholds Performance Standard 7 even though Indigenous rights have not been respected, 
because it does not recognize communities within the project’s direct footprint as Indigenous 
despite the fact that these groups self-identify as Indigenous.13 In other words, LTWP has 
skillfully wielded the IFC Performance Standards to categorize and manage people in a way 
that provides ease of access to land. 
 
Kenya’s natural resource boom has created new incentives for powerful actors to mobilize 
each of the powers of exclusion at their disposal to make claims to land. In this case, the 
Kenyan government and LTWP have used various technologies of government to secure 
access to land. The Kenyan government has made decisions, court cases rulings and 
regulations that protect the wind power project while LTWP has largely relied on discursive 
legitimation access to land for the purpose of natural resource development. LTWP has 
framed the wind project as a progressive and productive use of land. This rhetoric appeals to 
both investors and the Kenyan government, aligning with the government’s long-term plan 
                                                
13 For example, Danwatch (2016) claims that LTWP has failed to obtain Free, Prior and Informed Consent 
(FPIC) from indigenous communities,  FPIC requires full, meaningful and comprehensive information on the 
project and its alternatives to the affected communities, upon which the communities then make a final decision 
about it.  
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for national development, Vision 2030, which prioritizes investing in and developing 
Kenya’s land and natural resources. Recent editorials and reports reinforce this rhetoric, 
arguing that the wind project should be viewed through the ‘Vision 2030 lens’ as a step 
towards higher quality of life for all citizens (Kibati 2015) and depicting those resisting the 
project as ‘people in the way of progress’ (Danwatch 2016).  
 
LTWP has also used voluntary standards to legitimise their right to develop land and to 
disrupt and displace conflicting claims over access to land and resources. LTWP has hired 
experts to verify that the project complies with global norms related to responsible land 
acquisition. These experts have produced evidence to show investors how contentious 
political issues around land — such as claims to land and resources by Indigenous groups — 
have been ‘appropriately’ managed using voluntary standards. By referring to the project’s 
compliance with the IFC Performance Standards, for example, LTWP suggests that 
resistance against the project is unfounded and unreasonable. This example illustrates how 
investors can use voluntary standards to legitimise the means through which they gain and 
maintain access to land. 
 
Oil Development in Turkana and the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights  
The second example it set to the west of LTWP, across Lake Turkana (see Map 3). After 
decades of unsuccessful exploration across Kenya, oil was discovered in Kenya’s 
northwestern county of Turkana in 2012. Although exploration is ongoing to determine the 
potential of reserves, recent estimates suggest that the basin could have an excess of one 
billion barrels of oil (Tullow Oil 2016). In addition to extensive investment in exploration 
and development, transnational oil companies have entered a partnership with the 
Government of Kenya to accelerate the development of LAPSSET, which includes a 
pipeline, an oil refinery, airports and railway lines. This ambitious undertaking, which oil 
companies are helping to finance, is promised “…to promote regional economic 
development and to develop northern Kenya (which has long been economically 
marginalized compared to central counties) and integrate it into the national economy’ (Patey 
2014: 3). The Kenyan government promises that oil development will create jobs and 
generate revenue for the local government and communities. 
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Map 3. Site of first oil discovery in northern Kenya at Ngamia 1. 
 
Despite these promises, pastoralist communities fear being excluded from oil development, 
as well as the modern future that this industry represents. When compared to harnessing and 
exporting wind power, oil development will likely be less land intensive. In late 2014, it was 
suggested that only 50 square kilometers (in a county of nearly 77,000 square kilometers) 
had been fenced off from community use for the purpose of oil development (interview with 
representative of civil society organisation in Lodwar, November 2014). From this area, ‘5 to 
10 temporary structures’ used by pastoralists — likely seasonal manyattas used by 
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pastoralists while grazing their livestock — were ‘relocated’ (IFC 2015: 19). Although this is 
a relatively small area, the fencing off of land had generated anxieties among community 
members whose primary livelihood is pastoralism. An oil company employee who was 
responsible for community engagement explained:  
[Pastoralists] need much land. They have grazing lands they rotate. If [our company] 
discovers more and more oil, soon there will be [no grazing land] left. We do not own 
land but we acquire licenses for forty to fifty years, which leaves pastoralists without 
access to these land. I see that it might be difficult for oil and pastoralism to co-exist if 
our operations continue to grow (interview with employee of oil company #1 in 
Lodwar, November 2014).  
Oil companies have been relatively proactive about addressing these anxieties. This same 
employee went on to explain “We do not do anything without consulting local communities 
and local government” (interview with employee of oil company #1 in Lodwar, November 
2014). She worked in the company’s ‘Community Engagement Office,’ where she was 
responsible for building positive community relations (see Image 2). Nonetheless, questions 
about land ownership, compensation and benefit-sharing are likely to become more pressing, 
however, as companies move closer towards development and as construction begins on the 
infrastructure needed for exporting oil, such as pipelines, railways and roads (Cordaid 2015). 
 
Communities surrounding sites of oil exploration and development also have other concerns 
about oil exploration and development, including questions about the distribution of jobs 
created by oil sector and rising levels of insecurity since the oil discovery (Enns and 
Bersaglio 2015). Since 2012, there has been growing competition between communities over 
job opportunities and potential oil revenues. People want to know who will be able to access 
the job opportunities generated by the emergent oil industry, as well as how the economic 
benefits of oil will be distributed between the communities that surround sites of oil  
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Image 2. A model used to explain to communities how oil drills operates and to help ease 
community concerns about flaring. Located in an oil company’s ‘Community Engagement 
Office’ in northernwestern Kenya (Photo Credit: Author) 
 
exploration and development. These anxieties have aggravated and exacerbated existing 
conflicts between communities and contributed to a rise of insecurity across the county.  
 
Concerns over access to the benefits of oil exploration and development have resulted in 
some level of resistance against the companies, including occasional protests at oil camps. At 
various points in 2012, 2013 and 2014, protesters gathered outside the walls of secured oil 
camps to demand that oil companies provide more job opportunities to Turkanas and that 
they distribute the benefits of oil development more widely throughout the county (interview 
with representative of civil society organisation in Lodwar, November 2014). However, the 
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protests were also described as a means of getting the central government’s attention about 
broader socio-economic problems in Turkana, such as a lack of public services and economic 
opportunities (interview with representative of civil society organisation in Lodwar, 
November 2014). The hope is that the government will direct more resources to the 
impoverished county in light of the future revenue-generating potential of oil. Oil companies 
have responded to protests by temporarily shutting down their operations or by limiting the 
areas in which they conduct exploration. In the case of the most ‘dynamic’ protest in 2013, 
oil companies deployed their private security teams to secure operations and evacuate 
employees. 
 
Insecurity related to oil development has also moved beyond the walls of secured oil camps, 
to other parts of the county where companies are exploring for oil. The southern region of the 
country, in particular, has experienced more resource-based conflict, cattle raiding, and road 
banditry since the discovery of oil (Agade 2015). In October 2014, 21 police officers were 
killed in Kapedo, just 145 km south of the country’s largest oil discovery. This ambush 
brought the tally of police officer deaths in the region to 120 since the oil discovery. This 
insecurity relates to traditional rivalries between the Turkana and Pokot communities, who 
both use land within the blocs where oil has been discovered. These age-old rivalries have 
intensified since the oil discovery, as both groups aim to solidify their ownership of the area 
in order to ensure that they can claim future oil revenue (Cordaid 2015). An elderly 
pastoralist in Loima explained in a discussion about oil: ‘We are happy that [the companies] 
have found oil because it may be good for our people but about the oil, we expect that the 
Pokot will come and kill us because of it’ (Focus Group Discussion #2 with pastoralists in 
Loima, November 2014). This statement reflects the extent of uncertainty and fears of 
insecurity that people associate with oil prospecting. 
 
Resistance and insecurity is all but expected by transnational oil companies operating in 
areas of so-called limited statehood, such as Turkana. As a recent media piece commenting 
on oil exploration in Turkana explains, ‘…an inevitable consequence for global oil and gas 
firms as they move into ‘frontier’ zones in search of valuable resources is the security risk 
from operating in some of the world’s most dangerous conflict zones’ (Rowe 2014). In 
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response to insecurity, oil companies use certain strategies to secure their control over land 
and defend their assets.  
 
First, state actors and oil companies have secured exclusion at sites of oil exploration and 
development by using a combination of powers, including regulation, force and market 
powers. For example, exploration and appraisal drilling activities require the creation of a 
well bed about 4 - 5 hectares wide, as well as the construction of an access road, while 
development activities require access to slightly larger amounts of land (interview with 
former oil company employee in Loima, November 2014). If pastoralists occupy the land 
that the company wants to explore or develop, local police are enrolled in the process of 
relocation (interview with former oil company employee in Loima, November 2014). In the 
case that pastoralists must be ‘displaced’ from exploration or longer-term activities, 
companies are not mandated to provide direct compensation for the land because it is not 
held privately (IFC 2015). Instead, the in-kind compensation is offered in the form of 
community projects, ‘such as construction of, or improvements to community infrastructure, 
like classrooms or water supply systems’ (IFC 2015). In this way, companies use multiple 
powers to enact their claims to land — simultaneously using passive force and creating new 
incentives to convince existing land users to move off their land. 
 
Once the land has been made empty, oil companies secure their claims to land by building 
high fences surrounded by deep trenches and mounds of dirt. They construct watchtowers 
equipped with searchlights and private security forces armed with rifles. The larger oil 
companies have also made arrangements with the central government to contract local police 
force as security forces. Local police, known as the Kenya Police Reserves (KPR), are 
essentially armed civilians that companies hire to help secure their sites and other 
infrastructure, such as private company airstrips. KPR are also hired on short-term contracts 
to provide protection to company personnel during exploration activities. In this setting, KPR 
prevent inter-ethnic livestock raids and violence from spilling over into exploration sites. 
However, they also prevent theft and banditry against exploration teams. Finally, unarmed 
youth play a quasi-security role around oil camps. Youth are hired to monitor access roads. 
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This role includes waving down and redirecting pastoralists who wander too close to 
company land or assets in search of pasture and water.  
 
Given that the state has conventionally been seen as the only actor that can use force 
legitimately to exclude (Hall et al. 2011), companies must find ways to legitimate their use of 
force to secure land. As a manager of one oil company explained, ‘There was a trite saying 
you heard in this industry in [the past], “If you have ex-military handling your community 
relations, you wouldn’t have security concerns. This is no longer the way we talk” (interview 
with manager of oil company #3 in Nairobi, January 2015). To legitimise their use of force to 
exclude, oil companies have taken steps to align their security practices with global norms 
that authorize the private use of force to secure land and resources in certain situations, such 
as the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights (VPSHR). These standards 
effectively serve to license the extractive industry’s use of force to secure their concessions, 
as long as this use of force is not excessive. For example, the VPSHR state that companies 
can contract private security forces if the state’s provision of security is inadequate, and that 
companies can provide equipment to public security forces in order to better secure their 
concessions, as long as they take all appropriate and lawful measures to mitigate any 
foreseeable negative consequences (VPSHR 2000).  
 
Technical experts, such as consulting firms, lawyers and human rights experts, are enrolled 
in the process of demonstrating how oil companies are complying with global norms. For 
example, oil companies in Turkana have hired expert consultants to produce documents that 
demonstrate their adherence with the VPSHR, and to create evidence that their use of force is 
in compliance with global expectations. These companies have also worked with experts to 
help implement risk assurance frameworks to ensure that their security operations are in line 
with relevant global standards. Finally, a number of oil companies in the region also 
participate in a multi-stakeholder initiative, the Nairobi Process, as evidence that they are 
making efforts to manage and mitigate security challenges in compliance with global norms, 
and that any use of force that they exert to secure their concessions is seen as legitimate by 
other industry stakeholders. 
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This example further illustrates how experts are in enrolled in the process of legitimising 
corporate control over land; in this case, hired to produce documents that show how 
companies are using force appropriately to secure their control over land. The evidence 
created by experts is then used to prove to investors (and international financial institutions 
that are supporting Kenya’s burgeoning oil industry) that companies are mitigating risk by 
aligning their security practices with ‘best practice’. At the same time, the Kenyan 
government and oil companies are using other powers of exclusion, including regulation, 
force and market powers, to secure the industry’s access to and control over land.  
Concluding discussion 
In order to capitalize on resource booms, large areas of land must be opened up for 
investment. This requires reconfiguring relations of land access and control. This article has 
described the set of state-led interventions that have been implemented to transform land 
relations in northern Kenya, as the Kenyan government works to free land and resources of 
their existing users. I examine the various technologies of government — force, the market, 
regulation, and legitimation — used to create space for investment in Kenya’s emerging 
resource frontier. Importantly, ‘these powers do not so much follow as reinforce each other,’ 
working in tandem to alter the ways people can access or be excluded from land (Hall et al. 
2011: 192). 
 
However, the state is not the only actor implicated in Kenya’s frontier-making project. 
Rather, a multitude of actors are also involved in assembling land and resources for 
investment. As I show in this article, transnational corporations play a central role in 
reconfiguring relations of land access and exclusion, often using technologies of government 
that operate beyond the state to do so. In the two cases considered in this article, investors 
have responded to community uncertainty and resistance to natural resource development by 
attempting to establish the moral basis for their claims to land. For example, LTWP has 
described the land that they are building on as empty, underutilized and unproductive and the 
wind power project as a step towards Kenya’s more modern future. Such narratives about 
land and its potential rely on moral economics of use — justifying the displacement of some 
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land users in favour of more ‘productive’ land uses that are in the social interest of society 
(Prudham and Coleman 2011). 
 
Investors have also attempted to legitimate their control over land by demonstrating their 
compliance with global norms around responsible land acquisition, which are encoded in 
voluntary standards, such as the IFC Performance Standards and the VPSHR. In theory, 
voluntary standards are meant to benefit both companies and communities by mitigating the 
social and environmental externalities of resource development. In other words, the hope is 
that voluntary standards will ensure that investment is ‘done right’ (Li 2015). However, as I 
show in this article, voluntary standards can also be deployed to disrupt more conventional 
modes of land control and access with new paradigms of land control and access, or to 
displace community resistance. In the two examples considered here, investors use voluntary 
standards to justify their access to, and control of, land and resources in northern Kenya. 
Investors hire technical experts to help with this process. These experts are responsible for 
producing evidence that validates the means through which investors have acquired access 
and maintained control over land, so that resource projects can show their investors that land 
acquisition has been achieved in a ‘rightful’ or ‘appropriate’ manner.  
 
Ultimately, this analysis illustrates how private investors use voluntary standards to resolve 
technical debates about ‘the right disposition of things’ (Foucault 1991: 95). This use of 
voluntary standards is problematic, as it reinforces power inequalities between global actors 
and rural land users. As the Kenyan state works to rework the rules that govern access to land 
so as to capitalize on the country’s recent resource boom, transnational investors are 
simultaneously using voluntary standards to legitimize new paradigms of land control and to 
justify the exclusion of existing land users. Armed with ample resources and connected to 
international experts, these investors have the ability to produce documents that demonstrate 
their compliance with voluntary standards in order to legitimise their control over land. 
These experts assess and audit corporate practices against voluntary standards to create 
evidence that companies are acting appropriately, and in accordance with global norms, in 
exerting their control over land. Although rural land users can similarly use voluntary 
standards to back their own claims to land (or to contest corporate claims to their land), they 
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often lack the resources necessary to make voluntary standards serve their interests. 
Moreover, the state may intervene and upset bottom-up attempts to reclaim control over land. 
 
Much of the existing scholarship on voluntary standards has attempted to evaluate the 
usefulness of voluntary standards by debating their effectiveness as a means of regulating 
transnational corporations. In addition to questioning whether voluntary standards are 
‘effective’ or ‘ineffective’ as a governance tool, I argue that it is also pertinent to focus on 
understanding how different groups with varying degrees of power use voluntary standards 
and in order to achieve what ends. Voluntary standards are political. They can potentially be 
used to encourage responsible corporate conduct and hold investors to account for 
irresponsible conduct. But, in the hands of powerful actors, voluntary standards can also be 
wielded as a discursive frame that enhances the legitimacy of investor claims to land and 
disparages community resistance. With this in mind, future research may consider other 
examples where more or less powerful actors effectively wield voluntary standards to 
consolidate their control over land, in order to determine whether these standards have 
transformative potential or if they have become the master’s tools. 
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Article #2 
Corridor projects and rural politics in northern Kenya: The use of expertise ‘from 
below’ to disassemble land as a resource for investment 
 
 
Context 
This article analyses reactions ‘from below’ in response to the construction of the Lamu 
Port–South Sudan–Ethiopia Transport (LAPSSET) corridor in northern Kenya — a mega-
infrastructure development that includes a pipeline, new highway, railway and port, among 
other projects. In this article, I reflect on transformations in both governance and citizenship 
in contemporary frontier spaces, contributing insights to the broader themes motivating this 
dissertation. With regards to governance, this article illustrates how rural actors impacted by 
infrastructure development engage with land deals and participate in land governance. More 
specifically, I show how rural groups draw on different forms of expertise from the global 
arena — ranging from agricultural science to biodiversity science to international legal 
frameworks — in order to counter claims made by more powerful actors about how land 
should be used and managed. By illustrating how rural groups, who are conventionally 
thought of as existing ‘below’ the state, draw on expertise constructed ‘above’ the state to 
participate in land governance, this article reveals how frontier spaces serve as zones of 
governmental experimentation and innovation. 
 
This article also reflects on the practice and experience of citizenship in frontier spaces, 
which is characterized by complex political subjectivities (Larsen 2015). Just as actors 
beyond or other than the state are participating in governing Kenya’s frontier, actors beyond 
the state also confer rights often associated with citizenship. For example, some pastoralist 
groups have found that they can counter state and corporate claims to their land by having 
their distinct rights as Indigenous peoples recognized by nonstate actors. Although the 
Kenyan state refuses to acknowledge these rights, suprastate and nonstate political 
communities have extended Indigenous rights to pastoralists. This example illustrates how 
the practice and experience of citizenship in Kenya’s frontier challenges the notion that 
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‘without a state, there can be no citizenship;’ instead revealing that ‘alternative, nonstate 
communities and jurisdictions do in fact constitute important sources of rights and status’ 
(Maas 2013: 2).  
 
This article was conceptualized following an initial period of fieldwork in Kenya between 
October 2014 and April 2015. Although infrastructure development was not a planned focus 
of my research, LAPSSET featured so prominently during discussions and interviews about 
oil and gas in Kenya that it became essential to acknowledge infrastructure as a driving force 
of transformation in the north. Upon returning from my first period of fieldwork, I wrote an 
early draft of this article, attempting to tease out the different stakeholders impacted by and 
reacting to LAPSSET based on my findings. This early draft was also informed by the 
analysis of news stories and documents on LAPSSET published between January 2012 and 
June 2016. In May 2016, I returned to north-central Kenya to validate my analysis through 
interviews and site visits. During this period of fieldwork, I conducted 20 semi-structured, 
qualitative interviews with representatives of rights-based and environmental non-
governmental organisation (NGO), local and customary leaders, community members and 
industry actors. These interviews were conducted in two counties impacted to varying 
degrees by LAPSSET — Isiolo and Laikipia. Importantly, 38 other interviews conducted in 
other parts of Kenya, including Turkana and Nairobi, during my earlier fieldwork also 
informed my analysis.  
 
This article will be published in a leading journal in the field of rural politics and 
development in 2017. A shorter and revised version of this article is also included as a 
chapter in a forthcoming edited volume on natural resource development and social 
movements. This article was presented at the Development Studies Association’s (DSA) 
annual conference in 2016 – hosted by the Oxford Department of International Development 
(ODID) at the University of Oxford – as part of a panel titled ‘The politics of environment 
and natural resource governance and livelihoods’. This article also benefited from the 
thoughtful and thorough comments of Dr. Teresa Kramarz, along with other workshop 
participants, during the PhD workshop on Environment and Resources hosted by the Balsillie 
School of International Affairs. I am the sole contributor to this article. 
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Pipeline projects and rural politics in northern Kenya: The use of expertise ‘from 
below’ to disassemble land as a resource for development and investment 
 
 
Charis Enns 
 
 
Abstract: In 2012, construction began on the Lamu Port–South Sudan–Ethiopia Transport 
(LAPSSET) corridor project in northern Kenya. In addition to a pipeline that will carry crude 
oil across the country, the project will include international airports, resort cities, special 
development zones, a highway and a railway. Rural land users across northern Kenya will be 
significantly impacted by the corridor project, both during construction and once it is 
complete. There has been a spectrum of different and conflicting reactions to LAPSSET, as 
some rural land users have adamantly resisted the project while others have sought to be 
incorporated into it. Drawing on fieldwork conducted in north-central Kenya, this article 
offers a case study of different reactions ‘from below’ in response to this mega-infrastructure 
development. The central aim of this article is to examine how rural groups draw upon 
different forms of expertise — ranging from biodiversity science to international legal 
frameworks — as a basis for framing and legitimising their diverse reactions to large-scale 
land deals. The analysis contributes to wider debates about rural agency, by demonstrating 
how rural groups strategically deploy different forms of expertise in response to proposed 
land developments in order to negotiate their terms of incorporation into the deal or to 
present a countering consensus of how land could be better used and managed.  
 
Keywords: Land; pastoralism; expertise; knowledge production; Kenya; LAPSSET 
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Introduction  
In November 2015, an article in a Kenyan newspaper ran with the headline, ‘LAPSSET 
project runs into headwinds as residents demand full involvement’ (Abdi 2015). The Lamu 
Port–South Sudan–Ethiopia Transport (LAPSSET) project is an infrastructure corridor that 
includes a pipeline to transport crude oil from one side of Kenya to the other, as well as a 
new highway, railway and port. Although this particular newspaper article reported that 
communities in north-central Kenya are not opposed to project, it noted that some 
communities are mobilising in response to the project nonetheless — trying to ensure that 
they are involved in and benefit from the mega-infrastructure development. Towards 
Kenya’s coast on the Indian Ocean, LAPSSET is making national headlines for very 
different reasons. Rather than demanding benefits and seeking inclusion in the project, 
Indigenous communities and supporting civil society organisations are forming global 
alliances and advocating to stall or stop construction, based on their concerns about how the 
project will impact their land as a productive resource. In other parts of northern Kenya, 
domestic networks and alliances are forming in order to produce and share technical and 
scientific knowledge about the impacts of LAPSSET on socio-ecological systems. Such 
diverse political reactions ‘from below’ reflect the range and complexity of rural responses to 
large-scale land deals (Hall et al. 2015).  
 
Importantly, these reactions to mega-infrastructure development also bring to the fore 
questions about how rural populations mobilize in response to large-scale land deals, as well 
as why they respond in the ways that they do. There is a growing body of scholarship that 
draws on concepts and analytical tools from critical agrarian studies — including ideas about 
agrarian class politics, everyday forms of rural resistance and contentious politics — in order 
to understand how and when people mobilize in response to large-scale land deals (R. Hall et 
al. 2015; White et al. 2012; Wolford et al. 2013; Edelman, Oya, and Borras 2013; Mamonova 
2015). This scholarship has effectively challenged one of the fundamental assumptions of the 
field, ‘namely, the idea that ‘local communities’ always mobilize and engage in resistance in 
response to land deals’ (emphasis added, R. Hall et al. 2015). This scholarship generally 
agrees that movements from below in response to large-scale land acquisitions extend far 
beyond resistance, ranging from tacit acceptance to seeking incorporation. In effect, this 
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body of work has challenged ‘dominant framings of rural and peasant communities across 
the global South as either passive victims or unified resisters of land grabs,’ recognising that 
what happens on the ground in response to land deals is more varied and complex than is 
often assumed (R. Hall et al. 2015: 468).  
 
In this article, I aim to contribute to this body of scholarship by presenting a case study of 
rural reactions to mega-infrastructure development in north-central Kenya. In line with 
existing scholarship, my analysis demonstrates how rural land users respond to the same land 
deal in different ways, which is reflective of how rural people are impacted differently by 
land acquisitions and have diverse interests in land development. I also aim to extend this 
body of scholarship by examining how rural groups react to large-scale land deals. I show 
that rural groups draw upon different forms of expertise — ranging from agricultural science 
to biodiversity science to international legal frameworks — as a basis for framing and 
legitimising their reactions for, against or within large-scale land acquisitions. I argue that 
just as powerful actors, such as the state, can use expertise in order to justify re-shaping rural 
livelihoods and landscapes through large-scale land deals; rural groups can draw upon and 
deploy such expertise as well — competing with more powerful actors to shape the rules that 
govern access to land. My analysis, therefore, reveals the visibility and agency of rural actors 
in the midst of large-scale land acquisitions (LSLAs), demonstrating how these actors 
skilfully wield different forms of expertise in order to make and resist land deals.  
 
I begin by briefly reviewing recent literature that considers the interaction between land 
grabbing, political reactions ‘from below’ and the role of knowledge and expertise in relation 
to the phenomenon of land grabbing. The next section outlines the role of infrastructure as a 
driving force of large-scale land acquisitions across sub-Saharan Africa and then introduces 
my specific case study, providing contextual information about Kenya’s massive 
infrastructure corridor. In the section that follows, I analyse rural responses to this particular 
infrastructure project in northern Kenya. I highlight the ways in which this project will (or 
has the potential to) impact access to land and resources in the region, as well as the different 
reactions of two rural groups that will be impacted by the project. In this section, I also 
analyze the different types of expertise that these rural groups are mobilising to frame their 
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responses, and to challenge the existing ‘expert’ consensus about why it is necessary to 
invest in and develop this land. I conclude by drawing these different responses into dialogue 
with one another, considering how power asymmetries ultimately influence the ability that 
rural group shave to inform the rules that govern access to land. 
 
This article is informed by the discourse analysis of news stories and documents concerning 
LAPSSET published between January 2012 and June 2016. These news stories were 
collected using Google Alerts and Factiva and analyzed manually, searching for rural 
reactions both for and against LAPSSET. In May 2016, I conducted fieldwork in north-
central Kenya to validate my analysis of news stories through interviews and site visits. 
During this period of fieldwork, I conducted 20 semi-structured, qualitative interviews with 
actors who are at the centre of debates about land and LAPSSET, including representatives 
of rights-based and environmental non-governmental organisation (NGO), local and 
customary leaders, community members and industry actors. These interviews were 
conducted in two counties impacted by LAPSSET — Isiolo and Laikipia. An additional 38 
interviews were conducted in other parts of Kenya, including Turkana, Samburu and Nairobi, 
during previous fieldwork trips, which also informed my analysis.  
 
Analytical framework  
 
Political reactions ‘from below’14 to large-scale land deals 
While critical scholarship has long been interested in peasant agency and resistance in 
response to agrarian change, scholars have recently begun to devote more attention to 
examining (1) new forms of land grab, also known as ‘the global land rush’ (Borras, Hall, 
Scoones, White, & Wolford 2011; Deininger et al. 2011), and (2) diverse responses to the 
global land rush from below (R. Hall et al. 2015; White et al. 2012; Wolford et al. 2013; 
Edelman, Oya, and Borras 2013; Mamonova 2015). During the early 2000s, media reports 
and academic discussions on ‘land grab’ tended to emphasize cases of resistance and 
                                                
14 I use the phrase ‘from below’ as: (1) rural land users, regardless of their class, often participate in politics 
below the state to influence land politics; (2) rural land users are often part of politically marginalised people 
groups — although this is certainly not always the case.  
  69 
oppositional mobilisation in response to the expansion of corporate and state control over 
land (R. Hall et al. 2015). More recently, however, research has indicated that what happens 
on the ground in response to land deals is often more varied and complex than assumed (e.g. 
R. Hall et al. 2015, White et al. 2012; Wolford et al. 2013; Edelman, Oya, and Borras 2013; 
Mamonova 2015). Although rural land users may resist land grab, they may also demand to 
be incorporated within land deals, or attempt to negotiate what benefits they might receive 
from such deals. In other cases, there may a complete absence of mobilisation or resistance, 
as peasants demonstrate passive acceptance of changes to land use and access (Mamonova 
2015).  
 
The array of diverse responses to large-scale land deals has been attributed to the fact that 
rural communities are ‘differentiated along lines of class, gender, generation, ethnicity and 
nationality’ (R. Hall et al. 2015: 468). Because land deals impact individuals and 
communities differently, diverse rural reactions to land deals are to be expected (Borras and 
Franco 2013; R. Hall et al. 2015). This understanding of rural communities is not novel. For 
example, Hall argued that while rural social groups do share common conditions, ‘they are 
also cross-cut by conflicting interests, historically segmented and fragmented’ (1986: 14). 
Although Agrawal and Gibson have argued that researchers must acknowledge ‘the divergent 
interests of multiple actors within communities, the interactions or politics through which 
these interests emerge and different actors interact with each other, and the institutions that 
influence the outcomes of political processes’ (1999: 640). In short, because people perceive, 
interpret and experience changes to land use and access differently based on a whole range of 
environmental, social, economic and political factors, their responses are rarely uniform or 
homogeneous — even when reacting to the same land deal.  
 
The role of expertise in large-scale land deals 
Accepting that political responses to large-scale land deals are diverse, complex, and 
contingent, one interesting question that arises relates to how different forms of expertise are 
used to justify land deals and prevent or subvert resistance from rural land users. In recent 
works on land grab and agrarian change, expertise is understood as knowledge about land 
that is accepted as authoritative (Pritchard et al. 2016). This includes technical and political 
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expertise about what land is, what is can or should do and how humans should interact with it 
(Li 2014; Pritchard et al. 2016).  
 
Scholars such as Li (2014), Wolford and Nehring (2015), Pritchard et al. (2016) and Wolford 
(2015a) have shown how expert knowledge about land is produced and disseminated by 
powerful actors in order to legitimise large-scale land deals as common sense and necessary 
for development. For example, Li (2014) examines how international development 
organisations, such as the FAO and World Bank, use statistical techniques to quantify and 
qualify land that is ‘underutilized’ in order to assemble land as a resource awaiting global 
investment. Similarly, Wolford (2015a) explores how international development 
organisations use scientific understandings of plant breeding and soil quality to estimate 
land’s potential for agricultural intensification. These works each show how various actors, 
such as naturalists, surveyors, geologists, soil scientists and development practitioners, are 
enrolled in the process of producing knowledge about the suitability of land for investment 
(Pritchard et al. 2016; Li 2014; Wolford 2015a). These actors produce knowledge about land 
by measuring, calculating, estimating and predicting the risks and potential associated with 
investing in and developing land (Li 2014). As Li (2014) suggests, this information can be 
used to assemble land as a resource that would benefit from investment, and also to 
legitimise investment in land as both common sense and necessary.  
 
This recent work engages with a broader body of critical scholarship concerning the role of 
expertise in rural development (for example, see Li 2007, Goldman 2005, Scott 1998, Moore 
2001, Kothari 2005, Mitchell 2002). This body of scholarship pays careful attention to 
hierarchies of knowledge, showing how specific type of knowledge — such as 
indigenous/local, legal, scientific, administrative — carry different value and have different 
abilities to shape rural development processes. Drawing from this scholarship, authors such 
as Li (2014), Wolford and Nehring (2015), Pritchard et al. (2016) and Wolford (2015a) 
reflect more specifically on the types of expertise necessary to make land deals possible — 
including technical and political expertise about what land can or should do and whom 
should have access to it. For example, Wolford (2015a) has shown how scientists from 
ProSAVANA, a development program in Mozambique funded by the Brazilian Cooperation 
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Agency (ABC) and the Japanese International Cooperation Agency (JICA), use scientific 
reasoning to convince farmers to move away from unproductive subsistence farming towards 
more productive commodity cropping. Such reflections reveal the disciplining or 
governmentalising power of expert knowledge in relation to land deals. As powerful experts 
employ Western science and technological innovations to intervene in how land is used and 
who has access to it, they also shape peoples’ conduct. In this sense, expert knowledge about 
land is used to ‘encode practices of government on a population, objects, and landscapes’ in 
order to render land accessible and investible (Campbell 2015: 151).  
 
What remains understudied in this work, however, is how rural land users — who are often 
most impacted by land deals — respond to expert claims about land, and make use of 
expertise to negotiate and contest land deals. In other words, less attention had been paid to 
the ways in which actors with relatively less power mobilize and circulate different forms of 
expertise to negotiate the terms of land deals, or in support of alternatives to LSLA 
altogether. One notable exception is work by Goldstein (2016), who demonstrates how 
scientists and environmental NGOs use divergent expertise to contest the government’s land 
grab regime in Indonesia. She call this alternative scientific knowledge produced by 
networks of scientists and NGOs ‘divergent expertise’ and illustrates how divergent expertise 
can be used to problematize the ecological risks associated with industrial development and 
to raise questions about whether peatland is suitable for investment at all (Goldstein 2016). 
 
In the analysis that follows, I aim to extend this line of research. I argue that just as expertise 
can be constructed and circulated ‘from above’ to legitimise land deals, divergent expertise 
can also be mobilized ‘from below’ to negotiate and contest the rationale behind LSLA. I 
suggest that when land deals take place, rural groups are forced to engage with the expertise 
produced by relatively more powerful actors. They have the choice to either accept this 
expertise as valid, or to negotiate and contest it by presenting counter-claims about how land 
should be used and managed. Following Li (2014), who considers the practices and 
discourses that powerful actors, such as investors, use to make land suitable for investment, I 
examine the politics of contesting this suitability, asking what practices and discourses rural 
groups use to either incorporate themselves within land deals, or disassemble land as a 
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resource awaiting investment. This analysis contributes important insights to current research 
on political reactions ‘from below’ — revealing rural agency in relation to LSLA, as well as 
the specific strategies that are available to rural land users seeking to protect their interests in 
light of unprecedented competition over land. 
 
Like the scholarship outlined above, I acknowledge the disciplining or governmentalising 
power of expert knowledge in relation to large-scale land deals. In my analysis, I also pay 
attention to the struggles between different types of expertise that emerge when land deals 
take place, as various actors compete to shape the rules that govern access to land. As 
Agrawal (2009) suggests, there are many ways of knowing the world and these come into 
conflict with each other in the context of rural development rural development. Powerful 
actors circulate expertise in order to advance their interests and secure their investments in 
land. Yet, because systems of expertise can never fully colonize a place (Campbell 2015), 
rural land users do not necessarily have to accept this expertise. They can also mobilize 
divergent expertise to contest the necessity of large-scale investments. In the following 
sections of this paper, I show how rural groups are using new forms of expertise — such as 
biodiversity science and international human rights frameworks — to influence struggles 
over land. 
 
Infrastructural development as a driver of large-scale land acquisition  
The case that I present in this paper provides examples of political reactions from below in 
response to a mega-infrastructure development in northern Kenya. Infrastructure 
development is an important driver of the global rush for land that has been relatively 
understudied.15 Though mega-infrastructure projects, which require large tracts of land, are 
increasingly common; case studies that link the global land rush to the development of 
physical infrastructure have received ‘little attention as a proper unit of study’ (Otsuki 2016: 
1). Generally constructed ‘to link extractive frontiers to metropolitan areas and foreign 
markets,’ mega-infrastructure projects are made possible by private foreign investors, 
governments and multilateral development agencies, with the objective of facilitating 
                                                
15 Notable exceptions include Walker 2006; Levien 2012; Sampat 2013; Sampat 2015 
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regional integration, industrial development, and global trade (Safransky and Wolford 2011: 
5). These extensive developments — which are often referred to as transport or development 
corridors — sometimes span entire countries, if not continents, and include the construction 
of highways, railways, pipelines, port facilities, waterways, processing and export zones and 
refineries.  
 
The link between large-scale land acquisitions and infrastructural corridors in sub-Saharan 
Africa is a particularly timely topic, given that dozens of major corridors are currently 
underway across the continent. A recent study by Laurance et al. (2015) identifies 33 major 
infrastructural corridors that are under construction or are slated to begin construction in the 
coming years. If completed, these corridors will span over 53,000 km in length, crisscrossing 
much of the African continent (Laurance et al. 2015). Proponents of mega-infrastructure 
development argue that these projects will improve regional integration, increase agricultural 
production and grow exports (particularly mineral exports) (Weng et al. 2013; Edwards et al. 
2014). In contrast, opponents argue that large-scale land acquisitions for infrastructure 
development have the potential to result in dispossession and displacement, as well as 
opening up extensive areas of land to new environmental pressures (Laurance et al. 2015).  
 
Given that recent research has tended to overlook the relation between infrastructure 
development and new tensions over land in sub-Saharan Africa, this case contributes to a gap 
within existing literature (Otsuki 2016). Furthermore, mega-infrastructure projects in sub-
Saharan Africa generally involve a multitude of different actors — including global, national 
and local public and private sector actors, as well as civil society actors and communities. 
This makes them a particularly interesting space to examine what happens with between 
different types of expertise meet. Unlike large-scale agricultural developments, which may 
be financed a single private investor and facilitated by the state, mega-infrastructure projects 
tends to involve much more complicated networks of actors who rely on different forms of 
expertise in their attempt to legitimise land control and advance their projects. With this in 
mind, mega-infrastructure projects in provide a useful window into studying how different 
forms of expertise, including scientific, legal, social, and political expertise, are used by 
different actors to advance, negotiate or contest large-scale land deals. 
  74 
 
Infrastructure projects and politics in northern Kenya 
Geographies of difference and development in northern Kenya  
At 467,200 km2, the arid and semi-arid lands (ASALs) of Kenya encompass nearly 80 
percent of this East African country (REGLAP 2012). About 19 percent of the country’s 
population resides in the ASALs, which also play host to nearly 70 percent of the country’s 
livestock and over 75 percent of the country’s wildlife (REGLAP 2012). In this landscape, 
consisting almost entirely of deserts, dry grasslands and semi-arid woodlands, the vast 
majority of communities in Kenya’s ASALs rely on pastoralism as their primary livelihood. 
Pastoralism is often supplemented by other livelihood strategies, including mixed farming, 
agro-pastoralism and fishing. Over the past couple of decades, more destitute pastoralists 
with few or no livestock have begun to settle, clustering around food aid distribution centres 
or in urban and peri-urban settings in order to participate in alternative livelihoods, including 
wage labour, entrepreneurial activities and transportation.  
 
Although vast in size and in socio-cultural and ecological diversity, Kenya’s ASALs have 
historically been treated as ‘desolate wastelands’. The British colonizers viewed the region as 
an empty ‘buffer zone between the arable highlands to the south, and Sudan, Ethiopia and 
Somalia to the north’ (Browne 2015: 12). This sentiment has persisted among post-colonial 
administrations as well. Northern Kenya remains a ‘distant backwater’ in the public 
imaginary — particularly in the capital city, Nairobi. In the National Assembly, northern 
Members of Parliament regularly lament their position as Kenya’s ‘second-class citizens’ 
(Kenya National Assembly Official Record 1971; 2009; 2012). In everyday discourse, 
Kenyans often refer to northern Kenya as ‘the other Kenya’ or ‘the forgotten land’ (interview 
with representative from civil society organisation in Nairobi, October 2014). Many northern 
Kenyans have also internalized this sentiment, referring to themselves as ‘forgotten people’ 
or describing travels from the north of the country to the capital as a ‘trip to Kenya’ 
(interview with community member in Loima, November 2014).  
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Goldsmith (2013) has characterized the sharp differences as Kenya ‘A’ and Kenya ‘B’, 
where Kenya ‘A’ is Nairobi and its interconnected towns and road networks and Kenya ‘B’ 
refers to the northern regions of the country (Lamont 2015). As one civil society 
representative that I spoke with explained: ‘The government has always been absent in the 
north of the country. Just follow the railway and you will see what the state sees as worth 
developing’ (interview with representative from civil society organisation in Nairobi, 
October 2014). Thus, the otherness of northern Kenya is more than imagined. Perceptions 
about the ‘backwardness’ of northern Kenya have resulted in the ongoing political, social and 
economic marginalisation of Kenya’s ASALs (and of the people living in them). Public 
service and infrastructural deficits in the region have consistently gone unaddressed, as 
successive governments have repeatedly chosen to direct public spending and investments 
where they yield ‘greater’ outputs. These include the high-output agricultural highlands in 
central and western Kenya (Eriksen and Lind 2009). As a result, the region has been plagued 
by poverty, insecurity, weak economic integration and limited political leverage — all of 
which amplify the risks and vulnerabilities associated with life in the ASALs.  
 
The sharp distinction between Kenya ‘A’ and Kenya ‘B’ is particularly clear when 
considering transport infrastructure in the north. Although flights to northern Kenya have 
increased in frequency and decreased in price in recent years, the cost of flying remains out 
of reach for most northern Kenyans. In terms of road travel, the northern half of the country 
is characterized by inadequate and fragmented infrastructure. Beyond the two national 
highways that connect the north to the rest of the country, there are currently few tarmac 
roads. Travelers drive on loose murram, sand roads or dried-up riverbeds — often only 
identifiable by following recent vehicle tracks and impassable when it rains. Along certain 
stretches, banditry and inter-ethnic conflicts are common. Bus travel to certain parts of the 
north has become more accessible in recent years, but it is still somewhat of a risky 
undertaking: bandits and raiders continue to target buses on the Lodwar-Kitale Highway and, 
more recently, suspected ‘al-Shabaab militants’ have attacked buses in northeastern regions 
of Kenya, closer to the Somalia border. In short, both the real and imagined differences 
between northern Kenya and the rest of the country hinge largely on the landscape’s current 
infrastructure — or lack thereof.  
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LAPSSET: ‘The corridor to nowhere’16 
Recent events, however, have thrust northern Kenya onto the international stage in a different 
light. These events include significant discoveries of oil reserves in northern Kenya and off 
the country’s northern coastline. The potential of other natural resource projects and 
investments in the north — including wind power in northwestern Kenya and mineral 
deposits near the northern coast — has also attracted international attention and investments 
to the region. In light of the potential for natural resource development, Kenya’s new 
constitution has supported ‘opening up’ northern Kenya for investment and development. As 
Letai states, ‘the talk today within government and private sector is...that the future of Kenya 
is in the ASALs’ (2015a: 2). The positioning of northern Kenya as a pathway towards 
modernity marks a dramatic swing of the pendulum in terms of the attitudes, discourses, and 
policies historically directed at the country’s ASALs.  
 
The plan to open up northern Kenya is clearly outlined in the nation’s development plan, 
Vision 2030. Like a growing number of countries across sub-Saharan Africa, Kenya has 
adopted an ambitious, long-term national plan for development (Fourie 2014). The primary 
objective of this plan is to transform Kenya into a ‘newly-industrialising, middle-income 
country’ by 2030 through a series of successive five-year plans (GoK 2007: 1). The plan 
places the development of new infrastructure as the ‘nation’s highest priority’ (GoK 2007: 
7), proposing that by 2030, ‘it will become impossible to refer to any region of the country as 
‘remote’’ (2007: 6). Vision 2030 proposes to develop vast networks of roads, railways, ports, 
airports, water and sanitation facilities, and telecommunications by attracting private-sector 
investments, with a focus on infrastructure development in the northern half of the country 
(Fourie 2014).  
 
The planned infrastructure projects are referred to as ‘flagship projects’ in Vision 2030 — 
defined as large-scale initiatives that are capable of having a defining impact on the future 
development of the entire nation (GoK 2007). The Lamu Port–South Sudan–Ethiopia 
                                                
16 Browne (2015) refers to LAPSSET as the ‘corridor to nowhere,’ which likely plays on Mills (2012) A 
Railway to Nowhere, The Building of the Lunatic Line 1896-1901 
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Transport (LAPSSET) corridor project is one such flagship project. Now under construction, 
LAPSSET is described as having the potential to transform the enduring disconnect between 
Kenya ‘A’ and Kenya ‘B’. This mega-infrastructure project proposes to move oil from 
northern Kenya, northern Uganda and South Sudan to a refinery on the Kenyan coast, to 
increase cross-border trade with Uganda, South Sudan and Ethiopia, and to provide a 
‘backbone for opening up Northern Kenya and integrating it into the national economy’ 
(Vision2030). A primary driver of this project is an oil pipeline — which will span over 
2,000 kilometers; however, the project will also include a refinery, a dual-carriage highway, 
standard gauge railway to carry both passenger and cargo trains, new international airports 
and ‘resort cities’. A series of development zones are also part of the flagship project, 
including special economic zones, export processing zones and agricultural growth zones 
(Browne 2015). According to Laurence et al. (2015), the core components of the project will 
cover at least 15,482 km2 once complete. 
 
The various components of the LAPSSET corridor are at different stages of development.  
Significant progress has been made towards the construction on the project’s port. The dual-
carriage highway, which links Isiolo with Moyale on the Ethiopian border, was completed in 
2016, along with the international airport in Isiolo. Sites for the proposed hydro dam, as well 
as the proposed resort cities and other two airports have also been selected. During a field 
visit in May 2016, it appeared that access roads to some of these sites were already under 
development, suggesting that land deals have been completed and construction will soon 
begin (see Image 3). The oil pipeline is in the feasibility phase and the government is still 
seeking financing for this particular project. Recent reports, however, indicate that the 
pipeline may be supported by a mix of philanthropic and development financing, in part, 
from the Sustainable Development Investment Partnership (SDIP).17  
 
The government has committed to contributing between 3% and 6% of its annual GDP 
towards the development of the project over the next decade (Government of Kenya 2012). 
                                                
17 Members of SDIP include: Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, Citi, the United States, the United Kingdom, 
the Netherlands, Sweden, Denmark and Norway. Others are Development Bank of South Africa, Deutsche 
Bank, East Capital, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the European Investment 
Bank. 
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Once complete, however, it is suggested that LAPSSET will contribute between 2% and 3% 
of the country’s GDP (Government of Kenya 2012). At peak production, the World Bank 
estimates Kenya’s oil sector could generate $9 billion in revenues or 16 percent of Kenya’s 
national revenue. Additional spin-off projects and development zones are intended to 
contribute further profit. Signs of this can be seen in early stages of construction, as the 
project attracts investment from novel sources, such as companies registered in China, India 
and Turkey (Lamont 2015). For example, in 2014, the Kenya Ports Authority signed a 
$478.9 million deal with China Roads and Bridge Corporation to construct the projects’ first 
three port berths (Trade-Watch Africa 2014). Beyond large-scale international investment, 
the Government of Kenya also claims that the project will offer new economic opportunities 
for Kenyan entrepreneurs and investors. This has also proven to be true to some extent, as 
Kenyan companies have benefited from certain opportunities associated with LAPSSET, 
such as government consultancies and various construction contracts (Lamont 2015).  
 
 
Image 3. Access road to the proposed Isiolo Resort City (Photo Credit: Author) 
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The government sees LAPSSET as a strategy for attracting investment, improving regional 
integration and creating strong export-orientated industries. Yet, in order to achieve these 
objectives, rural livelihoods and landscapes in the north must be reshaped. Accordingly, 
certain policies and institutions are being used to alter peoples’ conduct in the north — 
encoding new practices of government on northern populations to make both land and people 
more efficient. For example, LAPSSET includes the development of ‘agricultural growth 
zones’ in the north, which will prepare new lands for cultivation by improving irrigation 
(GoK 2009: 10). A modern abattoir has also been built in Isiolo as part of LAPSSET to 
improve market-access for pastoralists. In response to these developments, county 
governments in northern Kenya are encouraging their populations to intensify their livestock 
and agricultural production in order to raise their own incomes. Such initiatives, however, are 
also meant to support the growth of innovative, commercially-orientated and modern 
agriculture and livestock sectors in the north. At the same time, opportunities in the service 
sector are expanding in the region. LAPSSET’s CEO claims that the project has so far 
created over 5,000 construction and service jobs, and that it will create new business 
opportunities for millions of people in northern Kenya in the coming years (Ochieng’ 2016).  
 
Thus, LAPSSET is just as much about preparing northern populations for industrial 
modernisation as it is about attracting investment. LAPSSET is being used to re-shape 
knowledge about what ASALs are good for, how these lands should be used and by whom: 
The project is accompanied by ideals, institutions and policies that aim to transition people 
away from subsistence livelihoods towards commercial livestock and agricultural production 
and/or wage labour, so that they can contribute to national economic growth by using the 
land to produce capital, labour, and commodities, but also so they can improve their own 
futures. According to Kenya’s national development plan, a primary objective of Vision 
2030 is to ‘initiate a national programme on attitudinal and value change,’ so that all 
Kenyans may become efficient, globally-competitive and prosperous (GoK 2007: 25). As 
Fourie writes, LAPSSET is ‘…arguably the clearest crystallisation of the modernist vision 
driving this strategy’ (2014: 555).  
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Much of the expertise that the Kenyan government uses to present LAPSSET as 
commonsense and necessary for development reflects the knowledge purported by other 
powerful actors in the global arena. Fourie argues that the Kenyan government has borrowed 
ideas about how land should be used to spur socio-economic development from a handful of 
East Asian countries, examining the way that Kenya’s Vision 2030 ‘bears the imprint of 
Singaporean and Malaysian policies, rather than only the more modish ‘Chinese Model’’ 
(2014: 540). The expertise of international financial institutions, such as the World Bank, has 
influenced LAPSSET. In describing the importance of LAPSSET, the World Bank, which is 
also financing parts of the project, explains:  
‘Kenya has a long established transport and trade link to the north-west, but the poor 
state of the road constrains growth opportunities along this important 
corridor...Enhancing connectivity to this region will improve the livelihoods of the 
pastoral communities in the region, enabling their people to share in the prospects for 
growth, poverty reduction and prosperity’ (World Bank 2015).  
In both cases, the Kenyan government is borrowing expertise that positions mega-
infrastructure projects as essential to rural development. Project proponents suggest that 
Kenya’s ASALs are full of potential for improved use, which will ultimately benefit northern 
populations, in order to rationalize and justify the reshaping of livelihoods and landscapes in 
the north. The legitimacy of large-scale land deals often goes unquestioned when 
accompanied by the promise of improvement. Problematically though, as Prudham and 
Coleman (2011) argue, doctrines of improvement often accompany land reform, as they act 
as powerful narratives that depoliticize the effects of enclosure and undermine other ways of 
using and managing land. 
 
Rural reactions to LAPSSET  
As a result of LAPSSET, dramatic changes in land use and tenure are underway across 
northern Kenya. In addition to transforming the regional economy, these changes also have 
the potential to alter socio-ecological life in the region. Once complete, LAPSSET will 
traverse a landscape that is vast in size, as well as in socio-cultural and ecological diversity. 
It will cut across or run alongside internationally protected heritage sites, such as the Lamu 
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Archipelago, and world-renowned conservation areas, such as Marsabit National Park and 
Samburu National Park. The region’s current land users — mainly consisting of pastoralists, 
subsistence farmers, conservationists (white settlers are predominant in this group), 
entrepreneurs, along with livestock and wildlife — will be significantly impacted by various 
components of the project. Though LAPSSET may present new opportunities for some, the 
project will also inevitably constrain the existing livelihood strategies of others by altering 
access to land and resources; for example, by transferring large tracts of land to commercial 
investors or constructing infrastructure on traditional grazing grounds. In other words, 
although touted in familiar language of development, improvement and modernisation, there 
remain pressing questions and uncertainties about what LAPSSET actually means for rural 
people and economies in Kenya’s north. 
 
There are roughly three different perspectives on LAPSSET from rural populations in north-
central Kenya. First, there is a relatively large group of people in northern Kenya that know 
very little about the project. This tends to be the case in places that are more remote or more 
distant from the project footprint. In such spaces, people may have heard rumors about a 
large road, but often did not know details. Problematically, some of these communities reside 
directly within the projects’ path, yet they have not been informed about potential impacts to 
their lands and livelihoods (interview with resident of Isiolo, May 2016). Moreover, there 
were also some reports of people being evicted from their land and resettled without any 
notice or any information about why (interview with resident of Isiolo, May 2016). A recent 
report presented to the World Bank by Kibugi et al. similarly comments that government 
authorities have undertaken surveys and installed beacons to indicate which land will be 
acquired for LAPSSET infrastructure without notifying or providing information to affected 
communities (2016: 13-14).  
  
Second, there are many people in northern Kenya that are seeking to be incorporated into the 
project and to benefit from LAPSSET in some capacity. These perspectives were most 
dominant in peri-urban centres, such as Isiolo and Nanyuki Towns. In these small centres, 
people see LAPSSET as a source of alternate livelihood possibilities and an opportunity to 
increase their income (interview with resident of Isiolo, May 2016). A mechanic in Isiolo 
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Town, hired to repair the vehicle I used while conducting fieldwork, happily boasted, ‘Soon, 
Isiolo will be the centre of Kenya and everyone will come here to find jobs. This is good 
news for us!’ (interview with resident of Isiolo, May 2016). The same mechanic would later 
take me to see Isiolo’s new international airport (built as part of the broader LAPSSET 
project), where we chatted with the security guard about the size of planes that would soon 
be landing on the airport’s tarmac and the types of international guests, diplomats and 
business opportunities that these planes would bring. Others welcomed LAPSSET as it 
promised to improve access to roads, which, in turn, would also provide better access to 
hospitals, schools, and markets (interview with community leader, May 2016). Others still 
expressed excitement about LAPSSET because it promises to bring more tourists to support 
and grow the region’s already strong conservation industry.  
 
Li (2014) suggests that consenting to land deals based on one’s desire for infrastructure, such 
as a road, has a specific history in rural parts of the global south: In many regions, ‘…budget 
constraints under ‘structural adjustment’, combined with the neoliberal promise that private 
investment is the way forward, have led the government to abandon remote populations and 
leave infrastructure provision to its ‘partners’ in the private sector’ (Li 2014: 600). In places 
where no private sector exists and local governments receive inadequate funds to build roads, 
rural populations have been abandoned without infrastructure. For these people, signing over 
land may be accepted as an adequate price to pay for access to a road (Li 2014). Regardless 
of motivation, these are many residents of northern Kenya that are willing to concede land 
for the ‘improvement’ and ‘development’ that LAPSSET promises to bring. 
  
Finally, there is a third group of rural land users that are either contesting LAPSSET 
altogether, or attempting to negotiate its terms, in order to protect their rights and interests. 
Generally speaking, such people are concerned about the ways that LAPSSET will alter land 
use and access and are mobilising in response. These mobilisations are not strictly a struggle 
against dispossession and enclosure. Rather, rural land users are mobilising for diverse 
reasons and with various interests in mind. As Hall et al. explain about rural resistance, rural 
groups ’…mobilize under a range of banners (those of the poor citizen, the political party, the 
peasant, the ethnic or indigenous group) for access to land as a productive resources, as a 
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backstop for precarious livelihoods, and as a symbol for identity and belonging’ (2011: 20). 
In the final sections of this paper, I consider how two of the more dominant rural land users 
in north-central Kenya — pastoralists and conservationists — are mobilising in response to 
LAPSSET, as well as the different types of expertise that these groups are deploying in order 
to frame and legitimise their reactions to the project. 
 
The case of pastoralists: Using legal expertise to challenge LSLAs 
In northern Kenya, pastoralists face multiple threats to their livelihoods, including climate 
change, scarcity of natural resources, insecurity, famine, and drought. In this sense, land 
deals and private investments are just a further pressure experienced by pastoralists who 
already experience precarity. LAPSSET, however, has the potential to exacerbate this 
situation. Mega-infrastructure projects, such as LAPSSET, have particularly severe impacts 
on pastoralist systems for a number of reasons. First, pastoralists require access to large areas 
of land and other natural resources in order to sustain their livestock, but mega-infrastructure 
projects create competition over land and resources (Letai 2015a; Letai and Tiampati 2015). 
Second, mobility is essential for pastoralists as they must be able to move their livestock to 
distant sources of pasture and water during periods of scarcity, but mega-infrastructure 
projects place new restrictions on this form of mobility (Letai and Tiampati 2015) (see Map 
5). Third, pastoralists rely on healthy ecosystems but mega-infrastructure projects come with 
the risk of land degradation and adverse environmental impacts.  
 
Another complicating factor when considering the impacts of LAPSSET on pastoralists is the 
geography of land tenure arrangements in the north (Letai 2015b). Unlike other parts of the 
country — particularly the more fertile agricultural highlands — land in the north is 
recognized as community land, vested in and held by communities identified on the basis of 
their ethnicity, culture or similar community of interest (GoK 2015a). This tenure 
arrangement was created in order to accommodate pastoralists, who require access to wider 
geographical areas and resources (Letai 2015b; Letai and Tiampati 2015). Problematically, 
however, much of this land has never been formally registered to communities, but has 
instead been left in the trust of the government. Although pastoralists may have access and 
use rights to this land, there is a lack of clarity around ownership and management. This lack 
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of clarity creates conditions under which pastoralists can be displaced in favour of 
infrastructural development for the ‘common good’ of Kenya.  
 
 
Map 4. Map of pastoral movements along the proposed LAPPSSET corridor (RVI 2015) 
 
As LAPSSET carries significant risks for pastoralists — the largest demographic in northern 
Kenya — it is not surprising that tensions have surfaced between pastoralists and proponents 
of LAPSSET. There have been a number of collective mobilisations in response to the mega-
infrastructure project. Coalitions and networks of local leaders and NGOs are pursuing 
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strategies to mobilize people, ranging from creating petitions to lobbying for legal changes to 
organising demonstrations. For example, on an annual basis, a coalition of local Indigenous 
rights and environmental NGOs organize a Camel Caravan, involving a five-day march that 
culminates near the proposed Isiolo Dam site on United Nations International Day of the 
World’s Indigenous People. This demonstration serves as a platform to lobby the government 
to protect pastoralists against the negative environmental and social impacts of mega-
infrastructure development. This particular event has garnered significant public attention, 
including local and international media coverage and financial support from global NGOs. 
Similar types of demonstrations have also been organized at other sites where pastoralists 
will be impacted by infrastructural development. For example, Indigenous rights 
organisations, such as Save Lamu and Pastoralist Development Network of Kenya, have 
organized events, workshops and protests around the need for better consultation with and 
compensation for those impacted by LAPSSET. In response to these initiatives, the 
Government of Kenya has taken some steps to address the concerns of pastoralists, such as 
creating steering committees within local government to liaise between pastoralist 
communities and higher-level government officials. However, discrimination against 
pastoralists and corruption have allegedly impeded the success of these initiatives (Kanyinke 
Sena 2012).  
 
Those mobilising against LAPSSET have drawn on two types of expertise to frame and 
legitimise their resistance against certain components of the project. First, pastoralist 
networks have made an ecological case to back their concerns about LAPSSET. They have 
argued that using land for pastoralism is not only sustainable, but that it is also the best way 
to manage land in Kenya’s ASALs. Civil society organisations and local leaders concerned 
about protecting pastoralists’ rights in light of LAPSSET have produced and circulated 
research that offers evidence that putting policies in place to support pastoralists would 
increase the productivity of Kenya’s ASALs. These networks draw on research that claims 
that grasslands in arid regions suffer from long-term under-grasing and over-grasing, but 
benefit from periodic bursts of intense grasing (Briske et al. 2008; Vetter 2005) — 
supporting what pastoralists have long argued about their land management practices. Such 
research is used to challenge the necessity of certain components of LAPSSET, such as 
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intensifying agricultural production, but to support other components of LAPSSET, such as 
the need for a functioning, modern abbatoire.  
 
Second, pastoralist networks have also begun to build a legal case against certain aspects of 
LAPSSET. Over the past few years, there have been a few high profile cases where 
pastoralist communities have taken the government to court for violating the rights of 
pastoralists in relation to land and resources, as well as control over customary territory 
(interview with civil society organisation, May 2016). As construction on LAPSSET 
advances, local Indigenous rights and environmental NGOs are also providing pastoralist 
communities with various forms of legal assistance and training to help them protect their 
rights. For example, SWT plans to train paralegals to monitor the human and Indigenous 
rights impacts of LAPSSET in Laikipia and Isiolo Counties (Kanyinke Sena 2015). During 
one interview with a local civil society organisation, it was suggested that legal knowledge 
would be key to mitigating the potentially negative impacts of LAPSSET on already 
marginalized populations: ‘Now,’ she said, ‘everyone needs to go to court. The courts need 
to be filled so that people hear and listen to pastoralists’ (interview, May 2016). 
  
Pastoralist groups and supporting civil society organisations report that LAPSSSET violates 
transnational law, including Indigenous peoples’ rights to land as territory; to free, prior and 
informed consent; and to managing their land and natural resources as they see fit. There 
mobilisations involve using the banner of indigeneity to assert their land and resource rights. 
By deploying identity-based claims, pastoralists are able to create alliances with global 
activists and to have their rights claims heard in global spaces, effectively amplifying their 
struggle at the global level. In response to this advocacy, global civil society organisations 
and other global agencies have directed attention to pastoralists’ struggles in northern Kenya. 
For example, a member of the United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues 
undertook an unofficial mission to Kenya to investigate the impact of LAPSSET on 
Indigenous peoples in 2012 (Kanyinke Sena 2015).  
 
Pastoralist movements in north-central Kenya have been strengthened and legitimised by 
research that supports their land management practices, as well as through the support of 
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actors with global connections, who possess resources and strategic links with established 
Indigenous peoples’ movements globally. By forming alliances with global activists, 
pastoralist networks are also exposed to new forms of legal expertise and strategies related to 
the rights of Indigenous peoples. Though the Kenyan government attempts to render land 
investible in northern Kenya through persuasion — defending land deals using ideas about 
improvement and modernisation — pastoralist networks can use land management science 
and legal expertise to advance their claims to land. Using these forms of expertise, pastoralist 
networks have the potential to shape or rewrite the rules that govern access to land in 
northern Kenya. 
  
It is worth noting that the question of who counts as ‘Indigenous’ in East Africa is 
contentious. This is particularly true in Kenya, where groups who self-identify as Indigenous 
are neither recognized nor provided protection under national law. Thus, reaching above and 
beyond the state for recognition is a particularly strategic move. As was explained during an 
interview with a representative of a local civil society organisation, ‘Instead of waiting for 
the government to recognize the rights of Indigenous peoples in relation to LAPSSET, we are 
building a movement and agitating for change, demanding that the state recognises our 
internationally-guaranteed rights’ (interview in Laikipia, May 2016). Thus, pastoralist 
movements are using legal knowledge about the rights of Indigenous peoples — constructed 
and legitimated within global spaces — to challenge land deals at the local level. 
Importantly, whether their claims to land and resources will be recognized by the Kenyan 
state remains to be seen; however, these claims clearly resonates with other global 
movements, evidenced by the increasingly attention and support that pastoralists are 
receiving from global actors as the construction on LAPSSET advances.  
 
The case of conservationists: Using biodiversity science to challenge LSLAs   
After pastoralism, conservation is the most predominant use of land in northern Kenya. The 
region is home to over 75 percent of the country’s wildlife, along with 18 national parks, 
reserves and sanctuaries and 33 community conservancies. These spaces support much of 
Kenya’s biodiversity and also serve as key migratory routes for both animals, as well as 
pastoralists and their livestock. Northern Kenya also plays an important role in the 
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conservation of endangered species, such as Grevy’s zebra, hirola, wild dog, black rhino and 
elephant. In addition to protecting wildlife, the conservation industry also contributes to the 
regional and national economies through wildlife tourism. 
 
The conservation industry is a significant contributor to the regional economy, particularly 
when one factors in the spin-off projects that the industry generates. Importantly, white 
settlers and foreign nationals play a dominant role in this industry in northern Kenya; 
however, many northern Kenyans are also active participants.18 For example, the region’s 
largest conservation organisation, Northern Rangelands Trust, claims to provide some degree 
of support to over 250,000 people across nearly 32,000 km2 of northern Kenya on an annual 
basis (NRT 2015). While livelihoods in the north are primarily livestock based, the 
conservation industry does create both direct and indirect employment opportunities in a 
region where few other industries exist (NRT 2015). 
 
The impacts of LAPSSET on the environment and biodiversity in northern Kenya stand to be 
lasting and potentially devastating. Although the exact routing of certain elements of the 
project are yet to be determined, the transport infrastructure will cut across or run alongside 
internationally protected heritage sites and world-renowned conservation areas. The 
construction and operation of new highways, access roads, rail lines, and the pipeline will 
disrupt these spaces, as well as wildlife and human/livestock migratory patterns. Moreover, 
recent work by Laurance et al. (2015) has examined the ‘halo effect’ of transport 
infrastructure in sub-Saharan Africa, where habitat disruption tends to extend far beyond the 
actual project footprint. This is a result of increased human activities, as well as the 
construction of secondary and tertiary roads around major transport nodes (Laurance et al. 
2015). At the very least, the construction of LAPSSET will result in the degradation of 
grasing grounds across the north, forcing wildlife and livestock to search for alternative 
pastures in a region where competition over fertile ground already exists. Given the high 
environmental costs and potential for habitat destruction, some scholars and conservation 
organisations have gone so far as to claim that LAPPSET’s costs may outweigh its benefits, 
                                                
18 Here I refer back to my definition of ‘from below’ (see Footnote #17) to point out that although white settlers 
are not part of a political marginalized people group, they still occupy rural spaces in northern Kenya and often 
operate from below to influence land politics (such as lobbying through civil society organizations).  
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claiming that certain components of the project are ‘clearly incompatible’ with local, national 
and international biodiversity and conservation objectives (Laurance et al. 2015; African 
Conservation Foundation 2013).  
 
In addition to the direct environmental impacts of constructing LAPSSET, other aspects of 
LAPSSET also present significant environmental risks. The sites selected for the proposed 
resort cities are in complex socio-ecological areas. For example, Isiolo resort city, which was 
described as ‘Kenya’s Las Vegas’, is being constructed in an incredibly remote area that 
serves as a dry-season grazing ground for pastoralists, as well as an important migratory 
route for elephants (interview with community leader, May 2016) (see Images 4 and 5). 
Moreover, the access roads being constructed to reach the city site are further disrupting 
grazing pastures. Finally, given its remote and arid location, the city will also require water. 
A new dam in the Ewaso Ng’iro River has been proposed to service the city, as well as to 
provide irrigation for new agricultural projects. The proposed dam reservoir will submerge a 
total of 2083 hectares of conservancy land, and additional land will be sequestered for the 
dam’s power station and switchboard (Sena 2015). Submerging this land in order to create 
the dam upstream will place new pressures on land and pastures in this region both down and 
upstream, impacting wildlife, humans and livestock. The dam will also alter the ecology of 
the Ewaso Ng’iro Basin, affecting the flow of the river and the availability of water both for 
wildlife and for subsistence and tourist activities (Sena 2015). In these ways, the 
environmental impacts of LAPSSET clearly extend far beyond the direct footprint of the 
project. 
 
Recognising the various environmental risks that LAPSSET presents, conservation and 
tourism actors are taking measures to understand and respond to the proposed development. 
At the forefront of this movement is the Ewaso Ng’iro Basin Stakeholder Forum, which was 
established in 2016 to share information about the impacts of LAPSSET and to agree upon a 
coordinated response. The forum, which is largely comprised of conservation organisations, 
civil society organisations and local leaders, is headed by a steering committee, which 
includes Northern Rangelands Trust, Laikipia Wildlife Forum, IMPACT, Conservation 
Alliance of Kenya, Kenya Wildlife Conservancies Association, and the Samburu Isiolo  
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Image 4. Site of the proposed Isiolo Resort City (at the base of the hills, in between the ‘gap’ 
in the hills) (Photo Credit: Author)     
 
 
Image 5. Artist renditions of proposed Isiolo Resort City (LAPSSET 2016) 
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Tourism Forum. Outside of the forum, a number of NGOs have also established partnerships 
with international civil society organisations, in order to raise awareness about the 
environmental and conservation implications of LAPSSET. South African-based NGO, 
Natural Justice, provides support to Save Lamu, a Kenyan NGO that lobbies for the 
sustainable and responsible development of LAPSSET. Similarly, the German Heinrich Böll 
Foundation and the American Jewish World Service provide assistance to Kenyan NGOs 
concerned with the environmental impacts of LAPSSET, such Friends of Lake Turkana 
(FoLT). Much like pastoralist movements, the response of conservation actors to LAPSSET 
has been strengthened through the support of global actors and alliances. 
 
Unlike pastoralist groups, however, conservationists cannot employ identity-based claims 
backed by transnational human rights instruments to back their mobilisations. Instead, these 
groups use environment and climate science to justify their concerns about LAPSSET. 
Currently, these actors are producing their own research and technical reports that assess the 
benefits and potential risks of the mega-infrastructure. These reports measure, estimate, and 
predict the far-reaching impacts of the LAPSSET on the environment, including biodiversity 
loss, deforestation, greenhouse gas emissions, and loss of vegetation cover. For example, the 
Ewaso Ng’iro Basin Stakeholder Forum is conducting an integrated technical review of the 
Isiolo Dam, engaging economists, ecologists, hydrologists, civil engineers, and resettlement 
experts in the process. Similarly, the African Wildlife Foundation has developed a series of 
maps, which portray wildlife ecosystems and human activity in relation to infrastructure 
development. These maps include wildlife movement, enterprise (e.g. lodges, livestock 
markets) and human population. Laikipia Wildlife Forum (LWF) and Mpala Research Centre 
(MRC) also recently commissioned a systematic aerial survey of Laikipia county, which 
provides information on numbers and distribution of wildlife, livestock, wildlife carcasses, 
human settlements, and land use. This type of scientific research can be used by conservation 
organisations to raise awareness locally, domestically, and globally about the potential 
impacts of infrastructure development on socio-ecological systems in northern Kenya. 
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This type of research can also be deployed to raise questions about the legal implications of 
moving ahead with LAPSSET from an environmental perspective. While the Government of 
Kenya claims that it assessed the environmental impacts of the project in 2012, a number of 
conservation organisations contest this fact. Some organisations reported during interviews 
that the government wrongly equated the LAPSSET feasibility study, which was conducted 
by Japan Port Consultants, with an Environmental and Social Impact Assessment (ESIA). 
Others claimed that no form of environmental assessment was ever conducted. Interestingly, 
the government issued a tender for a ‘Strategic Environmental Assessment for the LAPSSET 
Infrastructure Corridor’ in 2015, suggesting that a proper ESIA for LAPPSET is yet to be 
completed. Beginning construction on LAPSSET prior to environmental assessment violates 
domestic law. Hence, there are ongoing discussions about how conservation organisations 
could use this violation, as well as their own research about the environmental impacts of 
LAPSSET, to either seek a legal order to halt the project, or to justify the rerouting of certain 
components of the project (interview with representative of civil society organisation in 
Laikipia, May 2016). Similar strategies have been used by conservation organisations to 
reroute mega-infrastructure projects in other parts of the world; however, this strategy 
requires access to highly-qualified and experienced consultants and legal experts, which are 
costly to hire (interview with representative of civil society organisation in Laikipia, May 
2016). 
  
By remaking and deploying knowledge about the environmental impacts of LAPSSET, 
conservation organisations have been able to raise questions about whether northern Kenya is 
suitable for such a large-scale infrastructure project. They have used scientific research to 
claim that LAPSSET has the potential to interfere with local, national and international 
conservation agendas. Even if the Kenyan government rejects these claims, conservation 
organisations may still be able to exert pressure on the Kenyan government through global 
actors and venues. As transnational agencies, such as the United Nations, place ever more 
attention on environmental governance and biodiversity conservation, it has become possible 
to exert downward pressure on national decision makers. For example, in 2012, UNESCO 
convinced the Kenyan government to implement additional measures to protect the cultural 
and natural heritage of the coastal area where the LAPSSET port is under construction. More 
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recently, local media reports claimed that politicians wanted parts of LAPSSET rereouted to 
‘save wildlife’ (Salesa 2016). This demonstrates how civil society actors are effectively using 
conservation science to contest the suitability of land for investment — intervening in how 
land is used and who has access to it.  
 
Concluding discussion  
LAPSSET marks a turn of events for northern Kenya — a region of the country that has 
historically received little government investment or attention in relation to infrastructure 
development. The significant discoveries of natural resources in the north have served to 
transform imaginaries about land in northern Kenya from a desolate wasteland to a 
commodity awaiting investment and development. In order to attract ‘more efficient’ land 
users and incentivize investment, the government (and its financers) have made efforts to 
assemble land and resources for investment (Li 2014). In addition to plans to construct 
massive amounts of infrastructure in order to attract investors to the region, the government 
is also improving the perceived productivity of land; for example, by increasingly the 
number of irrigable hectares and better access to livestock markets. While the construction of 
LAPSSET is still in the very early stages, once complete, this infrastructure corridor has the 
potential to transform everyday life in northern Kenya by connecting the remote and 
marginalized corners of the country to the economic and political centres of the state. 
 
Yet, as this transformation unfolds, important questions about who is entitled to land, or to 
compensation for loss of land, are emerging. In response to proposed changes to land use, 
there are new tensions arising between existing and potential land uses in the region —
 exasperating existing tensions in the region over land. Some rural groups are strong 
proponents of LAPSSET and are demanding to be incorporated into the development, 
eagerly waiting to reap the benefits that have been promised by the state. However, other 
rural groups are more concerned about the ways that LAPSSET will alter land use and access 
and are mobilising in response. Some are contesting the mega-infrastructure development 
altogether, while others are attempting to negotiate the path and terms of the project. This 
diversity of rural reactions to LAPSSET reflects the differentiated impacts of LSLAs on rural 
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communities: Varied rural reactions to proposed changes to land use and tenure are informed 
by diverse interests and different imagined futures. 
 
In framing their diverse reactions to LSLA, rural groups mobilize and circulate different 
forms of knowledge about LAPSSET and its potential impacts. As I have sought to show in 
this article, rural land users can deploy different types of expertise in attempting to legitimate 
their use or control over land and to justify certain land management practices over others 
(Goldstein 2016). In this way, the case study presented in this article provides a window into 
studying what happens when different types of expertise collide and compete to shape the 
rules that govern access to and control over land. 
 
Proponents of LAPSSET have linked the mega-infrastructure project to economic returns, 
such as incentivising investment and production and expanding access to markets. This has 
helped to present LAPSSET as both common sense and necessary for rural development. 
Such modernising approaches to justifying LSLAs often go unquestioned, given that 
economics and business management are generally accepted as a privileged way of 
‘knowing’ land in rural regions of the developing world (Wolford 2015b). However, at the 
same time, pastoralists and conservation civil society organisations have also circulated 
other, and sometimes conflicting forms of expertise, in order to contest certain components 
of the proposed development, presenting alternate claims about how land in this particular 
region of Kenya should be used. For example, conservation organisations have used 
biodiversity science to weigh the environmental, economic and social costs and benefits of 
the mega-infrastructure project while pastoralists have drawn on land management science 
and legal knowledge to protect their customary land management practices.  
 
Importantly, the different and competing types of expertise being circulated by 
conservationists and pastoralists in opposition to LAPSSET reflects the somewhat 
adversarial relationship between these two groups. Conservationists and pastoralists have 
been competing over land in this region for many decades. For pastoralist groups, LAPSSET 
is particularly concerning because it represents an additional pressure on their access to land, 
in a region where conservation has already placed significant constraints on their livelihoods. 
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In other words, LAPSSET has different and potentially more devastating impacts on 
pastoralists. This may explain, in part, why strong coalitions between pastoralists and 
conservation groups have been somewhat slow to form in response to LAPSSET (although 
they certainly are beginning to emerge). 
 
It is important to note that although rural land users may have different visions for how land 
should be used and managed than the Kenyan government, the development goals of these 
groups are not necessarily incoherent. Regardless of one’s stance on LAPSSET, rural land 
users in northern Kenya are likely to agree that the region is ‘underperforming’ in relation to 
the rest of the country. There is also a strong consensus across the region that intensifying 
production and market integration will improve the wellbeing of the population. However, 
the ways in which rural land user wish to achieve development differ. LAPSSET proponents 
argue that building infrastructure to attract private-sector investment and create new 
economic opportunities in the north is the best way forward. In contrast, pastoralists and 
conservations argue that transforming northern Kenya from an ‘underperforming’ region 
requires capitalising on the region's existing strengths; for example, by putting policies and 
programmes in place that support livestock and/or biodiversity-related business. In other 
words, pastoralist and conservation movements rely on expertise that promotes alternative 
(and different) ways of using and organising rural landscapes in order to achieve rural 
development, rather than rejecting rural development altogether. 
 
Ultimately, the tensions arising between existing and potential land uses across northern 
Kenya are reflective of larger struggles over who governs landscapes and populations in the 
country's north. In response to this proposed mega-infrastructure development, various actors 
are competing to define what ASAL land is, how it should be used, and who has the right to 
use it. As stated previously, expertise about land has a disciplining or governmentalising 
power. Powerful actors, such as the Kenyan government, are pursuing a modern future for 
northern Kenya and they are, therefore, circulating expertise that works to render land in the 
north accessible and investible and that encourages populations to desire more ‘productive’ 
livelihoods. However, I show in this article, rural groups are contesting this expertise, 
presenting counter-claims about how land should be used and managed in the north. In doing 
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so, this groups are participating in the governance of northern Kenya's landscapes and 
populations. Wolford argues that LSLAs are ‘brokered by an increasingly vast field of 
development consultants, scientists, bureaucrats, and investors, all of whom wield forms of 
expertise that have considerable influence on the ground...’ (2015b, 227). My analysis 
reveals how rural groups similarly wield expertise in order to help make or to resist land 
deals. 
 
Yet, as Pritchard et al. point out, ‘the power to tell stories and have them be heard is - like all 
power - partial and contested’ (2016, 617). Power asymmetries influence how rural groups 
can shape or contest the rules that govern access to land. For example, whereas LAPSSET is 
backed by the capital and expertise of international financial institutions and bilateral donors, 
rural groups often lack the same level of support. In order to reroute parts of LAPSSET, local 
networks of pastoralists and conservation organisations would likely be required to hire 
consultants or legal counsel to assess the impacts and risks of the development and then 
launch legal cases against the Kenyan government based on these findings. This would be an 
expensive and risky undertaking in itself. For such reasons, it is often difficult for rural 
groups to sustain their movements, even when they can produce counter-knowledge that 
clearly challenges the benefits and necessity of LSLA. In other words, socio-economic and 
political power influences the ability that different groups have to use expertise to shape and 
contest the rules that govern access to land.  
 
Power asymmetries explain why rural actors often reach above and beyond the state in their 
mobilisations. Rural groups often lack the resources to produce expertise and sustain 
movements that effectively challenge large-scale land deals; yet global alliances and 
partnerships can be formed to advance their movements and claims to land. Importantly, 
people, organisations and agencies around the world increasingly recognize and value the 
alternative ways of using and organising landscapes that rural movements are trying to 
defend and promote. In the case of northern Kenya, the types of expertise mobilized by 
pastoralist and conservation organisations align with broader global development objectives, 
such as Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) #2, #12 and #15. In light of such 
development objectives, new types of knowledge and expertise have become increasingly 
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important to processes of rural development, which may provide rural land users with greater 
ability to influence how rural land should be used and managed. With this in mind, future 
research may examine the new types of expertise about land that are being generated through 
global agreements, such as the SDGs and the Paris Agreement, and how these forms of 
expertise intersect with the diverse interests of rural land users. 
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Article #3 
Enclave oil development and the rearticulation of citizenship in Turkana, Kenya: 
Exploring ‘crude citizenship’ 
 
 
Context 
This article analyses the emergence of extractive enclaves in northern Kenya and how the 
creation of these new economic spaces influences the experience and practice of citizenship. 
The analysis contributes insights to both of the broader themes motivating this dissertation, 
governance and citizenship. In relation to governance, this article argues that the Government 
of Kenya uses certain technologies of government to draw global capital to resource-rich 
areas. We argue that the government has enacted policies that make Kenya’s resource 
enclaves appealing to global markets, such as delegating administrative control over enclave 
spaces to corporate actors. Enabling corporations to exert de facto control over the 
administration, development and conditions of living and laboring within extractive enclaves 
helps oil companies to better secure their investments. This technique also enables the state 
to govern its economy and population through delegation, which is seen by some as the most 
efficient approach to governance. By illustrating the Kenyan state’s agency in the creation of 
enclave spaces, this article counters conventional Africanist literature that suggests that 
extractive enclaves are the result of an anemic state (Clapham, 1996; Jackson, 1993). Rather, 
this article reveals that state and corporate actors experiment with the governance of 
enclaves, negotiating sovereignty in order to create spaces that facilitate the flow of global 
capital. 
  
This article also critically reflects on the practice and experience of citizenship in extractive 
enclaves. As oil companies are delegated administrative control over enclave spaces, they 
also take on certain responsibilities, such as disciplining, regulating and offering care and 
protection to some communities. In turn, some community members direct their rights claims 
towards oil companies, rather than towards the state. For example, during 2014, some 
communities demanded that oil companies consult and engage with them prior to exploration 
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and development, even though the government had no clear legislation in place outlining this 
responsibility. Ultimately, this article argues that as communities begin to recognize that the 
state has ceded a degree of control to companies over extractive enclaves and the subjects 
within them, new political spaces and subjectivities are emerging.   
  
This article was published by Geoforum in 2015. Geoforum is a leading interdisciplinary 
journal publishing conceptually-led and empirically grounded research in human geography 
and related disciplines. The editorial board of Geoforum awarded this article second-place in 
the journal’s annual ‘Best Student Paper’ contest. I also presented an earlier version of this 
article at the annual meeting of the Canadian Association for the Study of International 
Development (CASID) in 2015, where it was nominated as a finalist for the 2015 Kari 
Polanyi-Levitt prize. The Canadian Association of Geographers also recognized this as a 
‘Hot Paper’ in their association’s news publication. 
  
Much of the research informing this paper was conducted during a research trip to Turkana 
County in northwestern Kenya between October and November 2014. During this trip, my 
co-author and I conducted 19 key informant interviews. We were invited by a teacher to 
facilitate a workshop with 88 students at an all-boys secondary school in Loima sub-county 
of Turkana (this, problematically, contributed to a large gender imbalance in our data 
collection). This workshop was incredibly informative as many of the young men that we 
spoke with hope to be employed by the county’s emerging oil industry in the future and thus 
are following the industry closely. In total, we spoke with over 130 people in total about oil 
and gas exploration in Turkana County. Our interviews were primarily with practitioners and 
civil society leaders who possessed significant knowledge of Kenya’s emerging oil and gas 
sector whereas our focus group discussions and workshop were with community members 
residing in communities close to sites of oil exploration. We also gathered field observations 
by visiting relevant sites of oil and gas exploration, as well as growing towns at the periphery 
of these sites. While we were not permitted to enter any oil camps, we were welcomed into 
company field offices and permitted to drive by active exploration wells. Other relevant 
insights were gathered while I was based in Kenya doing further fieldwork between 
November 2014 and May 2015, as well as May 2016.  
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Feedback from Geoforum’s two anonymous reviewers provided us with important guidance 
in clarifying our theoretical contribution. This article was also strengthened by comments 
from Dr. Brian Robinson and Dr. Juan Wang, as well as the other workshop participants, 
during McGill University’s Institute for the Study of International Development Dissertation 
Workshop in May 2015. As a note, I updated certain parts of the paper while preparing and 
revising my dissertation. These updates were made to reflect more recent statistics, media 
sources, and literature on oil in Turkana, as well as insights garnered during my most recent 
trip to northern Kenya in May 2016. 
  
Finally, the fieldwork informing this article was partly funded by the Overseas Development 
Institute’s (ODI) Pathways to Resilience in Semi-Arid Economies (PRISE) Programme. At 
the time, my co-author and I were also working on a secondary project that examined the 
implications of oil and gas development for livelihood resilience in Turkana. This research 
was published by The Extractive Industries and Society, as well as in a working paper that 
was written for ODI. I am very grateful for this funding, as well as our affiliation with ODI, 
which certainly opened doors for us while in Turkana.  
 
This manuscript was co-authored with Brock Bersaglio. A full statement of our contributions 
is included in the front materials of this dissertation.  
  
  101 
Enclave oil development and the rearticulation of citizenship in Turkana, Kenya: 
Exploring ‘crude citizenship’ 
 
Charis Enns and Brock Bersaglio 
 
Enns, C. and Bersaglio, B., 2015. Enclave oil development and the rearticulation of 
citizenship in  Turkana, Kenya: Exploring ‘crude citizenship’. Geoforum, 67, pp.78-88. 
Abstract 
Turkana County, located in the arid region of northwestern Kenya, has long been imagined 
as backwards and unproductive. As a result, successive governments have neglected to 
provide adequate social services and investments in the county, leaving people in Turkana 
reliant on humanitarian organisations for access to many of the rights and protections 
traditionally associated with state-based citizenship. Yet when oil was discovered in Turkana 
in 2012, the county was thrust into the international spotlight. In this article, we analyze 
changing political relationships in Turkana in light of expanding oil exploration and 
development activities. The analysis is informed by key information interviews, focus group 
discussions, and field observations carried out in Kenya between October 2014 and May 
2015 and in May 2016. Specifically, the article demonstrates that the Kenyan state’s 
historically hands-off approach to governing this part of Kenya has led some Turkanas to 
seek recognition and protection of their rights from oil companies operating in enclaves, 
rather than the state. We argue that this is drawing oil companies and rural communities into 
an uneasy citizen-state-like relationship, altering the experiences and practices of citizenship 
in Turkana. We conclude that the presence of oil companies in Turkana benefits some by 
creating new political space where individuals and communities can claim their rights. 
However, the ability to make use of this space and direct rights claims towards oil companies 
is distributed unevenly across Turkana and is experienced differently by different groups in 
rural society – a process we refer to as ‘crude citizenship’.  
 
Keywords: Enclaves; Citizenship; Kenya; Turkana; Oil; Oil companies   
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Introduction 
In October 2014, protesters gathered outside the walls of a heavily secured oil camp in a 
remote part of Turkana, a rural county in northern Kenya. Protestors demanded that oil 
companies in the region provide more job opportunities to Turkanas and distribute the 
benefits of oil development more widely throughout the county. Interestingly, the protestors 
directed their demands at oil companies rather than the central government, which has been 
accused of writing Turkana communities out of the national oil equation. In discussions with 
research participants about this protest, many claimed that the local government incited the 
protest, encouraging Turkanas to claim certain dues from the oil companies. In effect, these 
protests were a reaction against enclave development, which is an approach to resource 
extraction where economic investment is concentrated in secured spaces for the purpose of 
rapid resource development, often with little or no benefit to wider society (Ferguson 2005).  
 
In this article, we examine how enclave extraction is transforming political practices and 
relationships between rural community members, oil companies and the state in Turkana, 
using the concept of citizenship to frame our analysis. Based on our analysis, we argue that 
enclave oil development is altering the lived experience of citizenship, as well as the 
processes through which people enact their claims to rights as citizens, in northern Kenya. 
Our analysis contributes to existing scholarly literature that focuses on the diverse ways that 
rural communities in sub-Saharan Africa understand, contest and engage with enclave 
development on or surrounding their lands (see Ackah-Baidoo, 2012; Ferguson, 2005; 2006; 
Le Billion, 2004; Le Billion, 2005; MacEachern, 2010).19 Specifically, we aim to extend this 
literature by considering a situation in which enclave oil development is contributing to 
rearticulated forms of citizenship, as oil companies are granted administrative control over 
resource enclaves and communities residing near extractive sites turn to companies to fulfill 
their basic economic and social needs. In doing so, we both engage with and contribute to 
critical citizenship studies literature, which aims to move debates about citizenship beyond 
conventional notions of citizenship as a relationship between an individual and the state. Our 
case study of resource enclaves contributes to this literature by providing a specific 
                                                
19 We use the term Africa throughout this paper in reference to those countries on the African continent that are 
located south of the Sahara.  
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illustration of how ‘new spatialities and temporalities of citizenship are emerging that do not 
neatly coincide with the space–time of the modern state’ as a result of contemporary 
processes of globalisation (Nyers 2007: 2).  
  
By focusing on the experience and practice of citizenship in and around resource enclaves, 
we also draw attention to politics in the study of natural resource development in sub-
Saharan Africa. Scholarship on natural resource governance and extraction in this region 
often uses language that emphasises the benefits of resource development while downplaying 
and depoliticising power-laden relationships between extractive companies and rural 
communities (Van Alstine and Barkemeyer 2014). Our analysis instead takes the political 
implications of resource extraction seriously, recognising how natural resource discoveries 
draw new actors into regions and shift relations of power between groups, which can produce 
new forms of inequality and exclusion. Beyond this specific case study, we see citizenship as 
potentially useful conceptual lens for studying social and political relationships in and around 
extractive operations in other parts of the continent, where resource extraction often unfolds 
in an enclaved manner yet is similarly presented as a depoliticized approach to development. 
  
The fieldwork informing this paper was conducted in Kenya between October 2014 and 
April 2015. Qualitative data were collected through key informant interviews, focus groups 
and field observations. Interviews were first conducted with 16 key informants with expertise 
about oil governance in Kenya, including representatives of oil companies and international 
organisations. These interviews were mainly conducted in Nairobi. An additional 18 
interviews were conducted with community leaders, civil society advocates, and employees 
of oil companies in three sub-counties across Turkana, Lodwar, Lokichar and Loima (See 
Map 7). These individuals possessed expertise about oil governance in the county. Finally, 
we also conducted three focus groups with women, youth and men (pastoralists) respectively 
in one community residing near a site of oil exploration in Loima, bringing the total number 
of research participants to 134. Interview and focus group questions were open ended but 
focused on relationships between rural communities, oil companies and the state. Key 
informant interviewees and focus group participants were identified with the help of civil  
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Map 5. Map of counties, major towns, and villages in Turkana, as well as oil exploration 
wells and camps (Cordaid 2015) 
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society organisations. This approach was intentionally non-random, as we targeted 
participants who had experience with, or pertinent information on, Turkana’s emergent oil 
industry. We also sought to account for Agrawal and Gibson’s (1999) warning that rural 
communities should not be treated as homogenous, undifferentiated collectives; recognising 
that rural groups throughout Turkana have likely had different experiences with enclave oil 
development. To do so, we supplemented our own data with relevant data from other studies, 
including civil society reports, media reports and secondary literature as available.  
 
We begin this article by proposing a theoretical framework for understanding the 
complicated relationships emerging between rural communities, oil companies and the state 
in Turkana, drawing from two bodies of literature: literature on resource enclaves and 
literature from critical citizenship studies. In this section, we expand on our use of the term 
‘citizenship’. The next section of the paper provides an overview of the context of the study 
area, the history of oil exploration and development in the region, and the emergence of 
resource enclaves in Turkana. Next, we analyze citizenship in Turkana, suggesting that oil 
enclaves are influencing citizenship experiences and practices in the county. We argue that 
some Turkanas are seeking recognition and protection of their rights from oil companies. 
Such companies are (uneasily) responding to these ‘acts of citizenship’ (Isin and Nielsen 
2008), resigning themselves to the role of meeting citizen’s demands in order to obtain a 
social license to operate from the rural communities surrounding their operations. However, 
the ability to make demands and to claim one’s dues from oil companies is distributed 
unevenly across different groups in Turkana, resulting in differential citizenship. We refer to 
this process as ‘crude citizenship.’ We conclude by discussing how rural communities may 
redirect or refine crude citizenship in order to reclaim emergent resource enclaves as political 
spaces where their rights can be heard and recognized by companies and governments alike.  
 
Theorising citizenship in resource enclaves 
In this section, we develop a theoretical framework that guides our analysis of political 
relationships in Turkana’s emergent resource enclaves. This framework combines the notion 
of resource enclaves with theories from critical citizenship studies. We argue that, combined, 
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these theories create a useful framework for examining how the practices of citizenship – 
namely, the way in which rights and duties are performed – are being influenced by the 
presence of extractive companies. Before presenting this framework, we outline our 
understanding of relevant concepts, including ‘resources enclaves’ and ‘citizenship’. 
 
Natural resources and enclave development 
The concept of enclave development can be traced back to studies on economies of 
agglomeration in the 1960s. The term represented an attempt to make sense of the 
observation that industrialisation tends to congregate economies and networks in 
geographical spaces that have enclave-like characteristics – meaning that they are 
economically and/or politically distinct from the rest of society (see Cardoso and Faletto 
1969). The notion of enclave development eventually emerged from this literature to explain:  
… physically, administratively, or legally bounded territory[ies] whose 
geography or morphology is intimately related to the following economic 
characteristics: dependence on one or a few large firms; high specialisation in 
one activity; and weak integration into the local economy, which is used 
primarily to access some local factors of production (Phelps et al. 2015: 120).   
 
Today, it is commonly assumed that enclaves are incapable of contributing to sustainable, 
local economic development in the long term.  
  
The idea of resource enclaves has since been used to analyse diverse contexts around the 
globe – ranging from off-shore oil development in Africa (Ackah-Baidoo 2012) to Chile’s 
mining industry (Phelps et al. 2015). A seminal piece by Ferguson (2005), entitled Seeing 
Like an Oil Company, demonstrates how resource extraction occurs within secure enclaves in 
many parts of Africa. Drawing from Cardoso and Faletto’s (1969) notion of enclaves, 
Ferguson (2005) describes resource enclaves in Africa as being characterized by expatriate 
corporate control over land and resources, high levels of securitisation and capital-intensive 
production in spite of high labor surpluses. He suggests that these enclave spaces are used to 
secure capital investments in order to ensure that they remain out of the reach of states, 
which are often seen by investors as irresponsible, unpredictable or untrustworthy. 
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Following Ferguson’s lead, other scholars have critically reflected on the enclaved nature of 
resource extraction, both within and beyond the African continent. Much of this literature has 
critically examined the geographical distribution of enclaves throughout sub-Saharan Africa, 
as well as the impact (or lack thereof) of enclaves on rural communities bordering sites of 
resource extraction (Le Billion 2005, Ferguson 2006, Ackah-Baidoo 2012, Van Alstine 
2014). For example, MacEachern (2010) has described his experience working within a 
resource enclave in southwestern Chad as ‘life on a submarine’. He explains that although 
Chad is ‘…one of the poorest places on Earth, where the average life expectancy is about 47 
years, infant mortality rates are approximately 10 percent…’, oil company employees eat 
‘…Skippy peanut butter and Louisiana hot sauce brought in to stock the cafeterias’ and they 
live in ‘private air-conditioned trailers with hot showers and satellite television’ (2010: 349). 
His observations mirror Ferguson’s (2005, 2006) reflections of enclave resource 
development in other parts of sub-Saharan Africa. This work reveals the extent to which 
enclaves are detached and segregated from surrounding communities. 
  
Theorising about resource enclaves emerged as a reaction against the notion that capitalism 
has spread evenly across the globe, producing ‘global homogenisation and standardisation’ in 
the process (Ferguson 2005, Ferguson 2006). Rather than seeing societies and economies 
around the world as being subjected to the disciplines of capitalist globalisation (see Scott 
1999), resource enclave literature contends that capital investments remains uneven at best. 
For example, Ferguson shows how capital skips – rather than flows – from the global North 
to mineral-rich enclaves in the global South and then back to the global North again. In other 
words, the distribution of capital around the globe is not homogenous and its effects are not 
equal. Thus, while capital can be conceptualized as global in the sense that it moves around 
the world; it does not yet ‘encompass or cover contiguous geographic spaces’ (Ferguson 
2005: 279). As Ferguson argues, ‘capital does not ‘flow’ from London to Cabinda [but 
rather] it hops, neatly skipping over most of what lies in between’ (2005: 379). The ability of 
capital to skip between resource enclaves and the global North may be particularly true in 
states that are ‘weak’ or have ‘collapsed’. However, even in so-called strong states, capital 
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from resource extraction tends to be ‘sharply walled off’ from the national population 
(Ferguson 2005).  
 
Often, states enact flexible policies that enable capital investments to bypass the state, so that 
capital can move from place to place more quickly and firms can more efficiently exploit 
natural resource-rich patches (Palan 2006; Ackah-Baidoo, 2012; Van Alstine et al. 2014; see 
also Phelps et al. 2015). For example, states may create special economic zones by enacting 
more liberal economic policies in certain areas of the country — including tax credits and 
special work permits for certain industries. These zones create ‘favourable’ economic 
conditions for foreign firms by removing barriers or impediments to investment. In some 
cases, states may even delegate administrative control over these zones to firms (for example, 
through public-private partnerships) to maximise the efficiency of operations. States are 
willing and eager to work with extractive companies in order to create attractive economic 
spaces, as there are economic benefits to reap in return. At the same time, however, the 
relationship between states and the investors within enclaves is often complicated. As Palan 
(2006) explains, although states may readily sign contracts with oil companies that 
compromise their control and authority over enclaves, they may simultaneously denounce 
corporate authority and bemoan their loss of power and sovereignty. This reflects the 
complicated – even contradictory – nature of enclave development.  
  
Though states and political elites may benefit from enclave development, these benefits 
generally remain starkly disconnected from wider society (Ferguson 2005: 378). In other 
words, resource enclaves generally have ‘no immediate, significant and permanent positive 
impact’ on the communities that surround them (Llach et al. 2003: 13). This important point 
distinguishes resource enclaves from historic company towns, which traditionally contributed 
much more to society through both capital investment and the employment of massive and 
regularized work forces (see Cardoso and Faletto 1969, Ferguson 2005). Ferguson describes 
the differences between resource enclaves and historic company towns using the notion of 
‘socially thin’ versus ‘socially thick’ investment. In the case of resource enclaves, investment 
in socially thin as it is secured in enclave spaces and insulated from surrounding 
communities. Thus, investment in traditional enclave spaces contributes very little to 
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improving the social wellbeing of rural populations residing near sites of extraction 
(Ferguson, 2006). 
 
The practice of citizenship 
As many of the benefits produced by resource enclaves skip over nearby communities, 
enclaves themselves can act as reminders to community members about how they are 
overlooked within national development models (Ferguson 2005). Thus, communities in and 
around resource enclaves are often involved in social and political struggles, as they demand 
access to benefits from the state in light of enclave development occurring near their homes 
or on land that historically belonged to them. In other words, resource enclaves can also 
create political spaces where the rights of surrounding community members – or citizens – 
are up for negotiation. For this reason, we find literature from critical citizenship studies 
useful for analysing the relationships between actors in and around resource development 
enclaves. 
  
Before proceeding however, we wish to clarify how we understand the term citizenship. 
Traditionally, citizenship refers to a status bestowed on individuals that are considered 
members of a larger community (Marshall 1963). The term has conventionally been used to 
describe membership within a nation-state, where the citizen has certain rights and duties and 
the state seeks to protect the rights of all citizens (Marshall 1963). This particular notion of 
citizenship has long been upheld as an important political identity and associated with 
fulfilling human needs and desires, such as equal social and economic opportunities, liberty 
and autonomy (Rawls 1958). Importantly, rights associated with citizenship have 
conventionally been seen as extending equally to all members of a nation-state. As Eckert 
argues, ‘citizenship has always entailed aspirations to equality’ (2011: 311), imagined as a 
status that promises dignity and respect, equal rights, and voice for all members. 
 
This idealized image of citizenship, however, is seldom realized. Inevitably, certain groups 
are included within a nation-state’s socio-political order while others are excluded. Exclusion 
happens for various reasons, ranging from ethnicity to gender to religion to abilities. Indeed, 
there are many groups of people around the world who experience incomplete or inadequate 
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rights and liberties, such as migrants (Rygiel 2012, 2013), or who are often left without 
access to the rights altogether, such as refugees (Isin and Rygiel 2007). Accordingly, critical 
citizenship scholars have worked to reframe debates on citizenship, moving away from 
discussions that consider citizenship as a legal status that is conferred by the state on all 
citizens equally towards broader discussions about the ‘histories of exclusions, inequalities, 
hierarchies, securitisations that have been associated with citizenship’ (Nyers 2007: 2, also 
see Eckert 2011 and Lister 2007). Critical citizenship scholars also acknowledge the role that 
non-state actors play in mediating state-subject relationships, and in forming new types of 
citizenship altogether (for example, see: Lazar 2013, Ong 2006, Jaffe 2013). 
 
Our approach to studying citizenship is informed by critical citizenship studies. First, we 
define citizenship as ‘the ‘institution’ mediating rights between the subjects of politics and 
the polity to which these subjects belong’ (Isin and Nyers 2014: 1). We understand 
citizenship as the processes by which subjects seek recognition and protection of their rights 
and acknowledge that both state and non-state actors can mediate these processes. Second, 
we do not define citizenship as a status of equal membership but instead acknowledge that 
differentiated forms of citizenship exist and that not all people have access to the same 
allocation of rights (and duties) (Nyers 2007, Eckert 2011 and Lister 2007). Finally, we hold 
that even in abject conditions, people are political subjects that are capable of demanding 
rights and social justice (Rygiel 2012; Ilcan 2013, 2014; Ilcan and Rygiel 2015). We also 
suggest that people are also able to draw on multiple political identities simultaneously. As 
Isin and Nyers explain ‘…the citizen of a polity almost never belongs only to that polity but 
to several nested, if not overlapping and conflicting, series of polities…’ (2014: 2) and as 
Robins et al. argue, citizens ‘…may act like citizens of the modern state in one context, and 
subjects of traditional authorities in another’ (2008: 1079). This point is particularly 
important in light of our proceeding analysis, as community members politically identify as 
Turkanas, but also make political claims on other communities. Ultimately, from the critical 
citizenship studies perspective, citizenship is better understood as a practice or performance 
than as a legal status (Isin 2009, Isin and Nyers 2014, Nyers 2006).  
 
Resource enclaves and the re-articulation of citizenship  
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As discussed above, resource enclaves can be understood as new political spaces that have 
been created by flexible and market-driven state policies to facilitate global flows in trade 
and investment. Scholars, such as Aihwa Ong, use the idea of ‘graduated sovereignty’ to 
reflect on how states manage territories and populations in this type of political space. They 
suggest that in order to attract investment, states deploy sovereignty in a flexible manner. 
This, in turn, ‘…radically challenge[s] territorially based principles of citizenship’ (Ong 
2006a: 122). By selectively deploying sovereignty, the rights and entitlements of citizenship 
become disentangled from the state, as actors beyond the state gain authority to recognize 
and legitimise certain rights (Isin and Nyers 2014, Ong 2006a). 
  
For example, critical citizenship scholars have pointed to refugee camps, airports, cities, and 
cyber-space as examples of emergent political spaces where the rights and entitlements of 
citizenship have become disassociated or disarticulated from the terrains of the state (Isin and 
Rygiel 2007, Ilcan 2013, Rygiel 2012, Rygiel 2013, Khoo 2013, Ong 2005). In refugee 
camps, for example, a state may provide protection to non-citizens and refugees may look to 
claim their rights in a state other than their own. Furthermore, these claims are generally 
recognised by intervening non-state actors, such as humanitarian organisations like the 
United Nations (UN) High Commission for Refugees. In this way, the processes through 
which refugees seek and attain recognition for their rights are not rooted within their own 
national territory. This is just one example of how dimensions of citizenship are less fixed 
than previously assumed, largely as a result of globalisation. 
  
We suggest that secured resource enclaves similarly represent political spaces where the ‘tidy 
seams’ between sovereignty, territory and citizenship come undone (Ong 2005). Much like 
special economic zones, resource enclaves have been brought into being by flexible state 
policies that direct foreign investment towards the efficient exploitation of resource-rich 
areas. In order to attract capital to enclaves, the state promotes special taxation and 
investment schemes and infrastructure development, along with relative administrative 
freedom for local government and a degree of autonomous rule for corporate actors (Ong 
2008). While the state retains formal sovereignty over resource enclaves, corporations exert 
de facto control over the administration, development and conditions of living and laboring 
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within them. Enclaves, therefore, are co-governed by governmental and corporate authorities, 
representing ‘experimentation with governing and territorialisation in the interest of 
optimising wealth’ (Ong 2008: 121).  
  
With this in mind, we propose that experiments with governance for the purpose of attracting 
foreign investment influence the experience and practice of citizenship in and around 
resource enclaves. For example, governance experiments for the sake of resource 
development in the Delta region of Nigeria and Cabinda in Angola have arguably had 
perverse effects on citizenship (Le Billon 2001, 2004, Abrahamsen and Williams 2007). In 
both cases, the growth of enclaves has motivated calls for secession, as citizens have reacted 
against the extraction of ‘local’ resources by ‘outsiders’. Calls for secession have altered 
local political identities through disassociation from the state, situating corporations as 
middlemen between local political leaders (or rebels) and central governments (Le Billon 
2001, 2004, McNamee 2012).  
  
In other cases, such as in Sudan, as well as other regions of Nigeria, the governments’ fears 
of secession have resulted in the repression of rural communities near resource enclaves (Le 
Billon 2001, 2004, McNamee 2012). In these cases, states have used profits from enclave 
development to finance military operations to secure resource enclaves (Le Billon 2001). 
While the state has maintained de facto control over these spaces, a complex network of 
public and private, global and local, security actors has been used to secure enclaves 
(Abrahamsen and Williams 2007). Such violent repressions have come at a high cost for 
local communities, as the rule of law is placed above certain rights. For example, spaces for 
citizen action and democratic processes are limited (Le Billon 2001).  
  
This brief literature review reveals just some of the ways that experimentations with 
governance in resource enclaves have the potential to impact the experience and practice of 
citizenship. In the following sections, we further support this claim using the case of 
Turkana. More specifically, we aim to show that as states deploy graduated sovereignty 
strategies to attract private investment, and oil companies gain greater authority to exert 
control over enclave spaces, rural communities begin to look towards corporations for 
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recognition, legitimation and protection of their rights. Ultimately, our analysis shows how a 
form of differentiated citizenship emerges under graduated sovereignty, whereby rural 
communities that are proximate to oil operations experience ‘different kinds of rights, 
discipline, caring, and security’ than those that are distant (Ong 203: 43).  
Governance and citizenship in Turkana County, Kenya 
Turkana is a county located in the arid and semi-arid region of northwestern Kenya. The 
name of the county, ‘Turkana’, is borrowed from the name of the Turkana people, a Niolitic 
group that has called this region of Kenya home for centuries. Turkana encompasses 77,000 
km2 of land and has an estimated population of approximately 900,000 people (Agade 2015, 
GoK 2011). It shares international borders with Ethiopia, South Sudan and Uganda and is 
flanked by Lake Turkana to the east, the world’s largest permanent desert lake. Turkana is 
hot, dry and historically prone to droughts and famines.  
  
The persistence of pastoralism in Turkana is due in part to customary Turkana livelihood 
practices and land management systems, which preserve sources of pasture and water for use 
during droughts and dry seasons. For example, Turkanas make use of the region’s sparse 
resources by practicing a highly mobile form of pastoralism, by having access to distant 
sources of pasture and water, and by keeping multiple species of livestock that consume 
different types of vegetation. Historically, Turkanas also hunted wild animals, foraged for 
wild fruits and nuts, and even turned to low-input gardening during lean periods (Barrow 
1990, Oba 1992, Schilling et al. 2012). However, such strategies are becoming increasingly 
difficult to sustain in Turkana, as dry seasons have become longer.20  
  
Although, customary Turkana livelihood practices and land management systems have 
become difficult to sustain in recent years, pastoralism remains the predominant livelihood 
strategy for 70 per cent of the Turkana population (Watson and van Binsbergen 2008). In 
addition to climate change, the effectiveness of customary Turkana livelihood practices and 
land management systems is being confounded by prolonged violent conflicts, protracted 
humanitarian interventions, and changing land use and tenure systems. The latter changes are 
                                                
20 The frequency of droughts in Turkana has increased from one drought every 10 years in the 1970s to nearly 
one drought every year in the early 2000s (Huho et al. 2011). 
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associated with oil exploration and development in various parts of Turkana (Eriksen and 
Lind 2009). As a result of these combined factors, Turkana experiences some of the highest 
levels of poverty in Kenya, with 87.5 per cent of its people living below the poverty line. In 
addition, illiteracy rates are as high as 93 per cent (Demombynes and Kiringai 2011, Eriksen 
and Lind 2009, GoK 2013).   
 
A brief history of governance and citizenship in Turkana 
Turkana has historically been seen as having low economic and political importance to the 
state and has been governed accordingly. The colonial administration played a minimal role 
in governing northern Kenya, disproportionately allocating administrative and public 
resources to the high-output agricultural highlands in central and western Kenya instead 
(Eriksen and Lind 2009). Northern Kenya was governed through a paternalistic system of 
indirect rule, where protectorates were governed through local authorities that the colonial 
government put in power (for more on indirect rule, see Mamdani 1996). Local authorities 
reported to the colonial government but governed in accordance with local customs or law. 
The colonial government rarely directly intervened in the north, though it did occasionally 
invoke punitive measures in response to resistance from pastoralist groups. The colonial 
government also undertook initiatives meant to transition people away from pastoralism 
towards sedentary livelihoods and wage labour, which were rarely ‘successful’ (Eriksen and 
Lind 2009; Lokuruka and Lokuruka 2006).  
 
Post-colonial administrations remained visibly absent across northern Kenya, retaining many 
of the policies and practices of their colonial predecessors. Throughout the latter part of the 
20th century, Turkana suffered from prolonged periods of drought, famine and conflict, 
including cattle raiding, road banditry and resource-based conflict — such as conflicts over 
grasing pastures (Agade 2015). At certain points in time, the central government used the 
military to disarm and ‘pacify’ Turkanas (Agade 2015). The government also created the 
Kenya Police Reserve (KPR) — a voluntary reserve base that arms civilians — to improve 
security in rural areas; however, in practice the KRP has been inadequately overseen by the 
state and has failed to carry out much of its assigned function (Agade 2015: 203). As colonial 
and post-colonial administrations alike have repeatedly bowed away from the responsibilities 
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that typically fall on governments, Turkana has remained largely ‘unpoliced’ and ungoverned 
by the central government (Agade 2015: 203). 
  
It is worth noting that the visible absence of the state in Turkana is not simply a result of 
government agency (or the lack thereof); it is also an expression of Turkana agency. 
Turkanas have often elected to rely on customary authorities and warriors to provide 
governance and security, rather than the central government. The historic role that Turkanas 
have played in resisting the presence of the ‘foreign’ governments — referring to both 
colonial and post-colonial administrations — has been well documented elsewhere (see 
Collins 2006, Lamphear 1992, Lokuruka and Lokuruka 2006, McCabe 1994). Turkana 
resistance has involved both militant and non-militant opposition to military domination, the 
enforcement of new political boundaries, and changes to land use and tenure systems. This 
factor has undoubtedly contributed to the mutual distrust that lingers in the relationship 
between Turkanas and the central government, even in the post-colonial era. In this way, the 
strategic absence of the state in Turkana has been, at least in part, a conscious response to the 
Turkanas unwillingness to be governed as part of Kenya.  
  
Over the past few years, the current government has taken strides to improve governance in 
Turkana by devolving certain responsibilities. Some changes are apparent — particularly 
with regards to improved infrastructure in the county’s capital city, Lodwar. In Lodwar, the 
county has recently transitioned its airstrip to an airport, paved a number of murram roads 
and installed street lighting on major throughways. Such progress can be attributed, in part, 
to major changes in Kenya’s policy and institutional framework since 2010, which have 
brought about a new regime of devolved governance: Power, responsibilities and resources 
have been shifted from the national government to the 47 newly created county governments, 
which are now responsible for health services, urban and rural development, agriculture, 
local infrastructure, and early-childhood education.  
  
However, efforts to improve governance through devolution have been frustrated by a lack of 
resources and capacity at the county level. In many areas across Turkana — where small 
nomadic communities are dispersed widely in remote and inaccessible regions — 
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populations remain largely ungoverned. Communities in these areas often lack access to 
basic services and infrastructure, spending hours each day collecting for water and food, and 
often walking for days in order to receive the most basic services, such as healthcare. Many 
Turkanas also lack state-recognised identification or voter registration cards, which excludes 
them from decision-making processes that directly impact their lives. Security also remains a 
major concern in these communities and violent conflict between Turkanas and neighbouring 
groups is on the rise (Agade 2014, Schilling et al. 2012, Johannes et al. 2014). The KPR 
continues to serve as the region’s primary provider of security — especially because relations 
between Turkanas and the Kenya police force have deteriorated in recent years. For example, 
21 police officers were ambushed and killed by bandits in southern Turkana in November 
2014. In sum, though the devolved system of government may provide a solution to the 
longstanding marginalisation of Turkana in the long term the enjoyment of rights is currently 
highly uneven across the region. 
  
Due to the ongoing political, social and economic marginalisation of Turkanas, along with 
their reliance on a dwindling subsistence economy and lack of confidence in the central 
government, many Turkanas have come to rely on humanitarian organisations for their 
livelihoods, wellbeing and survival. International organisations began providing social 
services and emergency relief in Turkana nearly a century ago, beginning with Christian 
missionary organisations in the 1930s (McCabe 1990). Many Turkanas have come to rely on 
the presence of such organisations and to expect that they will supplement or fulfill 
governance gaps. This has resulted in a ‘degree of surrogacy and substitution of the 
government’s role’ (Thomas 1992: 143). In this sense, the historical relationship between 
Turkanas and humanitarian organisations has, over time, become somewhat akin to that 
between citizens and states.  
  
Problematically, programs implemented by humanitarian organisations frequently change 
and are sometimes phased out completely. When priorities change or funding dries up, 
humanitarian organisations move on, leaving gaps in both service provision and local 
economies. This lack of services is evident in the recent case of United Nations (UN) 
agencies and other humanitarian organisations leaving Lokichoggio, a small town in northern 
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Turkana. Colloquially referred to as ‘Loki’ within Kenya’s aid community, this town once 
served as a base for UN operations in South Sudan and northwestern Kenya. In addition to 
serving as a base for humanitarian relief, the influx of UN and other personnel stimulated the 
local economy and supporting sector industries. Since the withdrawal of the UN in this 
region, the once bustling Loki has come to be known as a ghost town. Business is essentially 
non-existent and people who used to be contracted or employed by the UN have lost their 
jobs. This has led many people to move elsewhere in search of new opportunities, as well as 
access to basic social services that were once provided by humanitarian organisations. 
During interviews with civil society organisations, the example of Loki was repeatedly raised 
to illustrate the changing nature and growing unreliability of humanitarian assistance in 
northern Kenya. Turkana’s history of weak governance and the shifting priorities of 
humanitarian organisations, juxtaposed against the entrance of oil companies to the region, 
make it a particularly interesting time to examine how citizenship is practiced and 
experienced in Turkana. 
 
Oil exploration and development in Kenya 
As the global importance of petroleum grew throughout the 20th century, oil companies 
sought out new frontiers for their exploration and development activities. Kenya can be seen 
as one of the latest frontiers for the oil industry, as commercially viable assets have only 
recently been discovered. The history of oil exploration in Kenya dates back to the 1950s, 
when Kenya was still under colonial rule. British Petroleum (BP) and Shell carried out early 
exploration work on the coast of Kenya beginning in 1954 (Clarke 2008). Over the following 
decades, Exxon, Total, Chevron, Woodside and CNOOC followed (Clarke 2008). Between 
1954 and 2011, a total of 33 wells were drilled in the country (ICES n.d.). While these wells 
revealed clear indications of hydrocarbons, none were deemed commercially viable (ICES 
n.d.). 
  
After decades of unsuccessful exploration across Kenya, viable oil reserves were discovered 
in Turkana in 2012 by the Anglo-Irish firm Tullow Oil. The first discovery was announced at 
Ngamia-1 well, which was followed by another discovery at Twiga South-1 (refer to Map 6). 
Between 2012 and 2015, initial estimates suggested that the South Lokichar Basin could 
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have an excess of 600 million barrels of oil (Tullow 2014). Following a third discovery at 
the Etom Two Well in 2016, reserve estimates were raised to one billion barrels (Tullow 
2016). Exploration is still ongoing in order to determine the potential of these reserves. 
Tullow has the most leads and prospects in the South Lokichar Basin, as well as in new 
basins across its acreage. In some blocks, Tullow Oil operates in partnership with Canadian 
firm Africa Oil. Tullow Oil and Africa Oil also have farm out agreements with Indian firm 
Delonex and Danish firm Maersk respectively. Other small and mid-sized companies are also 
exploring in the region, such as CEPSA with ERHC and Adamantine with Bowlevan.  
  
Between 2012 and 2013, the Kenyan government has issued 46 licenses for oil exploration 
and production in the country, earning revenue of roughly US $60 million in revenue (Kiragu 
2013). In 2016, the government announced that it would create an additional 17 new oil 
exploration blocks, with plans to auction licenses for these blocks in 2017. Since the initial 
oil discovery in 2012, Kenya has proven to be an appealing investment location, attracting 
transnational companies with ample capital and aggressive exploration strategies. One elder 
from a small village at the foot of the Loima Hills summed up Turkana’s new position in the 
Kenyan and global economy by expressing a widespread sentiment across the county: 
‘Turkana was forgotten in Kenya, but now that there is oil everywhere in our soil they are 
remembering us’ (interview in Loima, November 2014). 
 
Discussion 
The emergence of resource enclaves in Turkana 
Although oil companies have yet to move beyond the exploration stage in Turkana, oil 
activities are already unfolding in a ‘thoroughly enclaved manner’ — characterized by 
expatriate corporate control over land and resources, high levels of securitisation and capital-
intensive production in spite of high labor surpluses (Ferguson 2005: 278). In fact, in many 
ways, Turkana represents an almost ‘ideal’ type of resource enclave.  
  
To begin with, the oil industry has quickly and effectively created spaces of corporate control 
in Turkana. Like MacEachern (2010) explains in the case of Chad, oil camps in Turkana are 
walled off from the harsh realities of life in surrounding rural communities. Workers live in 
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highly secured gated compounds that are removed from surrounding towns and settlements. 
As a man contracted for short-term work with an oil company stated: ‘Living in the camp is 
like a vacation. There is plenty of food, shelter and clothes. Pay is just pocket money’ 
(interview in Loima Hills, November 2014). Management comes and goes directly from 
company-leased airstrips to the compounds (or the only hotel in the county with air-
conditioning) in SUV entourages. Both within and surrounding the compounds, company 
policies are enforced. For example, there are strict rules about drug and alcohol use on 
compounds. Company policies are also enforced traveling to and from company sites. For 
example, on the roads to and from the compounds, special speed limits are mandated and 
enforced by companies. Young Turkanas are hired to keep grazing livestock away from 
roads and camps, and to redirect pastoralists (or researchers) who wander to close to 
compounds without first obtaining permission. In this sense, the governing authority of oil 
companies is apparent within company compounds, as well as in the surrounding landscapes. 
  
As a further demonstration of corporate control, oil sites in Turkana have been highly 
securitized by (quasi-)privatized security forces. As mentioned previously, communities in 
Turkana are increasingly insecure (Agade 2014). Insecurity is exacerbated by the fact that 
there is limited public security in the county, leaving Turkanas to rely on the Kenya Police 
Reserve (KPR), which are essentially armed civilian volunteers. Oil companies, however, 
retain private security forces on-call in case of an emergency. They also contract members of 
the KPR to provide protection for company facilities. This innovative approach to ensuring 
security around oil sites — where private companies hire private security forces, as well as 
civilian volunteers that have been armed by the state to protect their operations — allows 
resource extraction to proceed in northern Kenya without requiring the central government to 
secure and regulate the entire national space (Ferguson 2006: 206). 
  
Finally, the actual work of oil exploration and development is highly mechanized and reliant 
on small groups of highly skilled workers, satisfying the third criteria of resource enclaves. 
The people who are working within these spaces of corporate control have high levels of 
education, expertise and skills — often coming from other parts of the world or other parts of 
Kenya. Given that Turkanas have among the lowest literacy and education levels in Kenya, 
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few are qualified for the limited employment opportunities that are available in this industry. 
As such, despite a high labor surplus in Turkana, the capital-intensive and mobile nature of 
the industry prevents oil companies from contributing to Turkana’s workforce in any 
significant manner. Thus, oil exploration and development in Turkana aligns with what 
Ferguson (2005) identifies as the dominant model for oil extraction across the African 
continent – namely, enclave oil development.  
 
Seeing resource enclaves as an expression of state agency 
It would be relatively easy to argue that the enclaved nature of oil activities in Turkana is a 
result of weak and underdeveloped state institutions. It is often suggested that issues of 
governance, corruption and transparency (or the lack thereof) explain why resource 
development unfolds in an enclaved manner and offers little benefit to wider society in 
Africa. In fact, many have argued that the weak and unaccountable political formations that 
plague Africa are conducive to the creation and persistence of enclave development 
(Maconachie and Hilson 2009, Stevens and Dietsche 2007, Wick and Bulte 2009). 
  
However, this understanding of enclave development appears too simplistic in the context of 
Turkana. The central government has not been absent in the governance of oil, but has 
instead taken on an active role that facilitates the flow of capital investment in extractive 
enclaves. As the Cabinet Secretary of Kenya’s Ministry of Mining explained during a media 
interview: ‘We want to market Kenya as a mineral investment hub in Africa. With details of 
which minerals to find where, it will be easy and attractive to investors’ (Kazungu as cited by 
The Star 2016). As Patey from the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies (OIES 2014: 17) 
explains: 
International oil companies have received ample support from both former and current 
governments in Kenya. International oil companies are confident that the Kenyan 
government will not delay the start of oil production by stymying foreign investment 
with restrictive regulations. 
 
In other words, the government has demonstrated a decidedly business-friendly attitude 
towards resource companies entering Kenya. This attitude has included offering large tax 
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exemptions, which attract foreign investment. The government has also taken a unique 
approach to contracting: Production sharing contracts result in low initial government profit 
shares, as they stipulate that those who strike commercial oil deposits are entitled to fully 
recover their costs over the production cycle (Patey 2014). Companies appreciate this 
business-friendly attitude: As the CEO of Africa Oil, Keith Hill, recently stated, ‘There are 
not many places left on earth where you can put together an acreage portfolio like this 
[Turkana] ... Good contract terms, good support from the government – there are not that 
many happy hunting grounds left’ (Hussain 2013).  
  
The central government has also allowed oil companies and various other international 
stakeholders to both directly and indirectly influence the governance of oil in Kenya. 
Existing legislation and frameworks are long outdated. Although the Petroleum Exploration 
Development and Production Bill 2014 provides clear provisions for local content on 
employment, the supply of goods and services and training Kenyan nationals, it has yet to be 
passed. In the absence of clear legislation, oil companies have been allowed to make many of 
their own decisions on these important issues. Currently, local content obligations for oil 
companies are negotiated and agreed upon in production sharing contracts (PSCs), which are 
confidential. By dragging its feet in passing binding legislation, the government has 
permitted oil companies to exert de facto administrative control over certain aspects of the 
governance of oil, such as local content.21  
  
In summary, resource enclaves are emerging in Turkana following what Ferguson (2005) 
refers to as a ‘low-overhead model’. The government facilitates capital investments in 
extractive enclaves using various techniques, ranging from providing favorable contract 
terms to allowing companies to have a say in decisions about the governance of Kenya’s oil. 
In this sense, resource enclaves are not strictly a result of weak governance but rather, 
facilitated by state policies that enable private firms to more efficiently control and extract 
                                                
21 It should be noted that the government is likely not intentionally moving slowly: It simply faces 
sizable challenges in this regard. Existing oil-related legislation is sorely inadequate and outdated. 
Yet, oil development is unfolding so rapidly, and it is simply difficult for the government to overhaul 
its legislation at these speed. 
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natural resources.22 In these spaces, the state demonstrates its authority through its ‘ability to 
provide contractual legal authority that can legitimate the extractive work of transnational 
firms’ rather than by exercising exclusive control over these spaces itself (Ferguson, 2005: 
207). In other words, the emergence of resource enclaves in Turkana is by design, occurring 
under the purview of the state.  
 
Resource enclaves and the fulfillment of rights by oil companies 
As the central government has limited its own involvement in Turkana in favour of 
delegating certain governance tasks to oil companies, companies have also been indirectly 
delegated certain responsibilities in relation to citizens. As one community leader that we 
interviewed explained: ‘There is no government presence in Turkana other than [traditional] 
chiefs and teachers. So communities look to companies. Companies fill tanks with water. 
They provide state services’ (interview in Loima, November 2015). The presence of oil 
companies in Turkana is redefining how rights are mediated in Turkana and rural 
communities and oil companies are being drawn into an uneasy citizen-state-like 
relationship. Communities are seeking recognition and protection of their rights from oil 
companies operating near or on their land; in turn, oil companies are forced to make 
decisions about whether and how best to respond.  
  
One example of oil companies taking on responsibilities that one might expect to be fulfilled 
by the state relates to the provision of social services and infrastructure development. 
Globally, it is not unusual for extractive companies to contribute to social service provision 
through corporate social responsibility (CSR) initiatives. In fact, extractive companies are 
increasingly expected to develop robust CSR programs around their operations in order to 
obtain a ‘social license to operate’ — namely, acceptance from local communities of 
extractive companies and their operations. In the context of Turkana, interviewees described 
how oil companies provide communities with improved access to water as part of their CSR 
                                                
22 In fairness to the current governments, it should be noted that the strategically hands off approach 
to governing Turkana is nothing new. Although it is an expression of state agency, it can also be 
traced back to the protracted presence of humanitarian organisations, the legacy of the colonial 
administration and active Turkana resistance against foreign domination.   
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initiatives (see Image 6). Companies with larger-scale operations, such as Tullow Oil and 
Africa Oil, are also providing (both directly and indirectly) community members with access 
to education, healthcare, and improved communication and road networks. As a result of the 
relative absence of the central government in Turkana, oil companies are finding themselves 
responsible for ‘the services and infrastructure that governments are responsible for but 
which have been neglected’ (Maconachie and Hilson 2013: 350). As these companies deliver 
social services and build infrastructure in order to fulfill the most basic of rights – such as the 
right to water, education and health and wellbeing – the line between the duties of the state 
and the duties of companies becomes blurred.  
 
 
Image 6. Donkeys grazing near a community water project installed by an oil company 
(Photo Credit: Author) 
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Oil companies are also playing a role in providing security in parts of Turkana — a 
responsibility that is generally expected to be filled by the state. Turkana has a high 
prevalence of illegal small arms and many communities in Turkana experience regular inter-
ethnic livestock raids and banditry. During interviews with former and current oil company 
employees, company compounds were described as secure. One interviewee commented that 
security was one reason why he enjoyed being able to live on-site during his contracts 
(interviews with former oil company employee in Lodwar, October 2014). While 
historically, security provision in Turkana has been limited and local communities have been 
left will little choice but to secure themselves, oil companies are now participating in 
alleviating insecurity by deploying security forces with a dual role of protecting company 
assets and neighboring communities (Cordaid 2015a). Interestingly, companies are not 
simply stepping into this role on their own volition but rather; people in Turkana are 
demanding that oil companies provide this service. During discussions with youth about the 
implications of oil, one young man stated, ‘The oil will cause conflict over who the oil 
belongs too. There will be misunderstanding between communities’ (interview in Loima, 
October 2014). Another young man responded to this comment by saying, ‘We must tell the 
oil companies to take care of peoples’ lives…[and] to take initiative to care for their security’ 
(interview in Loima, October 2014). The provision of security is one further example of how 
companies are participating in fulfilling some duties that one might expect to be fulfilled by 
the state. 
 
Finally, oil companies have also taken on some level of responsibility for distributing 
emergency food relief. It is estimated that in the wake of recent droughts, as much as 75% of 
Turkana’s population has been left reliant on food relief for survival (Constantaras 2014). 
Humanitarian and religious organisations, such as Oxfam and the Catholic Diocese of 
Lodwar, have been providing food relief in Turkana for over half a century (McCabe, 1990). 
However, many of these organisations are now beginning to shift their programming away 
from the provision of basic and emergency services in Turkana, towards more ‘sustainable’ 
forms of humanitarian assistance (interview with international humanitarian organisation in 
Lodwar, November 2014). This is creating a gap in emergency service provision, which oil 
companies are stepping into fill as part of their CSR programming (interview with civil 
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society organisation in Lodwar, November 2014). For example, Tullow Oil has partnered 
with the Catholic Diocese of Lodwar in order to provide food aid to communities in certain 
regions of Turkana county (interview with local civil society organisation in Lodwar, 
November 2014). Given that humanitarian organisations have been largely responsible for 
providing this service in the past, this particular responsibility is actually being delegated to 
oil companies by international humanitarian aid organisations, rather than by the state. 
Regardless, if access to ‘food aid is a reflection of ... citizenship and belonging in a nation’ as 
Phillips argues, then the provision of food relief by companies is further illustrative of the 
citizen-state-like relationship emerging between people in Turkana and oil companies (2009: 
37). 
 
The practice of citizenship in resource enclaves 
As oil companies take on certain responsibilities – substituting the government’s role to some 
extent – the experiences and practices of citizenship in Turkana have been complicated. New 
political spaces are emerging for Turkanas to seek recognition, legitimisation and protection 
of their rights. As Ong argues, when the ‘rights and protections long associated with 
citizenship [become] disarticulated from the state, they are re-articulated with elements such 
as market-based interests’ (2005: 697). In the case of Turkana, some rural communities are 
readily rearticulating their rights towards private interests, directing their claims towards 
foreign oil companies that are participating in governing Turkana’s resource enclaves. 
  
For example, barazas are public meetings or assemblies where government officials (of any 
level) bring together men and women to discuss and debate public matters, such as new 
government programs or upcoming elections. These meetings are usually held outdoors and 
range in size from smaller gatherings of a few dozen people to rallies of several thousand 
people. Some oil companies, such as Tullow Oil, have held barazas as part of their 
community engagement process. The companies have used these meetings to inform 
communities about their activities, while community members have used these meetings to 
place demands on companies. One interviewee discussed how communities have demanded 
that oil companies commit to installing water projects or other types of infrastructure before 
beginning exploration activities during barazas (interview with local civil society 
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organisation in Lodwar, November 2014). This interviewee also spoke of communities who 
insisted that companies hire and source goods locally, in order to contribute to local 
livelihoods. Although barazas have long served as a space where communities meet with 
public authorities to claim their rights, the fact that oil companies are now also hosting 
barazas provides rural communities with access to a new process through which they can 
claim their rights. Moreover, by making demands on oil companies through barazas, 
communities are essentially bypassing the central government to ensure that their demands 
are heard, as proper regulatory frameworks and legislative policies to protect their rights are 
not yet in place. For example, instead of waiting for local content legislation to be enacted, 
some communities have made demands on companies with regards to local content 
expectations during barazas. Importantly, communities are not necessarily happy about this 
arrangement: As Cordaid reports, communities have begun to ‘…complain about the virtual 
absence of national and county government in community consultations’ (2015a: 9). 
  
Turkanas are also using Tullow Oil’s ‘field offices’ as spaces for seeking recognition, 
legitimisation and fulfillment for their rights. These offices, which tend to be located in small 
urban centers in the general vicinity of oil sites, were established in order to facilitate 
community engagement. Key informants explained how Turkanas, particularly community 
leaders, regularly visit these offices in order to ask questions, express their concerns, or seek 
benefits. During an interview, field office staff reported that on a daily basis they document 
concerns about the company’s unequal hiring practices, personal losses and damages and 
fears about pollution and its effect on livestock. Field office staff then report to their 
managers in order to determine how community complaints should be addressed. For 
example, following repeated complaints about livestock being hit by company vehicles, 
Tullow Oil and Africa Oil began a youth employment program to keep grasing livestock 
away from roads and camps. They also decided on standard compensation packages for any 
losses. In essence, these field offices serve as political spaces where Turkanas can claim 
certain rights, which may have otherwise been directed towards the state. 
  
Although an interesting relationship is emerging between oil companies and communities, 
this relationship is somewhat uneasy. The visible absence of the central government and the 
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long-term presence of humanitarian organisations have perhaps contributed to the readiness 
of some people in Turkana to accept the role of oil companies as quasi-governmental actors. 
Yet, many oil companies are not particularly keen to find themselves in this relationship. In 
particular, companies are hesitant to fill the role of government in social service provision, as 
this is unsustainable and not good for the ‘bottom line’. As one manager of an oil company 
with exploration activities in Turkana explained: ‘The whole idea of community donations, 
throwing trinkets over the fence, is not sustainable or positive … I cannot tell you how many 
dozens of schools and hospitals [that oil companies have built] are now sitting empty’ 
(interview with oil company manager by phone, October 2014). Yet, at the same time, this 
manager explained that companies benefit from developing positive relationship with 
surrounding communities. As a result, oil companies in Turkana have uneasily resigned to 
the role of mediating certain rights claims and fulfilling certain duties in return for a social 
license to operate. 
 
Tiered citizenship in Turkana 
Although some Turkanas are making use of the new political spaces created by the oil 
discovery to seek recognition and protection of their rights, not all communities are equally 
impacted by oil exploration activities. The narratives that were shared with us during 
interviews and focus group discussions emphasized that the ability to have political or moral 
claims heard by oil companies was unevenly distributed across the county and differentiated 
by socio-economic status and gender. Communities and community members that are unable 
to direct their rights claims to oil companies experience a form of second-class citizenship, 
where their rights claims are denied or neglected by both the central government and oil 
companies.  
  
In interviews and focus groups, some Turkanas reported that the ability to benefit from oil 
companies was limited to members of society from certain socio-economic backgrounds. For 
example, most of the formal employment in the oil industry requires formal education and 
skills training. Such opportunities are generally only afforded to wealthier or elite Turkanas 
or Kenyans from other parts of the country. Those hired by oil companies for management or 
other secure positions reported that, in addition to a regular salary, they also experience 
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added benefits of living securely behind the walls of oil camps and enjoying regular access to 
food, shelter, security and healthcare. Importantly, these are benefits that most Turkanas do 
not experience on a daily basis, despite the fact that these comprise the basic necessities of 
life. Furthermore, highly skilled Turkanas have access to professional development 
opportunities both in Kenya and abroad. For example, dozens of young Turkanas have been 
sent to the United Kingdom to pursue oil-related post-graduate studies at some of the world’s 
most renowned universities. These individuals will graduate as part of an elite class of global 
professionals with world-class credentials, becoming what Ong (2007) refers to as the ‘elite 
citizen’ class and what Nash (2009) refers to as ‘super-citizens’. Upon graduating, these 
young Turkanas will possess marketable skills that will make them mobile and desirable 
professionals, and they will be rewarded with power and secure rights (Ong 2007). Others in 
Turkana are successfully taking advantage of the opportunities created by the oil discovery as 
well, establishing businesses to support oil development activities. These enterprising 
subjects experience improved rights and freedoms as a result of oil exploration and 
development on their land (see Ong, 2006b: 154 on enterprising subjects). 
  
Yet given that more than 80% of Turkanas have never attended school, the vast majority of 
Turkanas only qualify for work that is considered ‘unskilled’ within the oil industry. 
Unskilled work refers to manual labour, such as digging holes and trenches for men, and 
cleaning and cooking jobs for women. Unskilled work in the oil industry is insecure, short-
term, and relatively low paying. These jobs lack the benefits that come with semi-skilled and 
skilled positions, such as access to health care and further training opportunities. Research 
participants who had obtained unskilled work in the oil industry were grateful for the 
additional income that it brought into their households, but admitted that they could not count 
on these jobs to provide regular income and that their overall livelihood situation had not 
improved as a result of such work.  
 
Beyond socio-economic status, Turkanas also reported that the ability to direct their rights 
claims to oil companies was limited to community members from certain geographic locales. 
The interaction between communities and oil companies in Turkana is territorialized: 
Relationships emerge wherever oil companies happen to be exploring or working at a given 
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time, which does not occur evenly throughout the county. Community members located 
within close proximity to exploration and development activities find themselves able to use 
emergent political spaces — such as barazas and company field offices — to advance their 
rights claims, unlike community members that are geographically distant from oil sites. 
  
For example, community members from a small village on the shores of Lake Turkana 
requested improved access to safe drinking water from an oil company in return for a social 
license to operate. This community had long been making similar claims from the central 
government, which had gone unheeded. The oil company responded by funding a KSh 18 
million (US $200,000) water project for the community. While this project has contributed to 
meeting a basic right, access to water, for those residing within this particular community, 
those in more drought-prone regions of the county continue to suffer as they struggle to have 
this right realized. As a similar example, men that worked or had previously worked for an 
oil company reported in interviews that they felt safe while working for oil companies, both 
on the oil rig site and in the urban centres where they spent their free time or days off. In 
contrast, in conversations in communities located further away from exploration sites, 
community members reported an increased sense of insecurity and vulnerability since the 
discovery of oil (focus group discussion in Loima, November 2014). This insecurity was 
attributed to the fact that oil companies contract KPR (armed civilian volunteers) to work as 
security. As a result of out-migration to meet this new demand for KPR (as will as private 
security guards), communities have been left more vulnerable to raiders and bandits (see 
Cordaid (2015a) for similar reports). These examples further exemplify how different groups 
in society experience different degrees of protection of their rights from oil companies.  
  
Lastly, Turkanas also explained how the ability to claim rights through oil companies was 
differentiated by gender norms and inequalities. For example, elders and community leaders, 
most often men, participate in the barazas organised by oil companies. In an interview with a 
consultants hired by Tullow Oil to conduct a barazas, we were told that companies may 
enquire about women’s perspectives during these meetings but rarely insist on engaging with 
women directly. Perhaps for such reasons, our interviews and focus groups revealed that 
women (in comparison to men) often possess less accurate information and/or understanding 
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of oil exploration and development. Women also reported that while men were effectively 
leveraging barazas to claim certain rights through oil companies in return for access to land, 
the demands being made did not always meet the most pressing needs of women and 
children. Thus, the baraza approach to community consultation may perpetuate the 
marginalisation of women’s voices in Turkana society, as women are not able to participate 
in civil society and politics to the same extent as men. This example effectively demonstrates 
how oil companies, knowingly or otherwise, conduct consultations in spaces where people 
have differentiated abilities to exercise their civil and political rights, thereby reinforcing 
gender inequalities that have long existed in the region. It also illustrates how oil companies 
mediate the state’s duty to consult in a way that potentially privileges the interests of men 
over women. 
  
Ultimately, our interviews and focus groups shape our argument that enclaved development 
is contributing to differentiated citizenship in Turkana, as not all people have the same ability 
to make rights claims on oil companies. This is a phenomenon that we term ‘crude 
citizenship.’ Globally, people living within and around resource enclaves are generally 
starkly disconnected from their national societies, left to rely on the corporate actors that 
administer these spaces as substitute governors (Ferguson 2005). Some people are able to 
seek recognition and protection for their rights from resource companies in enclaved space 
— particularly as companies become more attentive to communities’ demands because 
obtaining a social license to operate is increasingly expected in the resource sector. However, 
others in resource enclaves experience a more crude form of citizenship, where their rights 
claims go unheard by both oil companies and the state. In other words, the creation of 
enclaved spaces through flexible state policies that aim to attract capital investments 
transform the political terrain in a way that (potentially) benefits some members of society 
while neglecting the rights and protections of others.  
 
Refining crude citizenship 
Although new political space has emerged for Turkanas to seek recognition, legitimisation 
and protection of their rights as citizens, the geographic distribution of these spaces and who 
gets to participate in these spaces are highly continent and exclusive. As a result, some 
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community members experience second-class citizenship, as oil companies view their rights 
claims as beyond the scope of their responsibility and irrelevant to attaining a social license 
to operate. This exemplifies how rearticulating citizenship as a responsibility of market-
based interests can result in ‘diverse and contradictory standards of human worthiness’ (Ong 
2005: 699), or as de Koning et al. (2015) argue, how the outsourcing of governance to private 
actors contributes to inequality rather than equality for citizens. In the case of Turkana, only 
individuals who happen to be in the right place at the right time and who happen to have the 
right relationship with oil companies are positioned as worthy of protection and having their 
rights claims heard.  
  
Thus, an implicit consequence of enclave development appears to be the emergence of a 
tiered or graduated citizenship structure, where rights claims are only heard in certain spaces 
and if they ‘foster economic success’ for extractive companies and, in turn, the central 
government and/or political elites (Ong 2006). While Ong’s concept of ‘graduated 
citizenship’ emerges from a very different context, it offers considerable value in explaining 
how and why states deploy particular sovereignty strategies — such as delegating 
administrative control to corporate actors — and the consequences that can follow. As states 
implement flexible policies in order to create spaces that facilitate the flow of global capital, 
corporations gain indirect power over the political conditions of peoples’ lives. These people 
are, in turn subjected to differentiated forms of protections and rights depending on whether 
they serve the specific economic interests of companies (de Koning et al. 2015), and in this 
process, they are ‘assigned different social fates’ (Ong 2006a: 78; Ong, 2006a: 79). 
  
It needs to be stressed that the implications of crude citizenship are not necessarily destined 
to be negative. The creation of new political spaces for communities to practice citizenship 
can be seen as a positive development. For many, the institution of citizenship has become a 
‘hopeless category that is complicit with the ongoing exclusions and exploitations of state 
and capitalist forms of power’ (Isin and Nyers 2014: 5). This situation has certainly been the 
case in Turkana, where the longstanding marginalisation of Turkanas has led many to believe 
that first-class citizenship for Turkanas is beyond reach. Oil exploration activities in Turkana 
may have the potential to address some of this pessimism. Because companies must be 
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attentive to the rights claims of citizens in order to attain a social license to operate and 
prevent resistance, companies have demonstrated a degree of willingness to heed the rights 
claims of Turkanas. For example, they have hosted barazas, which provide political space 
for people to demand their rights. 
  
Yet, making good use of these emergent political spaces requires civil society to engage in 
social struggle. As Isin and Nyers explain, ‘struggle both precedes the conferral of rights and 
extends long after its recognition as legitimate by the polity and other citizens’ (2014: 8). 
Effective social struggle in Turkana will require building the capacity of both local civil 
society and county government, with the goal of creating a common ground upon which oil 
companies and/or the central government can be pressured to address communities’ 
demands. One member of Turkana civil society captured the importance of this process, 
saying, ‘we need to organize ourselves before the multi-nationals organize us’ (interview 
with civil society organisation in Lodwar, November 2014).  
  
It should be noted that civil society in Turkana is already mobilising and capitalising on 
opportunities for political dialogue and action in light of the new political space that has been 
created by oil exploration and development. For example, Friends of Lake Turkana (FoLT), a 
grassroots organisation with a mission to foster social, economic and environmental justice in 
the Lake Turkana Basin, is campaigning for the rights of marginalized communities in 
Turkana who are threatened by both corporate and government-led resource development. 
Similarly, the Kenyan Civil Society Platform on Oil and Gas is partnering with civil society 
leaders and communities in Turkana to advocate for those affected by Kenya’s oil and gas 
industry. These organisations are engaging with oil companies, as well as the central 
government, in order to mediate the rights-claims of communities near oil operations. Thus, 
there is potential for civil society to claim the Turkana’s emergent resource enclaves as 
political spaces where their rights can be seen, heard and recognized. Yet, it also must be 
remembered that it is difficult to sustain social struggle in a marginalized and nomadic 
pastoralist society that is dispersed throughout the countryside and, especially when funds to 
support such movements are increasingly scarce. Moreover, since oil-related development 
both creates and dominates discussion in these new political spaces, it may be that such 
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spaces do little to advance broader (non-oil-related) struggles for social inclusion and full 
citizenship rights. 
  
Another avenue for redefining or refining the potentially negative implications of crude 
citizenship involves building the capacity of county government in Turkana. While 
devolution promises to improve governance by bringing the government ‘closer to the 
people,’ the current county government lacks the programs, capabilities, and resources 
required to effectively protect the rights of its polity in light of enclave oil development. 
Moreover, there is a longstanding lack of trust between communities and county government. 
As a result, many communities in Turkana see county government officials as ‘too-close-for-
comfort’ to oil companies, rather than representing community interests (Cordaid, 2015a). 
They also criticize county government from being absent to-date in negotiations between oil 
companies and communities (Cordaid, 2015a). If, however, trust could be rebuilt between 
county government and communities, and county government was given the resources and 
capacity necessary to mediate the rights claims of community members, the benefits of oil 
exploration and development could potentially be distributed more evenly across the county. 
  
Importantly, the potential for Turkanas to refine crude citizenship, to stick with the metaphor, 
and to experience the benefit of new political spaces created by enclave development does 
remain contingent on broader trends. As a globally organized economy, the oil industry is 
heavily influenced by global and regional trends, such as commodity prices, labour 
availability and costs, and technology development. In 2015, there were dramatic dips in oil 
prices – hitting $38.24 a barrel, the lowest in 6 years – and this fall has caused oil companies 
in Turkana to scale back, delay, or abandon their operations (Karambu, 2015). Some 
companies have pulled out all together. Therefore, whether Turkanas will be able to use 
emergent oil enclaves to truly transform their status in Kenyan society remains to be seen, as 
do the long-term impacts that enclave development may have on the experiences and 
practices of citizenship in Turkana.  
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Conclusion 
In this paper, we have argued that enclave oil development is impacting social and political 
relations in the county of Turkana in northwestern Kenya. Specifically, we have shown how 
the emergence of resources enclaves in Turkana is influencing the experiences and practices 
of citizenship. In light of the oil discovery, oil companies are taking on certain 
responsibilities in relation to communities, such as disciplining, regulating and offering care 
and protection. In return, some communities are rearticulating their rights and entitlements as 
citizens towards oil companies, rather than towards the state or humanitarian organisations. 
Our fieldwork suggests that this re-articulation of citizenship is altering the political terrain in 
Turkana in a manner that benefits some members of society, while neglecting the rights and 
protections of others. 
  
This paper contributes several insights to the academic literature on the extractive industries 
and the creation of resource enclaves in sub-Saharan Africa. First, it reaffirms that extractive 
development continues to unfold in a thoroughly enclaved manner in parts of Africa. More 
importantly, however, it reinforces Ferguson’s claim that resource enclaves should be 
recognized as new technologies of spatial and social regulation, rather than as accidents 
produced by the post-colonial bifuricated state (Mamdani 1996). As Ferguson argues: 
It is worth asking whether Africa’s combination of privately secured mineral-extraction 
enclaves and weakly governed humanitarian hinterlands might constitute not a 
lamentably immature form of globalisation but, rather, a quite ‘advanced’ and 
sophisticated mutation of it. If so, the forms of ‘global economy’ that have developed 
in some mineral-rich African countries in recent years might show us not only a 
theoretically interesting anomaly but also a frightening sort of political–economic 
model for some other regions that combine mineral wealth with political intractability 
(2005: 380). 
 
We suggest that this is the case in Turkana, where the state has chosen to remain visibly 
absent in favour of delegating administrative control to corporate actors in order to facilitate 
capital investments in resource extraction. 
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Next, complementing other recent studies focusing on enclave development (Ackah-Baidoo, 
2012; Ferguson, 2005; 2006; MacEachern, 2010), our work illustrates how rural 
communities in Africa engage with the political space that resource enclaves create. Given 
that Turkana represents an almost ‘ideal’ type of resource enclave, we underscore the fact 
that social and political relationships in and around oil enclaves in Turkana cannot be 
assumed across different African contexts. Rather, our findings reinforce existing evidence 
that relationships between state, corporate, and community actors around enclaves are 
complicated by diverse local realities. The case of Turkana, for example, diverges from some 
of the existing research in this field of study, which often focuses on cases of community 
resistance and conflict in response to enclave development.  
  
Finally, our work highlights the importance of ‘re-politicising’ analyses of the extractive 
industries and enclave development, particularly in African contexts. While some recent 
analyses have promoted extractive development in Africa as a technical, apolitical solution to 
poverty, we take seriously the way in which powerful corporate actors contribute to 
processes of social and political change when they enter rural communities. We also 
emphasize that there is a need to avoid overstating the long-term social, political and 
economic impacts of enclave oil development, given the instability of global markets and the 
uncertain future of the global oil industry.  
  
Our use of the term crude citizenship serves two purposes: First, it captures the fact that 
community members in and around resource enclaves often look towards crude oil 
companies for recognition and protection of their rights and that companies are (uneasily) 
responding to Turkana’s ‘acts of citizenship’ (Isin and Nielsen 2008) in order to obtain a 
social license to operate from the rural communities surrounding their operations. We 
suggest that people direct their rights claims towards oil companies because they have 
limited to access to state spaces in Turkana. This aspect of our analysis illustrates how new 
kinds of politics and political subjects emerge in resource enclaves. Like refugee camps (Isin 
and Rygiel 2007, Rygiel 2012, Sigona 2015), mega-cities (Ong 2007) and deportation centres 
(Isin and Rygiel 2007), resource enclaves can be seen as emergent political spaces where 
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rights and entitlements of citizenship are disassociated from the terrains of the nation-state 
and rearticulated towards other types of political communities.  
 
Second, the term crude citizenship hints at the problematic effects of enclave oil 
development on political equality between citizens. Although resource enclaves may create 
new spaces for people to be political and make rights claims, these spaces are not equally 
accessible to all. As our analysis shows, the ability to place demands on oil companies and to 
be recognized as political subjects with ‘a right to have rights’ (Arendt 1968) is differentiated 
by geography, socio-economic status and gender. This aspect of our analysis contributes to 
theorising about ‘differentiated’ (Holston 2008) or ‘variegated’ citizenship (Inda 2005). 
Research within critical citizenship studies has shown that differential citizenship exists 
within states (Inda 2005, Holston 2006). Our analysis extends this claim to other forms of 
citizenship, revealing how different groups in society experience different degrees of 
recognition and protection from oil companies. 
  
Our findings also highlight a number of interconnected areas for future work on resource 
development enclaves. First, our notion of crude citizenship requires further application, 
refining and development, assuming that it is received as a potentially useful concept to 
frame research that focuses on the political implications of enclave development. Efforts to 
apply this lens to case studies in other geographical locations would be beneficial within and 
outside Africa, as well as across the global South and North. Although scholars should 
remain sensitive to the dimensions of resource enclaves that are unique to the global South – 
such as the perpetuation of colonial style relationships between weak or incapacitated states 
and powerful transnational companies – there are similarities in terms of how states facilitate 
investment in resource extraction between the South and North that could be examined more 
closely. 
  
Our work also reveals a need to better understand the factors that shape how rural 
communities understand, contest and engage with resource enclaves. For example, why do 
Turkanas seem to understand resource enclaves as an opportunity to seek recognition, 
legitimisation and fulfillment of their rights, while many other rural communities resist 
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enclave development and challenge the presence and authority of corporations in such 
spaces? Because relationships between communities, companies and states in resource 
enclaves are diverse and complicated, there are countless opportunities for research into the 
many ways that communities respond to enclave development. This may be a promising area 
for action-based studies that could examine whether and how local communities and/or 
groups occupy political space in and around resource development enclaves, as well as how 
such groups try to take advantage of, engage with or resist the privileged position that private 
authorities have been granted by some African states.  
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Conclusion 
A new frontier or post-frontier? 
 
In July 2015, the Government of Kenya’s Ministry of Devolution and Planning released a 
National Policy for the Sustainable Development of Northern Kenya and other Arid Lands, 
titled ‘Unlocking Our Full Potential for Realisation of the Kenya Vision 2030’. This policy 
recognises that the diversion of public resources away from Kenya’s ASALs towards 
seemingly more productive regions of the country over the past half-century has been 
detrimental to the development of Kenya’s north. The policy also states that the neglect of 
the north is ‘not based on sound socioeconomic analysis but stem[s] from a lack of 
appreciation of the region’s potential and a lack of understanding of its production systems’ 
(GoK 2015: 2). The updated policy on the north recognises that Kenya ‘will not achieve 
sustained growth in her [sic] economy and progress as a nation if the ASALs are not 
appropriately factored into national planning and development’ (GoK 2015: 2). This policy 
marks a turning point for northern Kenya in national affairs, as well as in the national 
imaginary: It promises to draw the region and its peoples into the folds of national 
development and it repositions northern Kenya as central to the country’s future.  
 
At the same time, the policy also emulates aspects of Kenya’s first development strategy 
from 1965, as it still recommends that public spending be directed to regions that are rich in 
natural resources. Interestingly, the policy was drafted in 2012 — the same year that oil was 
discovered in northern Kenya. The policy states that, ‘the ASALs have hidden strengths and 
enormous untapped resources that can be harnessed not only to sustain themselves but to 
contribute to national development’ (GoK 2015: 2). It goes on to list the potential for 
resource development in the ASALs, including renewable energy sources, such as solar and 
wind, as well as other natural resource reserves, such as oil and gas, gypsum, soda ash, 
limestone, coal, iron ore, and sand and gravel (GoK 2015). It later claims that the ASALs 
‘require accelerated investment for a finite period in order to achieve equity and unlock the 
region’s potential’ (GoK 2015: 29). To unlock this potential and attract investment, the 
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government promises to improve ‘infrastructure’, ‘credit facilities’, ‘technical expertise’ and 
‘human capabilities’ (GoK 2015). The government also promises to take progressive 
measures to protect the rights of people in the north — including the water and grazing rights 
of pastoralists — while it creates a better ‘foundation for development’ for all northern 
Kenyans (GoK 2015: 32 and 30). The government is not necessarily making a superficial 
promise to respect pastoralists’ rights, but is suggesting that there is space for northern 
Kenyans in its modernising and developmentalist ambitions. ‘Unlocking Our Full Potential’ 
reads as a blueprint for Kenya’s frontier-making project — informing, guiding, and 
legitimising encounters between capital, resources and people in the north, in order to space 
for and acceptance of investment in the region’s natural resources. 
 
Bringing resource frontiers to life 
Tsing asks, ‘How does nature at the frontier become a set of resources? How are landscapes 
made empty and wild so that anyone can come to use and claim them?’ (2005: 30). Frontiers 
have often been described as ‘state-building projects’ (Geiger 2008, see also Korf et al. 2015 
and Einzenberger 2016, Scott 1998). For example, Scott’s (1998) seminal work on frontiers 
examines the interventions used by the state to draw remote populations into state territory 
and to administer order over frontier resources. To some extent, Kenya’s resource frontier is 
also a project of state expansion. As the preceding paragraphs, and other parts of my 
dissertation illustrate, the Kenyan government is actively expanding its presence in the north 
— in regions of the country that have historically been perceived as unimportant to the state 
— in order to consolidate control over land, resources and people. Importantly, however, my 
dissertation also shows that Kenya’s resource frontier is not simply a nation-making project. 
Many different actors are enrolled in the process of transforming the ‘empty wilds’ of 
northern Kenya into a set of resources using various technologies of government and fields 
of expertise. In other words, I argue that contemporary frontiers are often both state-building 
(Geiger 2008) and globalist projects (Tsing 2008). 
 
Although frontiers exist at the social and economic periphery or margins of the state, they 
have never been detached from the global centers of power. Historically, frontier-making 
projects fuelled colonial expansion, while today these projects are central to both global 
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development agendas and global markets. Throughout my dissertation, I examine how global 
actors, such as transnational corporations, international financial institutions and bilateral 
development agencies, are actively invested in the making of Kenya’s frontier. As I discuss 
in Article #1, the World Bank and numerous governments — such as the UK government 
and the Canadian government — have financed and supported various legislative and 
regulatory reforms in Kenya, meant to make Kenya’s resources more accessible, desirable 
and extractable to investors. Transnational corporations have also been involved in these 
processes. Private oil companies, for example, have advised the government on the 
development of the Private Security Industry Regulations Bill (2014) (Interview with 
representative of Kenya’s NHRI, February 2015).  
 
I also show how seemingly less powerful actors are also enrolled in this frontier-making 
project. Such actors include civil society organisations, Indigenous social movements and 
coalitions, conservation organisations and rural land users. This finding is most clearly 
reflected in Article #2, where I explore how rural groups draw on different forms of expertise 
from the global arena — ranging from agricultural science to biodiversity science to 
international legal frameworks — in order to counter claims made by more powerful actors 
about how land should be used and managed in Kenya’s new resource frontier. The agency 
of rural actors in frontier spaces is also demonstrated in Article #1, where pastoralist 
communities have launched a court case against an international consortium of private 
investors and the government over illegal land acquisition for a wind power project. Whether 
or not these communities will actually be able to influence the terms of land control remains 
to be seen. However, the fact that this case remains caught up in a lengthy legal battle 
suggests that rural land users have some degree of agency in shaping struggles over land in 
frontier spaces. The pastoralist communities involved in the court case have received support 
from both national and international civil society organisations. In this regard, less powerful 
actors are also connected to global spaces and agendas.   
 
At the outset of my dissertation, I asked: Who is involved in imagining, producing, and 
negotiating frontier spaces? I answer this question by examining how contemporary frontiers 
are imagined, produced and shaped by diverse actors and institutions that operate across 
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multiple-levels. Ultimately, I argue that the frontier is a product of contestation and 
negotiation between various actors competing to govern access to, and control over, land and 
resources. This conceptualisation of frontier spaces aligns with other recent studies on the 
frontier, such as work by Tsing (2003, 2005), Barney (2009), Peluso and Lund (2011) and 
Büscher (2013), Eilenberg (2014).  
 
A useful entry point for future research would be to more thoroughly trace the role of experts 
in ‘frontier constellations’ (Eilenberg 2014). As I have shown, experts are intimately 
entwined in frontier-making projects — including consultants, environmental scientists, 
engineers, lawyers and investment bankers — yet there is a need for more research that 
focuses explicitly on the novel strategies that these actors use to constitute and shape frontier 
spaces, such as Environmental Impact Assessments and project feasibility studies. For 
example, I argue in Article #1, for instance, that transnational corporations use the 
knowledge produced by technical experts and consultants to legitimise their control over 
land. However, I believe that these experts may play a more important role in creating and 
influencing the rules that govern access to land than is often assumed. This may be a fruitful 
avenue for future research. 
 
Governing resource frontiers 
In addition to examining who is involved in producing Kenya’s resource frontier, my 
dissertation also explores how this frontier has been produced. Like other recent literature on 
land politics in frontier spaces, I examine the specific governmental strategies used to 
assemble land as a resource for investment. For example, scholars such as Li (2014), Tsing 
(2003, 2005) and Barney (2009) have shown how land is ‘emptied’ in order to attract 
investors and create space for industrial development. Like these scholars, my articles 
discuss the maps that have been drawn, the policies that have been implemented, the 
infrastructure that is being improved and people that are being displaced with the goal of 
rendering land accessible and investible. Referring back to the opening paragraphs of this 
conclusion, Kenya’s national policy for northern Kenya in one example of the types of 
governmental technologies that are used to rationalize and legitimise frontier-making 
projects. This policy positions infrastructure development and large-scale land investments in 
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northern Kenya as essential to the nation’s progress, but also as a necessary step towards 
bettering the lives of northern Kenyans.  
 
Perhaps more importantly though, my articles also identify and examine technologies that 
work beyond the state to produce and govern resource frontiers. In Article #1, I describe how 
LTWP, an international consortium of companies and investors, has hired expert 
professionals to deal with community resistance against their wind power project in northern 
Kenya. These experts have conducted assessments and produced research that outlines how 
the consortium’s acquisition of land complies with global norms for responsible land 
development — thereby undermining community concerns and strengthening the 
consortium’s claim to land. In Article #1 and #3, I reflect on the global technologies of 
government used by oil companies, to shape the behavior of pastoralist communities and to 
secure control over how such landscapes are ordered. For example, oil companies in northern 
Kenya have hired technical experts to conduct surveying and seismic testing to measure oil 
reserves in their concessions. These measurements are used to attract investors, but also to 
adjudicate whether the oil companies can use land in a more ‘efficient’ way than existing 
land users. If the reserves are deemed ‘commercially viable’, existing land users may be 
displaced in order to create space for oil development.23  These examples illustrate how 
specific techniques and forms of expertise can be used to rationalize the appropriation of land 
from existing land users in order to pave the way for more ‘productive’ land uses.  
 
These examples are also interesting because they demonstrate the assemblage of actors 
involved in deploying global governmental interventions aimed at freeing land and resources 
for investment. For example, one interviewee described how EHRC Energy, an American oil 
company, contracted a Chinese firm to conduct its exploration drilling and seismic 
surveying: This Chinese firm, then, hired local police force from Turkana to provide security 
and contracted women from a nearby village to supply food during their exploration 
activities (interview with former oil company employee in Loima, November 2014). This 
exemplifies how contemporary frontiers are imagined, produced and shaped by diverse 
                                                
23 In some cases, resettlement is not necessary though, as companies increasingly have access to technologies 
that allow them to access reserves underneath existing land users from a distance— by drilling sideways, for 
example. 
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actors and institutions that operate across multiple-levels, as well as how groups of experts 
work together in order to assemble land for investment. 
 
In the introduction of my dissertation, I state that one question that I aim to answer through 
my research is: What technologies of government are used to challenge previous mechanisms 
of land control and consolidate new forms of authority and control in such spaces (Peluso 
and Lund 2011)? Although I reflect on many different strategies used to transform land 
relations throughout my dissertation, I emphasise the role of ‘expert professionals’ and global 
expertise in frontier-making projects. In Article #1, I illustrate how powerful actors use 
dominant forms of expertise to undermine the knowledge claims of existing land users in 
frontier spaces. In Article #2, I draw attention to rural agency, revealing how existing land 
users can draw on these same forms of expertise to negotiate their terms of incorporation into 
a land deal, or to present alternative ideas about how land should be used and managed (see 
Article #3). In this sense, my dissertation not only demonstrates the diverse actors enrolled in 
frontier-making projects — which have conventionally been described as merely state-
building projects — but it considers the global technologies deployed to create frontiers, and 
to manage the conduct of frontier subjects. 
 
Living within resource frontiers 
My dissertation also reveals how frontier-making projects are used to create new types of 
rural subjects, while simultaneously denying or eroding existing political identities in some 
cases. One explicit goal of Kenya’s frontier-making project is to reconfigure the relationship 
between the state and northern Kenyans. With the support of international financial 
institutions and bilateral development donors, the Kenyan government has deployed certain 
technologies to remake rural subjectivities, in order to produce more modern and productive 
subjects. In Article #2, I argue that the construction of a mega-infrastructure project in north-
central Kenya is just as much about attracting investors as it is about preparing northern 
populations for a ‘better’ life. This particular project, implemented under the auspices 
‘Vision 2030’, is part of the government’s broader plan to ‘initiate a national programme on 
attitudinal and value change,’ so that all Kenyans may become efficient, globally-competitive 
and prosperous citizens (GoK 2007: 25). It offers pastoralists in the region the opportunity to 
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transition away from subsistence livelihoods towards commercial production systems and/or 
wage labour, so that they can better contribute to national economic growth and improve 
their own futures. Drawing on such example, I show how the relationship between those 
governing and those governed is reconstituted in frontier spaces, as those governing seek to 
regulate the behaviour of the governed in order to achieve certain social and economic 
outcomes. This finding aligns with contemporary governmentality (Foucault 1991) literature, 
which bring attention to the ways in which specific techniques and forms of expertise are 
used to produce modern states and subjects (Rose 1999, Li 2007, Moore 2005, Ong 2006).  
 
Yet, northern Kenyans are not simply passive recipients of the state’s subject-making 
interventions. They are also not necessarily in opposition of development and modernity. As 
was stated in the introduction, pastoralist systems have evolved to be adaptive and 
innovative, yet they often have unique visions of the future and ‘expectations of modernity’ 
(Ferguson 1999). In response to Kenya’s frontier-making project, northern Kenyan are 
enacting their subjectivity and publically asserting their rights as citizens. For example, in 
Article #2, pastoralist groups in north-central Kenya have armed themselves with knowledge 
of Indigenous rights and are advocating for these rights to be respected by organising 
demonstrations and protests and by lobbying the government. Their goal is to assert their 
rights in order to force the government to make space for their political participation in 
decision-making and planning processes related to land tenure change and resource 
development. Such contestations and struggles reveal how governed subjects also shape the 
rationalities and technologies that are meant to discipline citizen life (Valdivia 2008: 459).  
 
In other cases, my analysis reveals how frontier-making projects can produce new kinds of 
political subjects and subjectivities altogether. In the more remote corners of northwestern 
Kenya — such as northern Turkana — the state remains relatively absent, as the central 
government continues to administer the region under a system of indirect rule. Though 
Kenya’s resource frontier extends into these regions, the state governs through a more 
fragmented approach to governance, devolving authority to local government and 
administrative control to oil companies. As oil companies enter the region and attempt to 
enclose pastoral land, pastoralist communities are experimenting with new ways of having 
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their rights claims mediated. For example, in Article #2, I show how pastoralist groups are 
reaching above and beyond the state to lay claim to their rights, attempting to constitute 
themselves as citizens of a global Indigenous polity. 
 
The formation of novel political subjectivities is also exemplified in Article #3. In this 
article, I demonstrate how pastoralist communities are demanding certain provisions and 
services from oil companies that one might expect to be fulfilled by the state. To some 
extent, oil companies are willing to comply with communities’ demands — effectively 
playing the role of government — in return for a ‘social license to operate’. This, I suggest, 
draws communities and oil companies into an uneasy citizen-state-like relationship. This 
example reflects new spaces for political agency can be created in contemporary resource 
frontiers, which are governed through ‘graduated’ and ‘overlapping sovereignties’ (Ong 
2006; Vandergeest and Unno 2012) 
 
I began my dissertation by questioning whether there was anything unconventional about the 
practice and experience of citizenship in resource frontiers. I argue that my research suggests 
that resource frontiers are, in fact, unique political spaces. To some extent, they are spaces 
where citizenship is remade in order to serve national interests. Yet, at the same time, 
frontiers are spaces where citizenship becomes disarticulated from the terrains of the state, as 
rural land users reach above and beyond the state to have their rights mediated, or as new 
actors enter frontiers and intervene to fulfill certain rights and protections long associated 
with state-based citizenship. In both cases, frontiers give rise to unique ways of experiencing 
and practicing citizenship. Problematically, innovative expressions of citizenship — such as 
‘crude citizenship’ discussed in Article #3 — may represent a form of partial citizenship, 
where subjects can only claim certain rights and where political participation is limited to 
very particular political discussions and spaces. 
 
A new frontier or a post-frontier? 
My research on Kenya’s resource frontier reflects recent work by Larsen (2015), who argues 
that new authorities and a forms of regulation are restructuring governance in resource 
frontiers, resulting in what he describes as the emergence a ‘post-frontier’ regime. The shift 
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from frontier to post-frontier is defined by the rise of new social and environmental 
restrictions and protection measures, including transnational environmental and social 
regulation, expanding human and Indigenous rights movements, a growing global emphasis 
on biodiversity conservation and new expectations around corporate social responsibility. As 
a result of these developments, contemporary resource frontiers are confusing and 
contradictory spaces where intensified resource extraction and mega-infrastructure projects 
exist alongside strengthening Indigenous rights movements and expanding conservation 
schemes.  
 
During the 1990s and early 2000s, frontiers were described as deregulated, free-for-all 
landscapes of political chaos, environmental havoc, and social contestation (Tsing 2005, 
Geiger 2008). Today, however, new regulatory technologies and institutions exist that are 
meant to bring order to frontier disorder. Expectations around corporate responsibility have 
led corporations to put new social and environmental safeguards in place in order to protect 
the environment and peoples’ rights. For example, Environmental and Social Impact 
Assessments (ESIAs), as discussed in Article #1, are one example of a technical tool that has 
been designed to bring order to frontier spaces, by regulating the conduct of transnational 
corporations. Global environmental and social standards for transnational corporations, 
which are also discussed in Article #1, serve as another example. Companies refer to such 
safeguard measures on their websites and embed them in their internal corporate policies and 
codes of conduct. At the same time, governments put certain measures in place to hold 
companies accountable against these safeguards. The Kenyan government now requires 
companies to have their ESIAs reviewed by the National Environmental Management 
Authority (NEMA) before beginning any new project. As Larsen argues, ‘Contrary to the 
critique of neoliberal deregulation, the post-frontier gaze rests on the exact opposite 
observation: namely, that most frontiers have become more regulated in both environmental 
and social terms’ (2015: 14). 
 
Growing recognition of Indigenous peoples’ rights and expanding conservation schemes are 
two other central features of post-frontier regimes. Indigenous organisations and 
conservation actors have created new spaces within resource frontiers where they can 
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promote their interests (in some cases, the interests of these groups overlap, which can 
strengthen their movements). Growing global support for both Indigenous rights and 
conservation movements has strengthened the agency of such groups in frontier encounters. 
For example, Article #2 describes how UNESCO convinced the Kenyan government to 
implement additional ecological planning measures prior to developing a mega-infrastructure 
project in the north. Thus alongside new social and environmental regulations for 
transnational corporations, frontiers are being (re-)ordered by efforts to secure peoples’ rights 
and protect the environment.  
 
Yet, frontiers still remain contested terrains shaped by power inequalities and overlapping 
authorities. Although new regulatory technologies have been created to govern frontier 
spaces, these technologies are not applied consistently and they are often not monitored in 
practice. Moreover, new regulatory technologies can be coopted by powerful actors to 
achieve unexpected ends, as illustrated in Article #1. Furthermore, although Indigenous 
struggles and conservation efforts feature prominently in contemporary frontier spaces, their 
mere presence does not put an end to frontier expansion. As Larsen writes, the rise of a post-
frontier regime does not necessarily close or tame frontiers and it certainly does not replace 
frontier logic. Rather, as I illustrate throughout my dissertation, post-frontier institutions alter 
the types of struggles that take over land and resources, as well as the types of actors that are 
enrolled in these struggles. Post-frontier regimes are shaped by struggles between a complex 
set of actors who compete to govern access to land and resources in pursuit of diverse values 
and goals. 
 
Combined, my dissertation articles reveal how actors with varying degrees of power use both 
old and new technologies of government to produce, negotiate and contest the rules that 
govern Kenya’s frontier landscapes and populations. I demonstrate how space exists for 
seemingly less powerful actors — such as rural land users — to influence how and where the 
state and industry expands in frontier spaces, as well as to claim their rights in return for 
creating space for this expansion. Yet, I also show that power asymmetries are not erased in 
post-frontier regimes; they are simply reconfigured. Although rural land users can use new 
techniques and forms of expertise to influence contestations over land and resources, these 
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simply shift the terrains of struggle to new venues. Thus, in order to better understand how 
contemporary frontiers are made (or unmade), researchers need to shift their gaze to new 
venues where the struggles over frontier land and resources increasingly take place, such as 
on the inside of court rooms, in the boardrooms of consultancy firms, or during public 
consultation processes. Increasingly, it is within these spaces that regimes of access to land 
and resources in frontier spaces are being negotiated and determined.  
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Appendices  
 
Appendix A: List of Interviewees  
In some cases, I presented interviewees with an informed consent form prior to the interview 
and then provided an oral explanation of the interview process prior to beginning the 
interview. In other cases (often when key informants could not read), either a translator or I 
explained the interview process orally. Interviewees dictated the way that they wanted to be 
identified in resulting publications, and I gave them the opportunity to revise their choice 
following the interview (and in some cases, after reading an initial draft of the publication). 
In nearly every case, interviewees preferred not to be identified by name, place of 
employment, or job title. Requests for anonymity relate to the politicized nature of resource 
development in northern Kenya. When interviewing industry actors, I was sometimes asked 
to sign non-disclosure agreements that outlined how I would be expected to treat data.  
 
Interviews in north-western Kenya 
 
Interviewee Location Date 
Humanitarian organization representative  Turkana (Loima) 06/11/14 
Community leader or representative  Turkana (Loima) 06/11/14 
Community leader or representative Turkana (Loima) 06/11/14 
Community leader or representative Turkana (Loima) 07/11/14 
Oil company manager or employee Turkana (Loima) 07/11/14 
Oil company manager or employee Turkana (Loima) 07/11/14 
Oil company manager or employee Turkana (Loima) 07/11/14 
Kenyan government representative  Turkana (Loima) 07/11/14 
Community leader or representative Turkana (Loima) 08/11/14 
Community leader or representative Turkana (Loima) 08/11/14 
Community leader or representative Turkana (Loima) 09/11/14 
Oil company manager or employee Turkana (Lodwar) 10/11/14 
Oil company manager or employee Turkana (Lodwar) 10/11/14 
Oil company manager or employee Turkana (Lodwar) 10/11/14 
Humanitarian organization representative Turkana (Lodwar) 11/11/14 
NGO representative  Turkana (Lodwar) 11/11/14 
Oil company manager or employee Turkana (Lokichar) 11/11/14 
Oil company manager or employee Turkana (Lokichar) 11/11/14 
NGO representative Turkana (Lodwar) 11/11/14 
Kenyan government representative Turkana (Loima) 07/11/14 
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Interviews in north-central Kenya 
 
Interviewee Location Date 
Kenyan government representative Laikipia 08/05/15*; 24/05/16* 
Kenyan government representative Laikipia 05/05/15*  
NGO representative Laikipia 08/05/15* 
NGO representative Laikipia 22/05/15* 
Conservation organization representative Laikipia  11/05/16 
Community leader or representative Laikipia 12/05/16 
Community leader or representative Laikipia 12/05/16 
Community leader or representative Laikipia 12/05/16 
Community leader or representative Laikipia 12/05/16 
Conservation organization representative Laikipia 16/05/16 
NGO representative Laikipia 18/05/16 
NGO representative Laikipia 18/05/16 
NGO representative Laikipia 18/05/16 
Conservation organization representative Laikipia 18/05/16 
Conservation organization representative Laikipia 19/05/2016 
Community leader or representative Isiolo Town 19/05/16 
Community leader or representative Isiolo Town 19/05/16 
Conservation organization representative Isiolo Town 19/05/16 
NGO representative Laikipia 22/05/16 
Conservation organization representative Laikipia 22/05/16 
 
*These interviews were conducted by the co-author 
 
Interviews in Nairobi 
 
Interviewee   Location Date 
NGO representative Nairobi 27/10/14 
Technical expert (industry or environmental consultant) Nairobi 27/10/14 
NGO representative  Nairobi 19/11/2014 
Technical expert (industry or environmental consultant) Nairobi 23/11/2014 
Technical expert (industry or environmental consultant) Nairobi 28/11/2014 
Kenyan government representative Nairobi 3/3/15 
NGO representative Nairobi 3/3/15 
Conservation organization representative Nairobi 25/05/16 
 
Interviews conducted by phone or Skype 
 
Interviewee   Location  Date 
Oil company manager or employee Vancouver, Canada 26/09/14 
NGO representative Ottawa, Canada 03/10/14 
Oil company manager or employee Washington, D.C. 13/10/14 
NGO representative Ottawa, Canada 16/10/14 
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NGO representative Vancouver, Canada 30/10/14 
Oil company manager or employee London, UK 05/01/15 
Technical expert (industry or environmental consultant) Toronto, Canada 09/07/15 
Technical expert (industry or environmental consultant) Ottawa, Canada 05/06/16 
Technical expert (industry or environmental consultant) Ottawa, Canada 15/06/16 
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Appendix B: List of Focus Group Discussions and Workshops 
Focus Group Discussions 
 
Participants Location Number of Participants Date 
Community members (men) Loima 7 8 November 2014 
Community members (female) Loima 5 7 November 2014 
 
Workshops 
 
Participants Location Number of Participants Date 
Secondary School Students  Loima 88 9 November 2014 
 
 
  
  178 
Appendix C: Course Descriptions 
 
As part of my research methods, I audited online professional development courses offered 
by Edumine, a certificate program offered in partnership by University of British Columbia 
(UBC) and the Canadian Institute of Mining (CIM) throughout the course of my doctoral 
studies. Course description for the four courses that I audited are listed below. These 
descriptions are copied directly from Edumine’s website: 
 
 
1) Establishing a Social Licence to Operate in Mining 
 
Introduction 
This is a course for anyone concerned with sustainable community relationships in mining: 
professionals, managers, regulators, NGOs, community leaders and graduate students. The 
course explains how a mining company can earn and maintain a social license to operate. It 
begins with the business case for dedicating resources to the social license and describes the 
returns a company could expect from each successive level of license. The course also 
explores what can be done to make the issuer of the license more politically stable so that the 
company's social political risk is reduced and the community's readiness for sustainable 
development is enhanced. Finally the course looks at the overlap between these activities and 
areas of corporate social responsibility, corporate citizenship, and sustainability reporting. 
 
Part 1 of the course explains what a social license to operate is, why it is important to mining 
companies, and how the general management theory known as the "resource dependence 
view of competitive advantage" explains how relationships with stakeholders affect project 
feasibility and success. 
 
Going deeper, Part 2 describes the four levels of social license and the three boundary criteria 
that must be met to go from one level to another, and examines common factors that can 
cause the level of social license to rise or fall. 
 
Turning to the issuer of the social license, Part 3 of the course draws on social network 
analysis concepts to explore the many ways a community could be unable to issue a social 
license that is durable and socially legitimate, and looks beneath the stakeholder politics at 
the social capital patterns that can improve a community's capacity to issue a solid social 
license, while simultaneously raising the level of social license the community grants to the 
company. 
 
Course Content 
Establishing a Social License to Operate in Mining is structured with three parts and a total 
of 12 learning sessions of 30-60 minutes each, plus interactive reviews. Course duration is 
equivalent to approximately nine hours of learning content. 
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2) Social Responsibility in Exploration 
 
Introduction 
Social Responsibility in Exploration is one of a series of courses developed from e3 Plus: A 
Framework for Responsible Exploration, a guideline developed by the Prospectors and 
Developers Association of Canada (PDAC) to help exploration companies continuously 
improve their social, environmental and health and safety performance and to 
comprehensively integrate these three aspects into all of their exploration programs around 
the world. 
 
e3 Plus provides the means for members to reduce social and environmental risk to their 
projects, to benefit local communities and to enable companies to become world leaders in 
corporate social responsibility performance (CSR). 
 
The intended audience for e3 Plus includes: the exploration sector, local communities, 
government organisations, non-governmental organisations, civil society, academia or any 
interested party. 
 
The complete series of e3Plus courses includes the following titles: 
 
Principles and Guidance for Responsible Exploration 
Social Responsibility in Exploration 
Environmental Stewardship in Exploration 1 - 2 
Health and Safety in Exploration 1 - 4 
 
Students of these courses please note that the first course in the series, Principles and 
Guidance, must be studied before any of the other courses. 
 
Course Content 
Social Responsibility in Exploration covers the following principal topics: 
 
Part 1: Governance 
Part 2: Due Diligence and Community Engagement 
Part 3: Community Development and Ethical Conduct 
Part 4: Responsibilities and Human Rights 
 
This course is presented as 15 study sessions, each of approximately 60 minutes study 
duration, plus four interactive reviews that confirm the viewer's achievement of learning 
objectives. The total duration of the course is approximately 20 hours. Note that this course is 
designed to be studied at the Summary Level. The full e3Plus content is provided for 
reference purposes at the Detailed Text Level. 
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3) The Evolving Image of Mining 
 
Introduction 
This is a course for managers, professionals, students and concerned stakeholders in mining 
who require a better understanding of the impacts of mining on the environment and 
communities.The course discusses the underlying causes which have shaped the public's 
evolving perception of the mining industry and presents ways in which mining companies 
can overcome these perceptions. 
 
The following subjects are covered: 
Separating Fact from Fiction 
Characteristics of Mining 
Canadian Mining Facts 
Mining Images - OK Tedi, Porgera, Grasberg and others 
Public Perception of Mining 
Promotion of Mining 
Mining and Communities 
Adding Value to Communities 
 
Content 
The course is presented as 10 learning sessions, each of 30 to 60 minutes duration. It includes 
three interactive review sessions for verification of course learning objectives. Total course 
duration is equivalent to approximately 7 hours of learning content. 
 
 
 
4) Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights 
 
Introduction 
We frequently see in the news that a mining or an oil and gas operation in some remote area 
has been either attacked by insurgents or has had their security arrangements linked with a 
human rights incident. The extractive industries have the dual responsibility of protecting 
their people and operations as well as respecting the human rights of their employees and the 
members of the communities in which they work. Often operating in increasingly unstable 
areas and with human rights growing as a salient topic, industries face significant challenges 
in balancing these two crucial responsibilities. 
 
Developed jointly by industry, governments and non-governmental organisations (NGOs), 
the Voluntary Principles for Security and Human Rights (VPSHR) have increasingly become 
the industry guideline for achieving this balance. The VPSHR's three components provide a 
set of guiding principles on how companies should manage: 
 
risk assessments 
relations with public security forces 
relations with private security providers 
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This course introduces you to the VPSHR, discusses risk assessment in the context of 
providing a secure working environment and protecting the human rights of employees and 
surrounding communities, and responsibilities concerned with human rights abuse 
allegations and the procedures for managing those allegations. It goes on to discuss the roles 
and responsibilities of public and private security forces and their relationship to 
management. 
 
Course Content 
Voluntary Principles for Security and Human Rights is structured with seven course parts 
and a total of 25 viewing sessions of 30-60 minutes each, plus course reviews. Current course 
duration is equivalent to approximately 15 hours of viewing content. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
